HUMAN FACTOR RISK MANAGEMENT FOR MARITIME PILOTAGE OPERATIONS by Oraith, H
 
 
HUMAN FACTOR RISK MANAGEMENT FOR 
MARITIME PILOTAGE OPERATIONS 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Liverpool John 
Moores University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
     
 







                                           ABSTRACT 
In recent years, marine pilotage accidents occurring on a worldwide basis as a result 
of human error have not ceased to transpire, despite advances in technology and a 
significant set of international conventions, regulations, and recommendations to 
reduce them. Existing studies reveal that previous maritime risk and safety assessment 
findings provide valuable insights, but over the last decade, scarce information in 
terms of human factor studies specific to pilotage operations can be found. The risks 
and uncertainties in pilotage operations have yet to be fully explored. As a result, 
identifying, evaluating, and mitigating the human factor-related risks influencing the 
safety performance of pilotage operations is essential.   
The aim of this research project is to investigate the effect of human factors on pilotage 
operations, and to evaluate the impact of these factors on operators' performance; this 
last in turn may affect current pilotage operations by ultimately proposing an effective 
risk management framework, based on a decision-making analysis methodology.  
Firstly, human-related risk factors (HCFs) identification is conducted through a 
combination of primary and secondary sourced data.  A comprehensive literature 
review was carried out, and a considerable number of real past case examples and 
maritime accident/incidents investigation reports have been reviewed. In order to 
validate the identified risk factors (HCFs) and to explore other contributory factors, 
survey questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with domain experts have been 
conducted. An initial structural hierarchy diagram for the identified risk factors 
(HCFs) has been developed and validated through experienced experts belonging to 
the maritime sector. 
In order to assess the human causal factors (HCFs), a novel hybrid MCDM technique 
based on the combination of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Decision-
Making Trial and Evaluation (DEMATEL) methods is applied. The AHP is firstly 
used to evaluate the weight and rank the importance of the identified human causal 
factors that affect pilotage operation safety, while the DEMATEL method is applied 
to determine whether there are relationships among the factors. 
The key findings of the previous models assist the decision-making process by 
informing of appropriate measures for mitigating the risks influencing pilotage 
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operations. Risk mitigation measures are identified through literature review, the 
implemented regulation, rules, and recommendations adopted by IMO and other 
organizations and via experts’ perspectives, and then evaluated through the Technique 
for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS).     
The results of this study are beneficial to the maritime industry, by means of 
identifying a new database on causal factors contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
pilotage disasters. In addition, the study provides an effective risk factors assessment 
tool, and offers a diagnostic instrument to help implement effective risk reduction 
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                          CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents an overview of this thesis. The first section provides the 
background and justification for conducting the study, followed by the discussion of 
the research aim, objectives, and questions. The fourth and fifth sections outline the 
research framework (methodology, and the scope of the thesis) and the structure of 
this thesis, respectively. 
1.2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Over the past decades, the complicated nature of pilotage operations has challenged 
researchers in the maritime industry to research, design and develop models and 
mechanisms to improve maritime safety and to solve the complexity associated with 
maritime transportation related risks, in particular, pilotage maritime operations. In 
spite of the development of new technologies, the developments in the shipping 
industry, and the implementation of safety related regulations, the impact of maritime 
accidents has remained on average at about the same level (Corovic & Djurovic, 2013; 
Noroozi et al., 2014), and the safety level of various ship types has not significantly 
changed (Eliopoulou & Papanikolaou, 2016).  
Most authorities concerned with safety at sea reported that human element factors have 
now become one of the major causes of accidents. And most of these accidents occur 
in narrow channels, and during berthing and unberthing manoeuvres (Uğurlu et al., 
2015b), resulting in damage to the environment and property (Erol and Basar, 2015). 
There are many causes that can result in maritime accidents such as organisational, 
mechanical, and electrical problems, as well as external factors such as adverse 
weather conditions; however, studies estimate that around 80% of maritime accidents 
are attributable to human error (Uğurlu et al., 2015a). And according to Graziano et al 
(2016), 96.5 % of the errors have been performed on the Bridge where the main actor 
is involved. 
 Prominent international organizations involved in the maritime industry such as the 
IMO, ASME and NFPA, UNCTAD have been improving on maritime navigation 
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safety through recommendation of rules and regulations aimed at addressing previous 
accidents. However, accidents still occur and will continue to happen if proactive risk 
assessment is not practised in pilotage operations. Therefore, the way pilotage 
operations’ risk is assessed and managed should be in a proactive rather than reactive 
manner.   
Over the past decade little has changed and cases of collisions and ship grounding are 
regularly reported, where numerous instances provide evidence that many incidents 
that occur during pilotage can be attributed to human error (Mercator, 2012; Uğurlu et 
al., 2015). Murdoch et al. (2012) stated that since 2000, the standard I&P club has seen 
the annual cost of dock damage claims increase from approximately $3 million to $19 
million, and almost 70% of these claims came because of bad ship handling, errors 
due to ship control, fast speed, tug errors or pilot errors. According to Gill and Wahner 
(2012) captains of the ships, deck officers, and pilots have caused the major 
contributory factor for many maritime disasters. The complication and the difficulties 
that the mater represents today in the shipping industry in terms of structural 
adjustments, technological changes and operational requirements reveal the necessity 
for further research to address this issue. 
In spite of the presence of marine pilots on board ships to avoid human error involved 
in marine accidents, and to ensure the safety of navigation of visiting ships, it is 
however, a fact that a considerable number of accidents still occur (Gard, 2014). Gard 
(2014) reported that, in recent years, the number of maritime accidents occurring 
worldwide has been increasing, involving significant contact damage to fixed objects 
by vessels manoeuvring in confined waters, mostly within port. Fixed objects include 
berths, docks, locks and shore side equipment such as cranes. The contact damage has 
resulted in some very large claims for the repair and/or loss of use of such objects. 
These accidents have raised questions on how risk/ safety is reviewed in pilotage 
operations.  
Pilotage operations involve the management of high-risk situations that require intense 
concentration and high standard levels of competence and skills, Pilotage operations 
are categorised as one of the most complex tasks, which is predominantly performed 
under a dynamic and uncertain working environment, extreme weather conditions, and 
heavily congested areas.  Pilotage operations are liable to diverse risks due to their 
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interaction and interdependence, in addition, the multiplicity of the entities who are 
performing ships’ berthing operations. It is conducted by multiple operators with 
different responsibilities including the pilot, ship’s crewmembers, tugboats and 
mooring boat crews, VTC regulators and shoreline personnel, who are required to 
work cooperatively together as one team with the objective of guiding the ship safely 
to its berth (Murdoch et al. 2012).  
It is worth mentioning that, during pilotage operations, high levels of operational 
uncertainties exist. Especially when a shipmaster is unfamiliar with the pilotage area 
or the master may be entering the port for the first time or the port pilot is not qualified. 
It is therefore essential that operators maintain a consistently high standard of human 
performance in order to maintain the ship's piloting safety, as any decrease in 
performance can potentially lead to a disaster (CAMSS, 2012).  Pilotage safety 
performance at sea contributes to maritime safety and is of great importance to 
seafarers, the shipping industry and the international maritime organisations.  
The quality of performance and safety of ship's operations during pilotage operations 
has a significant effect on productivity, safety, and reputation of the port. Therefore, 
a system evaluation that includes the early detection of risks is critical in avoiding 
performance degradation and damage to human life or properties. Furthermore, 
accidents or disasters that would endanger the pilotage operations will be avoided if a 
robust evaluation system forecasting mechanism is developed and effectively 
enforced. 
Ships have changed over the years and ship handling has to evolve in line with these 
changes, e.g. ship sizes have increased whereas, ports have not always increased in 
size accordingly (Armstrong, 2007, p.1).  Handling a large vessel in congested and 
restricted areas, such as straits, canals, and docks, is high-risk, making pilotage 
operations more challenging and complex (Uğurlu, et al., 2016). According to Xi et 
al. (2017), the technological innovations, developments in the shipping industry, and 
the emergence of complex systems and Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), makes the 
consequences of disasters more and more serious. The incredible growth of 
international trade and the introduction of new technologies mean that shipping 
industry risks are evolving. The issue is complex, and there is an imperative need to 
focus on this issue in more detail.  
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A large tanker ship entering a harbour may collide with a breakwater at the entrance 
of a port as a result of a pilot's error, which can cause an environmental disaster. An 
accident that may occur in areas, such as straits, or canals, or docks, may cause heavy 
traffic to slow down or even stop the transportation and shipping, and could causes 
high economic damage to the countries of the region (Erol and Başar, 2015). For 
instance, one serious accident caused by the grounding or collision of ships at sea or 
upon entering the port because of human error can endanger the port, crew, ships, 
cargoes, and damage the maritime environment, causing huge financial impact on 
coastal countries and companies (David, 2008). One such recent disaster was the 
collision of the M/V Cosco Busan with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in 
2007, an accident that cost the vessel's operator and insurers more than $60 million in 
clean-up costs and claims damages (NTSB, 2009).  
In light of these considerations, and based on the above reasons, and the accidents 
described previously together with other disasters, the need for the maritime industry 
to improve its operations safety can be justified. It is now assumed that the assessment 
of the human related risk associated with pilotage operations, needs to be established 
in the maritime industry and threats to human performance must also be understood 
and mitigated to maintain pilotage operations safety, and achieve enhanced safety for 
international shipping and reduce consequent injuries, loss of life, and damage to the 
maritime environment and properties..   
Since the marine casualties, most frequently occur when ships are piloting in 
narrowing waters, such as ports, and channels, investigating the major contributory 
causes to human error, which play a central role in the causal chain of maritime 
accidents, is critical to mitigate threats to the marine pilotage operations. Thus, 
determining the human factor influence on ship navigation safety is becoming more 
and more important (Gerigk and Hejmlic, 2015). The human factor should be dealt 
with proactively, and more research on this topic should be conducted to reduce the 
risks of pilotage accidents.  
To tackle this issue, it is essential to understand what these risks are and how they 
influence the pilotage operations’ safety performance. The appropriate way to reduce 
the frequency and risk of maritime accidents is by identifying and mitigating the root 
causes of the accidents occurring in this region. In order to reach this aim, it is 
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necessary to consider how operators may contribute to causing these accidents, and 
how they may act to mitigate and escape from any accidents that do occur. As Dekker 
(2006) stated, in order to find the cause of an accident it is important to identify where 
people made incorrect assessments and wrong decisions.   
In this regard, the existing studies reveal that the findings of previous maritime risk/ 
safety assessments provide valuable insights. According to the literature review, there 
are a small number of studies specifically focused on the human factor risk assessment 
especially in pilotage operations. Nevertheless, the findings of the literature review 
reveals that the current human factor related risk analysing models are not capable of 
meeting challenges faced by maritime stakeholders. 
 The human related risks in the pilotage operations have yet to be fully explored. In 
addition, limited studies have examined the efficiency of the implemented mitigation 
measures in the maritime pilotage operations. Currently, the attention that is given to 
human related risk factors’ measurement in this area is limited and needs further 
investigation. Therefore, the research applications on pilotage operations safety 
performance is becoming more and more important  and should be emphasized to 
reduce the risks of accidents. The identification and mitigation of these risks is crucial 
as the successes or failures of the shipping industry can have far-reaching impacts on 
global trade and economy.  Therefore, this research presents a risk measurements tool 
and has developed a performance improvement framework, and decision-making 
techniques that are capable of finding solutions that will ensure safety and efficient 
performance of pilotage operations. 
1.2.1 Justification for conducting the research 
Providing high quality and safe port service that meet the needs of customers lead to 
increase the port attractiveness to attract shipping carriers to berth at the port and 
enhance the port competitiveness (Ding et al., 2019).  Therefore, the research 
applications on pilotage operations safety are becoming more and more important and 
should be emphasized to reduce the risks of accidents. As mentioned in the previous 
section, in the last decade the ships have not only become larger and faster, but there 
has also been a big increase in the numbers, resulting in more vessel traffic, 
particularly in ports and their vicinity (Hsu, 2012). Consequently, marine disasters are 
more likely in such waters causing loss of lives, damage to vessels and cargo, and 
6 
 
damage to the maritime environment (Pak et al., 2015). Any of the aforementioned 
reasons would be sufficient to justify the need for the maritime industry to examine 
the impact of the human elements on maritime safety. 
 On the whole the above concerns indicate that pilotage operations safety at sea is of 
great importance to all the parties interested in the maritime industry and the research 
applications on the human factor are becoming more and more important and should 
be emphasized to reduce the risks of pilotage accidents. On the other hand, the problem 
facing maritime stakeholders who are professionals in assessing and managing human 
related risks regarding the pilotage operations is the lack of a model that approximates 
the risk management realities of the field and confusion over terminology, approaches 
and methods in the discipline. There is an imperative need to form a generic 
framework that can highlight the human errors and pilotage operations’ safety issues 
facing marine professionals.  
In recent years many research projects, regarding the maritime risk management issue 
have been conducted from several aspects, by using different methods in order to 
reduce the occurrence of maritime accidents in open sea areas, however it appears 
from a review of the literature that little research has been done in the maritime domain 
on issues related to the pilotage operation safety analysis issue, and until now, few 
studies have employed an appropriate evaluation method to examine how human 
factors contribute to the maritime pilotage accidents.  
The incapability of traditional methods in addressing human-related risk factors in 
pilotage operations reveals a necessity for more practical research and a new approach 
in order to ensure proper implementation of the risk quantification and mitigation 
methods. There is a distinct need for a new human-related measurement tool not only 
to meet the need of port stakeholders but also to develop diagnostic instruments to port 
and pilotage systems capable of supporting decision-making in solving complex 
pilotage operations problems in an uncertain environment.  
The problem with the previous studies is that they could conclude that all risks or 
challenges could be considered “critical” or “important”, when the respondents were 
assessing each of them separately. Therefore, a ranking is missing to reflect the 
perceived degree of importance of risk factors in relation to each other. Without such 
ranking, stakeholders are not able to determine the relative importance of factors and 
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will have difficulties in determining the right strategies to overcome them. Therefore, 
in order to solve this problem, and to produce more realistic and reliable results, this 
study aims at introducing a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method, to 
overcomes the shortcomings of the previous studies by introducing a new approach to 
identify the relative importance among accidents’ human causal factors in maritime 
pilotage operations, by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into 
consideration.  
Another limitation of the previous studies is that in recent years, international maritime 
authorities, scholars and practitioners have made a significant amount of effort to 
evaluate the human factor in order to identify root causes of human error and accident 
causations in the shipping transportation industry in order to improve safety at sea; 
however, most of these researches frequently neglected to evaluate the causal 
relationships among the human factors that contributed to the pilotage accidents, and 
few of these studies focused on analysing the interaction between accident causation 
factors using MCDM method. Therefore, in order to solve this problem this thesis 
presents a new method which has the capability of effectively quantifying the causal 
relationships and interdependence among factors. The method could also be used to 
estimate, and assimilate the relationships and interdependencies among human factor 
variables involved in other transportation systems and industrial fields. 
At the substantive level, there exists a gap in knowledge about this issue. Similarly, at 
the academic level there is a need for more-practical research to find out the 
justification for the existence of the risk management and different methods for its 
proper implementation on this significant environment particularly with due regard to 
the potential requirements in the near future. This is a research gap that has not yet 
been intensely examined and needs to be addressed. This study, therefore, aims to 
propose a new comprehensive framework for identifying assessing, mitigating the 
human factors related risk affecting maritime pilotage operations safety, using a 
decision- making methods.  
1.3. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this research project is to propose a novel conceptual human-related risk 
management framework based on a decision-making analysis methodology for 
identifying, assessing, and mitigating the human factors affecting the maritime 
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pilotage operations safety. The developed conceptual framework provides an 
integrated and effective human-related risk factors assessment tool and offers a 
diagnostic instrument to reduce human error, enhance the maritime pilotage safety 
performance and thus subsequently mitigating maritime accidents. 
The aims specified above, can be addressed by achieving the following objectives:  
• To carry out a literature search on human related risk factor associated within 
maritime pilotage operations.  
• To develop a conceptual framework, to identify and develop a taxonomy for the 
human causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents 
• To establish an innovative human causal factors quantification method to evaluate 
the weight and rank the human causal factors using Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
• To develop an innovative method using a Decision Making Trial and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMATEL) technique to investigate the relationships between human 
causal factors 
• To develop a model for the selection of the most ideal risk mitigation strategy, based 
on the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal situation (TOPSIS).    
• To examine the proposed methods by the use of various case studies in some of the 
major ports and pilotage areas of the UK and Mediterranean. 
This thesis, therefore, raises the following research questions and will answer them at 
the end of this research.  
1.4. GENERAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the research background aforementioned, this study aims to provide an effective 
human factor quantification tool, and offer a diagnostic instrument to pilotage 
operations to satisfy the port stakeholders in a flexible manner. In this regard, in order 
to ensure that the research objectives are met and for providing a base for activities in 
this research, the following questions have been generated:  
 RQ1.What are the risk factors (human element/ human factor) causing 
maritime pilotage accidents and how can they be identified and classified 
(develop a taxonomy)? 
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 RQ2. What are the most appropriate and useful methods to assess the most 
significant identified human related risk factors and how can they be used? 
 RQ3. How can the identified human factors risk be prioritised and ranked?  
 RQ4. What are relationships and interactions between human factors and 
how are these factors influencing each other?  
 RQ5. How can the identified human related risk factors be mitigated and 
controlled? What are the risk mitigation measures (risk control options) that 
can be implemented to control and improve the performance of bridge staff 
involved in the execution of pilotage operations?   
To answer the above questions, and based on the proposed conceptual framework, the 
three steps risk management process (i.e. human-related risk factors identification, 
assessment, and mitigation) as the main guideline to structure the research process is 
employed. This process is needed not just to meet the needs of interested stakeholders, 
but also to enrich the diagnostic tools available to support decision-making in complex 
pilotage operations in an uncertain maritime environment. 
What are the human factor related risks causing maritime pilotage accidents and how 
can they be identified and classified (develop a taxonomy)? 
“The human factor is a complex, multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety 
and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire spectrum of human 
activities performed by a ship's crew, shore-based management, regulatory bodies, 
recognised organisations, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant parties, all of 
whom need to cooperate to address human element issues effectively”(IMO, 2003). 
Human factors refer to human and individual characteristics, which influence 
behaviour at work in a way that can affect safety. In this study, much emphasis will 
be placed on operational aspects, including the human factor-related risks which have 
an impact on the operators who are responsible for executing pilotage operations. 
According to Berg et al (2013), the human factor plays a significant role in maritime 
safety. Therefore, managing the human factor that affects maritime safety is an 




The first objective of this study is to develop a comprehensive human factor related 
risks identification and classification methodology within the context of the maritime 
pilotage operations. The procedure for risk factors identification is one of the most 
significant steps in pilotage safety/risk assessment process. Risk identification enables 
decision makers to classify the contributory causal factors that can lead to maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. Risk classification enables complexity to be 
simplified (Ugurlu et al., 2015). In addition, it facilitates the evaluation and helps risk 
managers to understand the events and the circumstances from which they arise (Pak 
et al., 2015). 
There are different types of human factors that can contribute to maritime accidents 
during pilotage operations. Furthermore, there are different methods and techniques 
for their identification. The investigation should not be limited only to identify the 
causes already known. The investigation must be carried out for potential causes which 
may lead to accidents in future but have not happened yet. It must be ensured that all 
the human causal factors are identified. Taking into consideration the ones which have 
previously occurred. There are different tools and techniques to do this. This study 
adopts more than one method to collect data and provide extra evidence of the human 
factors affecting maritime pilotage operations safety.  
In this research identifying the human causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents 
was accomplished through a combination of primary and secondary source data. 
Firstly, a comprehensive literature review related to the study was carried out. A 
detailed literature review is critical and extremely essential to research work, which 
must not only be comprehensive but also has to be up to date. The benefit of 
conducting this literature review is that it can assist to review previous relevant studies 
related to human factors and their impact on maritime accidents. It saves time and cost 
as the required data is previously searched and available (Saunders et al., 2007).   
In addition, because obtaining primary data about an accident that has occurred in the 
past is practically impossible, using accident and incidents reports as a secondary 
source of data is unavoidable (Mazaheri et al., 2013; Mazaheri et al., 2015). In this 
research a considerable number of real past case examples and an analysis of the 
maritime accident investigations reports regarding pilotage operations events that 
occurred between 1995 and 2015 have been reviewed and examined. These reports 
11 
 
were investigated by expert accident investigators and published by countries and 
relevant institutions and organisations such as, the Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch (MAIB) of the United Kingdom, the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) of the United States of America, and the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB). Accident investigation reports are considered to be one of the most 
reliable sources of evidence to identify the root causes of the ships’ accidents 
(Mazaheri et al., 2015). These issues will be further discussed in the literature review 
in Chapter two.  
The main philosophy of reviewing and studying examples from past marine 
incident/accident, is to obtain an understanding of the concept of accidents, to figure 
out how they happen, to determine the causes and contributory factors which may 
negatively influence mooring operations safety and play a central role in the causal 
chain of maritime accidents. As Graziano et al. (2016) concluded “Accidents analysis 
provides important information on the root causes of marine accidents in specific 
locations and conditions”. Learning reasons for accidents should assist others to learn 
lessons from them, what went wrong and how to avoid recurrence of similar accidents 
in the future. Thus, determining the root causes of the accidents is extremely important 
in mitigating the likelihood of their occurring in the future (Ugurlu et al., 2015).  
The study is not all about the investigation of a particular previous accident. Revealing 
pilotage operations’ associated risks, is not an easy task, especially when the process 
is proactively based. And due to the lack of data, the use of domain experts’ knowledge 
is required to overcome this challenge. An empirical study has been conducted, 
interviews, and survey questionnaires with maritime experts were carried out through 
which it will be possible to explore and identify the other potential risk factors which 
may contribute to pilotage accidents in the future. After having identified the causal 
factors of the pilotage accidents, an initial structural hierarchy risk taxonomic diagram 
is developed, and then validated through experienced experts belonging to the 
maritime sector.  Chapter 4 will be dedicated to developing an appropriate 
methodology framework to identify and classify the human causal factors contributing 
to pilotage accidents. 
What are the most appropriate and useful methods to assess the identified human 
related risk factors and how can they be used? 
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The objectives of the above questions rely on widely used decision-making techniques 
such as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Decision Making Trial and Evaluation 
Laboratory (DEMATEL), and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS). For the application of any specific risk-based model on the 
pilotage operations environment there will be a need to use expert judgements and to 
use knowledge-based decision support systems. The decisions are usually made on 
multiple uncertain attributes. As a result, this study needs to deal with the uncertainties 
of data which are mostly unavoidable in pilotage operational contexts. Furthermore, 
given the complexity of pilotage operations, knowledge of human factor influences is 
critical to understand and mitigate threats to performance. In addition, decision makers 
may require an essential understanding of the interdependence relationships among 
the identified risk factors and develop appropriate solutions to reduce their impact and 
improve pilotage operations’ safety  
The evaluations of human causal factors, their importance, relationships, and selection 
of an appropriate measures to ensure the pilotage operations safety is a crucial decision 
for many stakeholders including port managers, ship-owners, surveyors, and safety 
engineers. The determination process of human factors in maritime pilotage accident 
should have the technical ability of handling complex multidimensional factors with 
scientifically acceptable methodology. Therefore, identification, evaluating, and 
mitigation of maritime pilotage accident caused by human errors is a kind of multiple 
criteria decision-making (MCDM) problem and requires MCDM methods to solve it 
(Özdemir et al., 2015). Consequently, in this study, in order to handle the problem 
appropriately, MCDM methods, AHP, DEMATEL, and the TOPSIS are employed. 
MCDM is considered one of the most significant types of decision making studies. 
MCDM is a procedure that facilitates decision making processes, such as choosing, 
ranking or sorting actions. Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) methods have 
been applied by many researchers and practitioners for evaluating, assessing and 
ranking alternatives across diverse industries (Behzadian et al., 2012). Consequently, 
in this study, in order to handle the problem appropriately, MCDM methods, AHP, 
DEMATEL, and TOPSIS are employed. The MCDM techniques have been used 
because the scope of this research is to select from a predetermined number of decision 
alternatives on a set of attributes for a defined objective 
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 In such a process of complex group MCDM, ambiguous and incomplete data are 
usually presented in different quantitative and qualitative forms. According to Yoon 
and Gyutal (1989), MCDM is “technical decision aids for evaluating alternatives 
which are characterised by multiple attributes”. The attributes represent the different 
dimensions from which the alternatives can be viewed. Most critical situations that 
use MCDM problems in engineering practice are characterised by both quantitative 
and qualitative attributes with various types of uncertainties. In many circumstances, 
the attributes, especially in qualitative forms may only be properly assessed by human 
judgment, which is subjective in nature and is inevitably associated with uncertainties.  
From the above discussion, the quantification of human errors can be viewed as a 
typical multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) problem under uncertainty as it 
involves multiple criteria of both quantitative and qualitative features to solve multi-
criteria and complicated problems. The aforementioned techniques are based on the 
principle of the higher the weights, the more desirable the alternatives. The 
weights/ratings assigned to criteria are mostly obtained through subjective judgments 
and the scores are synthesised as a single value for each alternative to select the best 
solution from the alternatives. However, MCDM problems can be often assessed 
imprecisely due to uncertain and incomplete data related to different quantitative and 
qualitative determinants. 
In order to tackle the problem, a hybrid approach of two or more methodologies that 
are already proven to be successfully applicable for dealing with MCDM problems 
under uncertainty has shown more appropriate applications. In this research, a hybrid 
approach of AHP and TDEMATEL for solving MCDM problems under fuzzy 
environment was applied to address the choice of to human factors that affect pilotage 
operation safety. Using a combination of both subjective approaches of utilizing expert 
judgment to select appropriate criteria could reduce the effects of ambiguity that arose 
from using information from human judgment and preferences. 
In this study AHP method has been used to compare the importance or rating of a 
criterion against that of other criteria at the same level in the hierarchy decision. The 
fundamental criteria scale for the expert judgment was used in the pairwise 
comparison matrices, because it is already in the fuzzy form (Saaty, 2008a).  In this 
methodology, to deal with the uncertainty of human thoughts and expressions, 
14 
 
linguistic terms has been used in making decisions and the assessment grades. 
Linguistic terms are expressed by fuzzy numbers. In addition, to confirm the 
consistency of the pairwise judgement (judgement reliability), the consistency 
verification is employed, which is considered as one of the most important tasks of the 
AHP approach. The application of the fuzzy theory was introduced by Zadeh (1965) 
to express the linguistic terms used in the decision-making process in order to 
determine the existence of uncertainty and subjectivity of human judgment. The fuzzy 
theory has been preferred to assist in the selection of appropriate criteria because the 
fuzzy approach allows for the uncertainty of expert judgment to be taken into 
consideration.  
How can the identified related risk factors be prioritised and ranked? And what are 
the relationships and interactions between human factors and how are these risk 
factors an influence on each other?  
This research adopts a mixed approach, it is uses an MCDM approach as a data 
analysis technique. In the MCDM applications, the evaluations of human causal 
factors and their importance are conducted. The causal relationships and potential 
interactions among the selected human factors are also investigated. Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied to determine the relative weights and rank the 
importance of the selected human factors that affect pilotage operation safety, while 
the DEMATEL method is applied to identify whether there are relationships among 
these factors. A mixed approach that uses different techniques and data sources in the 
same study can offset weaknesses in each. The combination of various methods (i.e. a 
hybrid approach) can yield more powerful decision-making support tools in MCDM 
problems. Therefore, this research applying a mixed methodology (i.e. hybrid 
approach). 
The aforementioned methodologies facilitate the decision-making process for 
identifying the most important risk factors influencing the safety of maritime pilotage 
operations, and provide a comprehensive illustration of relationships among the 
factors and offer insightful understanding of the mutual influence among the risk 
factors to be managed. The key findings of the previous methods assist the decision-
making process for choosing appropriate measures in later stages for mitigating the 
risks influencing pilotage operations, and prevent the occurrence of a similar 
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incident/accident to the one investigated from reoccurring. Chapters 5 will be 
dedicated to developing appropriate decision- making frameworks to evaluate the 
human causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents. 
How can the identified human related risk factors be mitigated and controlled? What 
are the main risk mitigation measures to be considered?   
After the pilotage related risks factors were identified and assessed in order to manage 
and control the risks, an appropriate decision-making method is employed to select 
the most ideal measures for their mitigation. The proposed risk mitigation model for 
pilotage operations enable us to choose optimal risk mitigation measures which are 
deemed to be an important and necessary step in pilotage operations’ safety 
improvement, and mitigating maritime accidents. The list of implemented risk 
mitigation measures (RMMs) to improve the pilotage operations’ safety is identified 
through a literature review, rules and regulations adopted by maritime authorities, and 
via marine experts’ perspectives. Afterwards, in order to obtain feasible alternatives 
(mitigation/control options), the identified risk mitigation measures are prioritized and 
selected. The selection is addressed by the adoption of the TOPSIS model.  
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The previous literature review indicated that there is lack of knowledge about how to 
control risks in the maritime pilotage operations. Specifically, there is a lack of human 
related risk management framework in pilotage operations as a guidance or foundation 
which would support decision makers in the achievement of efficient risk 
management. According to Harris (2000), the ultimate objective of managing the risks 
is the capability of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risk factors in which any 
company or industry is involved. In view of this, the research methodology of this 
study aims to develop a comprehensive framework for identifying, assessing, and 
mitigating the human factors related risks in maritime pilotage operations.  
The proposed framework offers valuable insight to find optimal solutions for effective 
risk control to improve the pilotage operations’ performance, and ensure that safety 
measures can be taken to reduce the potential human errors that may occur during 
maritime pilotage operations in real-world practice, and thus subsequently preventing 
or at least mitigating maritime accidents in the future. The research framework of this 
thesis is shown in Figure 1.1. 
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Maritime risk and safety are very broad research topics. This research focuses only on 
the evaluation of the impact of the human factor related risk on the safety of pilotage 
operations. In addition, it examines the currently implemented risk mitigation 
measures in this uncertain environment. The research will begin by reviewing 
literature articles, official documentation and other published materials related with 
pilotage incidents/accidents from reliable organisations to establish the need for 
carrying out human errors related risk research in pilotage operations to prevent or 
mitigate maritime accidents.  
In conducting research on the riskiness related to pilotage and pilotage safety 
performance, much emphasis will be placed on operational aspects, including the 
human factors which have an impact on the pilots, assistant parties, and ship’s 
crewmembers’ performance (personnel who are responsible for executing pilotage 
operations) which in turn may affect the normal pilotage operations, leaving other risk 
aspects influencing pilotage safety such as organizational, management, policy 
implications, and natural and political issues to be addressed in future work. The 
reason this research is focused on the human factor only is that it is evident from the 
literature review that the human element has proven to be a major contributory factor 
for many maritime accidents and the majority of these accidents have been caused by 
ship’s captain, ship’s crew members, pilots, and assistant parties’ errors. Examples 
come from data from a number of sources (Tzannatos, 2010), (Murdoch et al. 2012), 
(Gill and Wahner, 2012), (Akhtar and Utne, 2014), (Gard, 2014) and (MAIB, 2015).  
Relevant literature review is used as a base to identify the human factors contributing 
to pilotage maritime accidents (HCFs). The historical data that has been utilized for 
this study is the accident reports of the maritime accidents/ incidents investigations 
reports prepared by different maritime organisation. However, as a result of lack of 
data, and in order to validate the HCFs that were extracted from the existing resources, 
and to explore other contributory factors and potential causes which may contribute to 
accidents in future that have not been mentioned in the literature and other 
documentation, another source of data is used in the form of expert knowledge. The 
expert knowledge for this study is acquired as a primary source via survey 
questionnaire and interviews with domain experts. 
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This study adopts more than one method to collect data and provide extra evidence of 
the human factors affecting maritime pilotage operations’ safety. Data was collected 
via survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews with experienced experts 
from both academic and industrial fields. This step was employed to better understand 
the role of humans in accident causation and ensure that all the causal factors 
contributing to pilotage accidents are identified. Questionnaires were designed and 
tested with the results being used to modify the contents. Ethical approval was also 
obtained to further validate questionnaire contents and participant consent. The 
questionnaires were then distributed via either emails or offline with a cover letter and 
content form to the targeted experts. The final questionnaire is shown in appendix II. 
After having identified the contributory factors of the pilotage accidents and based on 
previous maritime safety studies related with human factors and risk classification, 
with assistance of ship’s masters and academic experts with education level PhD 
degree from an educational institution, staff who have more than 10 years teaching 
and researching experience and have a good understanding of marine operations risk 
research, a hierarchal structure as a taxonomy is initially constructed. Thereafter, in 
order to validate the developed hierarchy a series of email questionnaires were 
distributed and face-to-face interviews were conducted.  
The geographical focus of the research within this thesis are a major ports and pilotage 
area located in the United Kingdom (UK), and Miditerraiian. Experienced experts 
were requested to participate and share their expertise in identifying and evaluating 
data for technical models in the research. In order to reduce the individual researcher 
bias (Oppermann, 2000), the participants of this study were selected from a variety of 
backgrounds and different geographical areas within the maritime industry. In order 
to obtain views on a wider scale and to get multiple points of view, the participants 
included ships’ captains who had served long periods onboard different types of ships 
which are navigating and visiting worldwide sea ports, experienced senior marine 
pilots, and tug masters who had been working long periods in different ports 
companies.  
Furthermore, senior marine risk consultants, and academics from maritime 
educational institution staff with rich knowledge and experience of risk assessment 
and questionnaire surveys, flag state administration officials, insurance and port 
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company managers who are professionals in assessing and managing risks, and who 
could provide factual information and broader data regarding causes of human errors 
that might occur during pilotage operations, and technical information and opinions 
on the research topic. All the criteria mentioned above ensures that the professionals 
are sufficiently senior and knowledgeable to answer the questions and are able to 
provide a good insight and valuable comments to all aspects of the survey.  
For the purpose of assessing the human related risk factors, it is essential to measure 
the human factors contribute to the maritime pilotage accidents by determining their 
priority weighting and evaluating their inter-relationships. Other questionnaire 
surveys (risk assessment survey) were conducted and analysed using a mixed 
methodology (i.e. hybrid approach) Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Decision-
Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL). AHP has been applied to rank 
and identify the importance of the HCF and DEMATEL has been utilised to evaluate 
the causal relationships among interdependent HCFs. This thesis presents decision 
making techniques that are capable of finding optimal solutions that will ensure safety 
of pilotage operations. 
In order to identify the relevant risk mitigation measures with regard to the identified 
risk factors, the current implemented measures in the real-time context and the rules 
and regulations adopted by maritime organizations were reviewed. In order to explore 
other mitigation measures that have not been mentioned in the literature and other 
documentation further questionnaire surveys were conducted. TOPSIS (Technique for 
Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) was then used to analyse the data 
and rank the relative importance of those risk mitigation measures. The safety 





Figure 1.1 Research framework in this study 
 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of seven chapters to achieve the major research objectives.  
Chapter One – Introduction:  
This chapter outlines a general overview of the research background and justification, 
aim, objectives, and the generated research questions, the scope of research, and 
methodological approach and structure of this thesis. It briefly reviews the requirement 




Chapter Two – Literature review:  
This chapter comprehensively reviews the literature on the concepts of safety in 
maritime transportation, intensive literature search on human related errors and main 
sources of risk factors (human related risk factors) and its effect on pilotage operations 
safety, the status of risk management in the maritime shipping operations context and 
their development as well as an analysis of the maritime accident investigations reports 
regarding pilotage operations events. This chapter discusses the current existing 
studies in association with human factors, and assesses the current knowledge on 
human factors and their effect on pilotage operations safety performance. The 
efficiency of currently implemented pilotage risk mitigation strategies in the maritime 
organizations. Eventually, some research gaps are found out, particularly concerning 
the pilotage operations human-related risks in the maritime sector.  
Chapter Three – Research methodology: This chapter details the research 
methodology adopted, philosophy, approach, strategies and choices that established 
the fundamental for the research work. After defining the overall research design, the 
chapter looks to justify the methodological choices to meet the research objectives by 
outlining the application of data collection and analysis methods.  
Chapter Four – causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents identification: This 
chapter presents the first step of the human factors related risk assessment process, i.e. 
the human factors affecting maritime pilotage operations safety identification. In order 
to expand the coverage of the risk factors identification and classify the unstructured 
risk factors, this chapter reviews relevant literature and other published materials 
involved with the human causal factors that contribute to maritime accidents, surveys, 
face-to-face and telephone interviews with professional experts belonging to various 
sectors of the maritime industry have been conducted. Based on the survey results, the 
hierarchical structure of identified risk factors is developed, modified and further 
validated through a serial of email and face-to-face interviews with the experts.  
Chapter five – maritime pilotage operations risk assessment: This chapter introduces 
the second phase of the risk management framework. This chapter focuses on the 
assessment of identified human factors influencing the safety of maritime pilotage 
operations (HCFs), using a hybrid approach of two methodologies. It illustrates second 
and third-round questionnaire surveys conducted by empirical studies, where the data 
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collected are analysed using AHP and DEMATEL methods. This is carried out to 
determine the relative weights of the risk factors identified and highlight the 
interrelationships between factors. First, the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) is 
applied to determine the relative weights and rank the importance of the human factors 
that affect pilotage operation safety, and then the DEMATEL method is applied to 
identify whether there are relationships among the factors and which factors have 
influence on other factors. 
  Chapter Six – Identification and evaluation of risk mitigation measures: Instead of 
identifying the mitigation measures based just on the literature review, this research 
focuses on the current implemented measures and identifies them through the rules 
and regulations adopted by maritime organizations and via expert perspectives from 
both UK, Mediterranean, and other maritime industries. The significant levels of the 
identified risk mitigation measures are evaluated and ranked by using a TOPSIS 
method.  
Chapter Seven – Conclusion: This chapter summarises the overall results and findings 
of this study. It also suggests the limitations of this thesis and provides the direction 
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                             CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, to review previous relevant studies related to human factors and their 
impact on maritime accidents, a comprehensive and carful literature review was 
carried out. The literature was used to provide background information and an 
understanding of the field. This review of the literature will concentrate on the type of 
human factors that influence pilotage performance and contribute to accidents during 
pilotage operations. The significance of carrying out an analytical literature review is 
critical to the success of this study, as this helped the researcher to use new and 
appropriate methods to fill the gaps in this area and contribute to the development of 
better policies and more effective preventative measures to improve maritime pilotage 
safety.  
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Maritime safety in the last few decades has become one of the most significant issues 
in the maritime industry. Since the known disaster of the passenger ship, Titanic, 
where there where 1,502 fatalities, the greatest challenge and the largest problems 
facing the maritime industry, according to reports, is human error (Corovic and 
Djurovic, 2013). The human errors are the basic and by far the major cause of maritime 
accidents, where 80% of all maritime accidents are caused by human error (IMO, 
2011). As Graziano et al. (2016) stated, the human factor has been considered as 
contributing to most marine casualties. It is estimated that most of maritime accidents 
can be attributed to human error. Therefore, investigating of human factors and their 
contribution to accidents is essential. 
In recent years many research projects regarding the maritime safety and maritime 
transportation-related risks have been conducted from a range of perspectives and 
several aspects including hundreds of articles and reports, however, few studies have 
examined how the human factors contribute to the maritime pilotage accidents, and 
until now, very few works of literature has been produced in the maritime domain on 
issues related to human factors and the pilotage operation safety issue. Therefore, 




Due to the lack of data regarding this area this literature review is restricted to 
researches that have investigated similar themes and applied similar methodologies 
which attempted to examine the effect of human factors on maritime safety, determine 
the main contributory factors of the accident, and to provide a solution for evaluating 
causes of accidents in the marine industry. The purpose of this literature review is to 
present previous studies that have been conducted related to the human factors in 
shipping operations, and their impact on maritime safety with a particular emphasis 
on pilotage operations. Understanding how the research area has developed in the past 
can help researchers to target the right directions for their research and assist with the 
formulation of new policies and practices to reduce future maritime accidents. (Luo 
and Shin, 2016).  
 The literature review provides significant data and information to this study and it is 
envisaged, “to provide a historical perspective of the respective research area and an 
in-depth account of independent research endeavours” (Colicchio and Strozzi, 2012). 
This chapter reviews the fundamental elements which make a valuable contribution to 
every step of the research pathway.  It discloses, clarifies and exemplifies the structure 
of problems related to human factors and their effect on pilotage operations safety.  
The information has been sourced from academic journals, newspapers, books, and 
consultancy reports. 
In this chapter, the literature related to the study is reviewed. The concept of pilotage 
operations and the human factor are described. The role of `human factor in maritime 
accidents at sea is outlined and past case examples of real pilotage accidents, including 
human errors, and unsafe acts caused by pilots and ship crew members and their 
impact on maritime safety is also discussed in this Chapter. The international rules, 
regulations, and the recommendations which have been adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization, and presented by other organizations, in order to ensure 
maritime pilotage safety are presented. Existing human factor and maritime accident-
related methodology and various studies which have been conducted on the role of the 
human factor in the marine environment are discussed. 
2.3 THE CONCEPT OF THE PILOTAGE OPERATIONS 
Pilotage can be defined in number of ways relating to the nature of the pilotage act. 
For instance, harbour or port pilotage might refer to pilotage involving guiding a vessel 
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into or out of a port. This can also be known as sea pilotage. Coastal-based pilotage is 
understood in some countries to be where a vessel is guided by pilot along the coast 
and not necessarily into or out of a port or harbour in that country. Deep-sea piloting 
is a pilotage that takes place in the North Sea, the English Channel, and Baltic Sea, 
and is subject to the requirements of IMO Resolution A.480v and A.486. UK pilotage 
is governed under the 1987 Pilotage Act as amended. According to UKMPA (2012),  
the English law, section 742 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which still stands 
today under current legislation, a pilot is defined as “any person not belonging to a 
ship who has the conduct thereof”.  
Maritime pilotage is managing of high-risk situations and complex tasks that requires 
intense concentration and high skill levels (CAMSS, 2012).  It is worth mentioning 
that, during pilotage operations, high levels of operational uncertainties exist, 
particularly when the weather is adverse or the ship is very large. Consequently, this 
will put pressure on the master at the peak and lead him to make his own assumptions 
on how the approach to the berth should be handled, especially when a shipmaster is 
unfamiliar with the area, or entering the port for the first time (Armstrong, 2007, p.8). 
Therefore, “Compulsory Pilotage in port areas is the principal risk mitigation measure 
available to ensure the safety of navigation of visiting ships; the safety of passengers 
and crews; the protection of the various environments: port, marine, riparian and 
littoral; the safety of other vessels navigating in the same waters and the overall 
efficiency and commercial success of the port” (UKMPA, 2012).  
The importance of employing qualified pilots in approaches to ports and other areas 
where specialised local knowledge is required was formally recognized by IMO in 
1968, when the organisation adopted the Assembly Resolution A.159 (ES.IV) 
recommendation on pilotage. The resolution recommends that governments organise 
pilotage services where they would be likely to prove more effective than other 
measures and to define the ships and classes of ships for which employment of a pilot 
would be mandatory. Qualified pilots are usually employed by the local port or 
maritime administration and provide their services to ships for a fee, calculated in 
relation to the ship's tonnage, draught or other criteria.  
 “Pilots with local knowledge have been employed onboard ships for centuries to guide 
vessels into or out of port safely or wherever navigation may be considered hazardous, 
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particularly when a shipmaster is unfamiliar with the area” (IMO, 2016). In addition 
to local knowledge and expertise which reduces risks of navigating in constrained 
waterways, marine pilots are able to provide effective communication with the shore 
and tugs, often in the local language. Pilots should be experts and skilful ship handlers 
who guide ships through dangerous or congested waters, such as harbours or river 
mouths, give expert advice to the master concerning navigation, berthing and un-
berthing conditions, and complete the berthing and un-berthing operation of the ships 
by controlling the ship's manoeuvrability directly and the tugs and shore linesmen 
through a radio. “The pilot is not simply a navigation adviser. In law the pilot has 
conduct of the navigation of the ship which involves a multitude of tasks and 
responsibilities” (UKMPA, 2012).  
Maritime pilots play a critical role in ensuring the safe navigation of vessels (Hsu, 
2012). Therefore, the pilot should ensure that he is adequately rested prior to an act of 
pilotage, in good physical and mental fitness and not under the effect of drugs or 
alcohol. The pilot and ship’s master are responsible for the safety of navigation of the 
vessel piloting, as well as for other ships they may encounter, wharves, locks and 
docks. Indeed, the situation is that the ship master remains in charge of the ship and 
the pilot is in charge of handling the ship. A marine pilot assigned to that task has a 
responsibility to the state, the port authority and the ship’s master, however, according 
to the IMO regulations, his presence onboard does not exempt the Master and the 
OOW from their duties and responsibilities for the ship’s safety.  
The relationship between ship’s captain and pilot has always been a delicate one; it 
should be one of mutual trust and respect (Armstrong, 2007, p.8). There should be a 
sense of increased confidence when the pilot comes on board the vessel. Not only does 
the pilot bring local expertise that reduces the risk of navigation in confined waters.  
(CAMSS, 2012). But the pilot comes up on the bridge expecting to be a part of the 
bridge team. How the master and the pilot meet and greet each other is the key to how 
the rest of the passage and manoeuvring will be, it is very important that the chemistry 
between the pilot and ship’s master is good. Otherwise it might lead to dangerous 





2.4 HUMAN FACTOR/HUMAN ERROR  
A study on human factors to reduce human factor influencing the safety of operations 
of a complex system, was established in the 1950s (Subramaniam, 2010), however, 
the early work on the human-related risk assessment in maritime transport has been 
changed, and the scientists in the maritime field came to recognize that the old ways 
that have been used in past decades did not provide good system performance and are 
not capable of meeting challenges faced by maritime stakeholders. Furthermore, they 
also realized the need for new approaches for identification and quantification of 
human errors to verify various risks within a system, where the human factor has 
emerged as a major concern in maritime safety research and has become increasingly 
one of the most important maritime safety issues, as it has been widely acknowledged 
to be the most frequent cause that leads towards marine accidents.  
As has been mentioned previously, “When discussing maritime safety, the term human 
element or human factor plays a crucial role” (Berg et al., 2013). There is no 
established international definition of the term, but according to IMO (2003), the 
human element is a complex, multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety and 
marine environmental protection. Human factor is considered as one of the most 
important contributors to the causation and avoidance of accidents (Subramaniam, 
2010). Therefore, it is strategically important to carry out human factor evaluation in 
the shipping industry. Investigating human factors contributing to maritime accidents 
is of key importance for maritime policy and management, and highly required 
(Macrae, 2009). According to Özdemir and Guneroglu (2015), studying of the human 
factor and accident analysis has recently become a significant research topic among 
maritime professionals and scientists.  
One of the ways to improve a human performance is by incorporating human elements, 
which can be achieved by carrying out human performance analyses and mitigating 
potential human errors within the system. According to Sanders and McCormick 
(1993), human error is an inappropriate or unacceptable human decision or action that 
degrades efficiency, safety or system performance. Safahani (2009) stated that, human 
error is a general term, which covers a variety of unsafe acts, omissions, behaviours, 
and unsafe conditions or a combination of these. Rothblum (2000) defined human 
error as incorrect decision, improperly performed action, or an improper lack of action.  
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(Rudan et al. (2012) describes human error as a product of the making of an incorrect 
decision or action. Reason (1990) describes the human error as unsafe acts that have 
various forms such as, violations or errors. Errors are divided into three sub-categories: 
decision based-errors, skill-based errors, and perceptual errors. Violations are 
behaviours that show disregard for the rules, and regulations (Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2003). 
 Human error associated with maritime pilotage operation accidents is an important 
issue in the shipping industry and to maritime stakeholders. The area of human error 
has continuously seen new publications and new findings over the past 30 years, 
signifying the complexity of human interactions with maritime operations (Luo and 
Shin, 2016). In order to mitigate potential human errors and improve the safety 
performance of the pilotage operations, it is of paramount importance that the aspect 
of human factor is incorporated in any effort of quantification of risk.  Thus, the 
appropriate way to reduce the risk and the frequency of maritime accidents is by 
identifying the contributing human factors to human error and investigating methods 
which will either eliminate or mitigate these accidents (Celika and Cebib, 2009). Once 
that has been achieved, the human errors element contribution to marine accidents can 
be reduced. As Lu and Tsai (2008) pointed out, reducing accidents at sea depends upon 
implementing effective safety measures. 
2.5 THE ROLE OF HUMAN FACTOR IN MARITME ACCIDENTS AT SEA 
Over the past decades the greatest challenge faced by the maritime industry and the 
largest problems contributing to most maritime disasters has been the human factor. 
The international studies on maritime accidents show that the human error continues 
to be the primary cause in a considerable number of accidents at sea and these have 
not ceased to occur (Chauvin et al., 2013; Noroozi et al., 2014; Uğurlu et al., 2015; 
Othman, et al; and Graziano et al., 2016), despite advances in technology, and many 
studies being undertaken by many researchers and professionals (Akyuz and Celik, 
2014), in addition, the rules and regulations that have been adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization in order to reduce them (Hetherington et al., 2006), resulting 
in the loss of life and damage to property and the environment (Hansen et al., 2002; 
Luo and Shin, 2016). Luo and Shin (2016) reported that, the overall number of 
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maritime accidents over the past 36 years is 63,991, an average of 1.777 per year and 
human error has been identified as the main cause of these accidents.  
UK Club reported that the percentage of the claims due to human error causes in 
maritime accidents increased, and the majority of these mistakes have been caused by 
deck officers, crew, shore persons and marine pilots (Goulielmos et al., 2012). In 
addition, less-skilled mooring parties CAMSS (2012). Mercator (2012) stated that 
over the past decade, cases of collisions and ships grounding are regularly reported, 
where numerous instances provide evidence that many incidents that occur during 
pilotage can be attributed to ineffective bridge team management, and it is often the 
case that the master and watchkeepers cease to monitor the navigation and position of 
the ship after the pilot has boarded. 
The data presented in Figure 2.1 highlights the statistics of the accidents reported to 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) from 2002 to 2011 to UK registered 
merchant vessels of 100 gross tons or more. Of 1337 accidents, 811 were caused as a 
result of human and technical factors, 555 accidents were due to human factor, 447 
accidents had a technical factor, and 191 accidents were both human and technical 
factors (MAIB, 2011).  
 
 
                                                   Source: MAIB, 2011. Graph author generated 
                               Figure 2.1 the accidents reported to MAIB from 2002 to 2011  
 
The data presented in Figure 2.2 highlights 1190 of the accidents (causalities and 
incidents reported to MAIB in  2016; these involved 1310 vessels. 42 of these  
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accidents involved only non-commercial vessels, there were 687 accidents involving 
750 commercial vessels that involved actual or potential casualties to vessels (MAIB, 
2016) 
                                                        
                                                                       Source: MAIB 2016 
                    Figure 2.2: The accidents reported to MAIB in 2016 
2.5.1. Past case examples of real marine accidents 
In this study, in order to identify contributing factors to maritime accidents,  
investigation reports related to a number of occurring real worldwide maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations between the period 1995 and 2015 have been 
reviewed and examined. These reports were investigated and published by countries 
and relevant institutions and organisations such as, the Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch (MAIB) of the United Kingdom, National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) of the United States of America, and the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB).  
As has been mentioned previously, determining the root causes of the accidents is 
extremely important in mitigating the possibility of their occurring in the future 
(Ugurlu et al., 2015),  as many disasters have occurred because organizations have 
ignored the warning signs of past incidents or have failed to learn from the lessons of 
the past (Rohleder & Cooke, 2006). Therefore, one of the methods to reduce the 
number of maritime accidents, is to identify the types of human errors, by studying the 




















reports of marine accidents occurring worldwide, this last to determine how they 
happened (Chauvin et al., 2013). Moreover, ideally, learning the reasons behind 
accidents should help others to understand the causes and contributory factors which 
may negatively influence mooring operations safety, and to learn from them what went 
wrong and how to avoid similar incidents. By identifying and eliminating the causes, 
it is possible to prevent or mitigate the accidents in the future. 
Investigations have been carried out by the MAIB in the UK. These investigations 
were into accidents that involved a UK vessel or occurred in UK 12-mile territorial 
waters during the period 2005 to 2013.  In each case a pilot was onboard. The result 
of the analysis as demonstrated in Fig.2.3. showed that the major cause of the accidents 
which occurred was the human factor, and in the majority of cases reviewed the causes 
were  one or more of the following: the pilot-master information exchange failure, 
poor bridge team-pilot integration, lack of communication, lack of planning, lack of 
ship handling skills, and pilot distracted/ overloaded (MAIB, 2015). 
 
 
                                                                                  Source: MAIB 2015 
                  Figure 2.3. Pilots- top safety issues 2005-2013   
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2.5.1.1 Team working and its influence on pilotage operations safety 
Good teamwork plays a major role in safe and efficient navigation, as breakdowns in 
team work can lead to undesirable situation (Grech et al., 2008).The accident of the of 
container ship CMA CGM Centaurus is a case example of bridge team-pilot 
integration failure, when she had heavy contact with the quay and two shore cranes 
while under pilotage during her arrival at Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates (Gard, 
2006). The collision of bulk carrier Heloise with the tug Ocean Georgie Bain in the 
port of Montreal, is also one of the best accident examples of bridge team-pilot 
integration failure. The TSB (2013) investigation into this occurrence found that the 
pilot on the Heloise was not monitoring the Ocean Georgie Bain's position at the time 
of the collision, and the bridge crew on the Heloise had not been assisting the pilot by 
maintaining a lookout or using navigational equipment to advise the pilot of relevant 
traffic.  
The lack of monitoring by the pilot and bridge team contributed to the collision 
between the two vessels. In this occurrence, when the pilot lost sight of the Ocean 
Georgie Bain while he was occupied with the task of locating the nearby pleasure craft, 
he did not request assistance from the bridge team, and the bridge team did not monitor 
the tug, maintain a lookout, or assist the pilot at that time. A significant factor in this 
situation was the language barrier that impeded communication. In addition, the 
master–pilot exchange was informal and minimal, and when the pilot made attempts 
to communicate with the officer of the watch (OOW) in English, his actions indicated 
that he had difficulty understanding the pilot's requests. The difficulties in 
communication among members of the bridge team while under way contributed to 
poor BRM and prevented the bridge team from serving as an effective backup for the 
pilot.  
2.5.1.2. Communication and language problems and their effects on pilotage 
operations safety  
Communication is very important for achieving the task goals, such as ship berthing 
operations. In a crisis situation good communication and language skills allow the 
deck officers to recognise a problem quickly and manage the situation and team safely 
and effectively (Saeed, 2015). Several studies have investigated coordination and 
communication between vessels, which showed that difficulties of communication 
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(between two or more vessels or between members of the same crew) are the main 
causes of accidents. 
 According to NTSB (1981), inadequate communication between ship crew is a 
contributing factor to maritime accidents, and 70% of major marine collisions 
occurred while a pilot was directing one or both vessels.  Study was conducted by the 
US Coast Guard (1995), they found that, the most important human factor challenges 
facing the maritime industry and the greatest problems which contributed to most of 
the casualties were: inadequate communication and coordination between pilot and 
bridge crew.  
Additionally, the IMO has underlined the importance of effective communication in 
an International Seminar as a crucial issue for Marine Safety (Winbow, 2002). In 
addition, Hetherington et al (2006) pointed out that, communication is considered as 
one of the core skills central to effective and safe performance in all high-risk 
industries, it also influences team situation awareness as well as team working and 
effective decision-making, the language barrier is one of the main communication 
problems found on ships, and should be taken into account. Chauvin et al. (2013) also 
reported that, maritime accidents occurred due to problems of coordination and 
problems of communication between crewmembers.   
One of the best examples of these accidents  occurring as result of poor language which 
resulted in poor communication and insufficient master/ pilot information exchange 
was when the vessel Sichem Melbourne, made contact with mooring structures at 
Coryton Oil Refinery Terminal on the River Thames estuary near London on 25 
February 2008. There was an inadequate exchange of information between the ship’s 
master and pilot before commencing unmooring operations, as a result of poor 
interaction and communications. Much of the conversation between the crew was 
conducted in the Russian language and this made it difficult for the pilot to understand 
and recognise the master’s actions and to be fully aware of situations, and effectively 
excluded the pilot from the bridge team (MAIB, 2008). 
Failure of communication represents one third of maritime accidents caused by human 
factors, and lack of maritime English, and improper use of Standard Maritime 
Communication Phrases (SMCP) are the reasons why one third of the accidents are 
due to communication failures (Ziarati et al., 2011). Communication disintegration is 
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listed as one among several significant factors which contributed to the maritime 
accidents (Psaraftis et al. 1998; Hanzu et al., 2008; Macrae, 2009; Chauvin et al., 2013; 
Ugurlu et al., (2015). 
 Problems are mainly related to ambiguities or misunderstandings or to an absence of 
relevant communication between two pilots or between pilot and ship’s crewmember, 
or between pilots, and the vessel traffic service (VTS) (Chauvin et al., 2013). Low 
level English language skills of the ships’ crews or pilots, results in ineffective 
communication and this ineffective communication affects negatively on the safety of 
the ship’s manoeuvring.  
Language barriers have been and will continue to be a challenge. Nowadays, in the 
maritime industry, employees of many cultures and nationalities work within the same 
environment. Multilingual and multi-national crew members on ships cause decisive 
problems for the shipping industry. Despite the positive impacts of multinational 
crews, communication was seen as the major problem. Ding & Liang (2005) stated 
that, multicultural crews and a possible lack of a common language have produced a 
rising concern about the competence of ship crews; proficiency in English is one clear 
example. According to Berg et al (2013) communication, and the language skills of a 
seafarer are the most important issues that contribute to maritime safety on the 
individual level.  
Language barriers on foreign ships continue to be a serious obstacle to the safe 
navigation of these vessels in pilotage waters. Since effective information exchange is 
vital to safe navigation, safety is compromised on those vessels where the pilots are 
unable to communicate with the crew. Berg et al (2013) highlighted that, the lack of 
language skills may cause accidents as misunderstandings are inevitable in an 
environment where the crew shares no common language. These issues were discussed 
by Theotokas and Progoulaki (2007) who stated that 96% of marine accidents caused 
by the human factor came as a result of issues with the relationships among 
multilingual crews and sailors from different nationalities and cultures.  
During pilotage operations, when skills in English are not good enough, it increases 
the risk of misunderstandings, which is a very dangerous activity and creates confusion 
on the bridge. Decisions based on wrong interpretations of complicated or ambiguous 
information as result of poor language or bad communication, might lead to 
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undesirable situations. As a result, the majority of accidents could be prevented if the 
pilot and the bridge team had proper knowledge of a language and a common 
understanding of how the manoeuvring would be carried out (Gard, 2006) 
2.5.1.3 Master/Pilot exchange information (MPX) and its effect on pilotage safety 
The failure to exchange the information between pilot and ships master and failure to 
prepare passage plan properly before manoeuvring commences is a contributing factor 
to maritime accidents, and to ensure effective berthing operations, it is essential that 
the relevant information is exchanged between the master and the pilot before the 
commence of berthing operations (Wild and Constable, 2013). “The master-pilot 
exchange forms the basis for the pilot and bridge team to work cooperatively to 
monitor the vessel's progress” (TSB, 2014a).  
In spite of Annex 2 of Resolution A.960 (23) and the IMO's Standards of Training and 
Certification of Watchkeeping (STCW) 2010 which obliged the ship’s master and the 
pilot to exchange information regarding navigation procedures, local conditions, and 
the ship's characteristic, investigations that have been conducted to analyses marine 
accidents, frequently reveal the root causes to be associated with the failure to 
exchange the information between pilot and ships master and failure to prepare a 
proper passage plan. The majority of cases investigated by Gard (2014) involving 
pilots showed that the major cause of accidents was due to failure to exchange the 
information between pilot and ship’s master, there had been insufficient time for the 
ship’s crew to familiarise themselves with the pilot’s intended passage plan because 
the pilot boarding ground was frequently closer to the harbour entrance compared with 
the charted boarding ground.   
One of these events was on 25 July 2013, in a strong tidal flow, when the tanker Apollo 
left its intended track and made contact with the quayside at the Northfleet Hope 
container terminal on the River Thames near London, the vessel and the quayside both 
sustained significant damage as a result of the accident. One of the main causal factors 
for the accident was that the information regarding the vessel’s propulsion system was 
not readily available to the pilots, either through the port’s information data system or 
the vessel’s pilot card (MAIB, 2014).  
The grounding of M/V Tundra, was another example that demonstrates how the failure 
to prepare a passage plan could contribute to the accidents, when the Tundra departed 
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Montreal, The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigation into this 
occurrence found that the pilot and other members of the bridge team had not been 
exchanging information pertaining to the navigation of the vessel. And passage plans 
for the voyage were not discussed and the bridge team was unaware of a planned 
course change. TSB found that fatigue and ineffective communication between the 
pilot and bridge team contributed to the grounding of the bulk carrier Tundra, near 
Sainte-Anne-de-Sorel, Quebec (TSB, 2014).  
2.5.1.4 Situation awareness and its effect on pilotage safety 
Analysis of a considerable number of pilotage accidents and several pieces of research 
has indicated that a lack of Situation Awareness (SA) is a high risk factor and one of 
the main contributory factors of a marine accidents. Hetherington et al (2006) stated 
that, Situation awareness is the “ability of an individual to possess a mental model of 
what is going on at any one time and also to make projections as to how the situation 
will develop”. SA was defined by Grech et al (2008, p.48) as “extent of convergence 
between multiple crew members continuously evolving assessments of the state and 
future direction of a process”.  
Situation awareness (SA) is important for successful performance and necessary for 
the pilot and ship’s master to select appropriate action during pilotage operations. 
Effective situational awareness is the most important factor that plays a major role in 
decision-making processes in pilotage operations. Saeed (2015) stated that, adequate 
Situation awareness (SA) is important for successful performance in maritime 
operations. He pointed out that inadequate or complete loss of SA can significantly 
affect performance and decision making in abnormal, time critical circumstances.  
Decision making is the process of reaching a decision based on appropriate judgments, 
which depend on problem identification, recognition of solutions and options, 
assessing all solutions and options, understanding risks involved and finally reaching 
the best decision, and this cannot be done unless the individual obtains the quality of 
situation awareness (Safahani, 2015).   Studies were conducted by Grech & Horberry, 
(2002) using a Leximancer tool  in order to determine the extent to which SA is a 
relevant issue in merchant shipping operations, They found that SA is the most 




Another study was carried out by Grech et al., (2002) in which they evaluated human 
error in maritime operations, based on the analysis of maritime accident reports 
involving 177 vessels, during the period 1987–2000 from eight different countries. 
Using Endsley's error taxonomy to define the three levels of situation awareness 
(situation perception, situation comprehension, and situation anticipation). They found 
that 71% of all human error types on ships are due to lack of situational awareness. 
The collision of the M/V Cosco Busan with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge in 
2007, is the best example which demonstrate the negative effects of losing situational 
awareness, on maritime safety. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada found that 
the cause of the collision was the failure to safely navigate the vessel in restricted 
visibility as a result of three primary errors that were made, which eventually led to 
losing of situation awareness: The absence of a comprehensive pre-departure master-
pilot exchange; a lack of effective communication between the pilot and the master 
during the voyage, and thirdly, the master's ineffective oversight of the pilot's 
performance and the vessel's progress (NTSB, 2009). 
2.5.1.5 Influence of Ship Technology on pilotage operation safety  
Unfamiliarity with the electronic navigation equipment is considered a high risk and 
plays a significant role in the occurrence of maritime accidents (Hetherington, 2006). 
It can result in being fully unaware of the position of the ship and leading to loss of 
the whole situation awareness, particularly when the vessels navigate through narrow 
canals or while underway, inbound/outbound from/to ports and channels in the dark 
or under poor visibility conditions. For example, the case of the grounding of the 
chemical tanker Ovit in the Dover Straits in 2013, when the watch keepers failed to 
use an electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) properly, due to the 
lack of on-board familiarisation training in the use of ECDIS (MAIB, 2015a).  
Advanced maritime technology and the novel electronic navigational systems have 
significant safety and efficiency benefits. The potential effect of automation on the 
performance of the shipboard tasks and the role of advanced technology systems can 
reduce the risk of maritime accidents. However, poor knowledge in the use of 
navigational aids such as automated identification system (AIS), radar, GPS, and 
ECDIS can have a negative effect on pilotage operation safety. Lützhöft and Dekker 
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(2002), pointed out that, automation creates new human weaknesses and plays a 
significant role in the success and failure of navigation today. 
Although new maritime technology can be viewed as beneficial in terms of being able 
to process more data, one of the consequences of the increasing level of technology is 
a loss of situation awareness, which significantly affects performance in abnormal, 
time-critical situations, potentially leading to an accident (Grech et al., 2008, p.125). 
An MAIB (2004) report, based on the analysis of 33 collisions involving 41 vessels 
during the period 1994–2003, showed that the poor use of radar is one of the biggest 
contributory factors in collisions, since it appeared in 73% of the cases being 
investigated. This conclusion is supported by Rios, and Baniela, (2013) and Chauvin 
et al. (2013), who emphasised the ratio of errors causing collisions and grounding, as 
result of mariners’ lack of knowledge in using technology. This indicates that the 
standard of training and the seafarer’s familiarity with electronic navigation equipment 
is inadequate and limited. 
According to the US Coast Guard studies (1995), a lack of technical knowledge and 
failure to use the available navigational tools (particularly radar), on the bridge is one 
of the most important human factors which challenges seafarers, and contributes to 
maritime casualties.  One case example was the near-collision between the cruise ship 
"Statendam", and the Tug/barge Unit "Belleisli Sond"/"Radium 622" on passage from 
Sitka, Alaska, to Vancouver, British Columbia, on the evening of 11 August 1996. 
The TSB (1996) investigated the occurrence of the near-collision, they found that the 
biggest contributing causes to the incident were: the reduced visibility in fog and 
darkness and the pilot's lack of familiarity with the navigational systems of the 
"Statendam". 
The Maritime Accident and Investigation Board (MAIB) (2009), presented the 
following examples of where ECDIS had been the cause of, or contributed to an 
accident.  In their report on the Pride of Canterbury, (2009) they report that despite an 
ECDIS system being onboard, none of the 8 officers was able to use it and it had been 
incorrectly configured. Navigation was conducted by eye and by reference to an 
electronic navigational chart display (ENC).  None of the bridge team had been trained 
in the use of ENC, and the settings were inappropriate such that key dangers would 
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not have been displayed. This case highlights that the greatest technology is only as 
good as the knowledge an officer possesses in respect of it. 
On 15 November 2012 the bulk carrier Amber made contact with moored craft and 
grounded on the south shore of the River Thames, England shortly after departing 
from Tilbury power station. The vessel’s bridge team lost situational awareness in 
dense fog as the vessel manoeuvred from the berth on the north shore, before 
grounding on the opposite side of the river. The MAIB (2013) investigation found that 
the accident was caused by the bridge team’s loss of situational awareness as the vessel 
left the berth in restricted visibility. The roles and responsibilities of the bridge team 
had not been confirmed before departure, no continuous radar watch was kept and the 
vessel’s position, course and speed were not effectively monitored during the 
manoeuvre. The collective loss of situational awareness, and poor standard of 
communications within the bridge team, led to the vessel making contact with moored 
barges and grounding. The pilot’s attempt to establish the vessel’s position and speed 
using the radar was unsuccessful as he was not familiar with the set. In addition, the 
radar display would have been cluttered by the trails of all targets, which would have 
moved relative to the vessel because there was no speed input to the set. 
Following the investigation into the bulk carrier Amber incident, recommendations 
were issued in the MAIB annual report 2013. They recommended that the bridge teams 
must be familiar with all navigational and communications equipment onboard and 
understand the need to ensure that radars are set at optimum range scales and 
performance monitoring is used. (MAIB, 2013). 
2.5.1.6. Fatigue and its effect on pilotage operations safety 
Fatigue is considered a contributing factor to human errors which eventually lead to 
maritime casualties (Phillips; 2000; Hetherington et al., 2006; Ferguson, et al. 2008; 
Akhtar, and Utne, 2014). The seafarers International Research Centre's definition 
contends that fatigue is a result of continuously high or prolonged levels of information 
load which involves subjective feelings of tiredness or a disinclination to work 
(Cardiff University, 1996, p. 5).  The marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 
(2004, p.3) conducted a study of vessel bridge watchkeeping to determine the extent 
to which fatigue, among other issues, affected marine safety. The study examined all 
collisions, groundings, contacts, and near collisions that had occurred in the United 
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Kingdom between 1995 and 2003. It concluded that, the current provision of STCW 
95 in respect of safe manning, hours of work and lookout are not effective. In addition, 
Investigators found that a third of all the groundings involved a fatigued officer alone 
on the bridge at night. 
Two of the most recent accidents caused by the fatigue factor, are the cases of the 
collision of the tanker ship Eagle Otome the Sabine-Neches Canal, Port Arthur, Texas, 
in 2011(NTSB, 2011), and the grounding of dry cargo vessel Beaumont at Cabo Negro 
on the north Spanish coast in 2012 (MAIB, 2013a).  Both of these cases had as a 
common feature a fatigued navigator on watch operation. While in the Eagle Otome 
case two different sources of fatigue that adversely affected the pilot’s cognitive 
performance as a result of his untreated obstructive sleep apnea and his work schedule 
in the days preceding the accident would have disrupted his circadian sleep pattern, in 
the dry cargo vessel Beaumont case the watch keeping chief officer fell asleep while 
on watch and alone on the bridge.  
The case of the grounding of the bulk carrier Raven Arrow” in the Johnstone Strait, 
British Columbia on September 24, 1997 also was another notable example of the 
influence of fatigue on pilot’s performance. The bulk carrier Raven Arrow grounded 
in fog when the pilot lost situational awareness and prematurely altered course to enter 
Blackney Passage after having elected to conduct the navigation of the vessel without 
assistance from the ship's complement. (Increasing his workload). The Pilot lost 
situational awareness and prematurely altered course.  
Contributing to the occurrence were the following factors: the pilot was probably 
fatigued (at the time of the occurrence the pilot had been awake for over 19.5 hours); 
sound navigational principles were not implemented by the bridge team, the exchange 
of information between the pilot and officer of the watch was minimal (the officer of 
the watch had some doubts with respect to course alteration but did not challenge the 
pilot’s decision, this report goes beyond the individual pilot and fatigue, and addresses 
fatigue from the perspective of management by examining pilot scheduling and fatigue 
management (TSB, 1997). Due to reduced manning levels in the maritime industry 
there is now an emphasis on automation. The increase in automation and decrease in 
manning levels has changed the role of the seafarer, resulting in faster ships which are 
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almost always sailing, with minimum time spent in ports and minimum rest periods 
for the crew, leading them to either physical or mental fatigue. 
The feedback from maritime accident investigation reports shows enormous 
challenges in preventing shipping accidents. Human fatigue is difficult to measure and 
even more difficult to state as a cause of an accident, therefore, accident investigation 
reports are often reluctantly to assign any great importance to human fatigue (Grech 
et al., 2008 p.59). As mentioned in the preceding section, the IMO adopted several 
actions, regulations, and guidelines in order to ensure maritime safety and to either 
eliminate or mitigate mistakes caused by human factors that contribute to marine 
accidents during maritime operations. For example, Maritime Labour Convention 
2006 (MLC 2006), and IMO (2001) Guidance on Fatigue, have developed practical 
guidance to assist interested parties to better understand and manage the issue of 
“fatigue.” However, the lack of an effective response to lessons learned from marine 
accident reports has threatened precautions already taken towards system safety 
2.5.1.7. Workload and its effect on pilotage safety 
Mental work load is a significant issue to consider when assessing the demand placed 
on an operator by changes in the marine task. Nowadays maritime Pilots and the ship’s 
crew perform many more tasks than before because of reduced numbers of staff. There 
has been a cultural shift in the maritime industry toward increased levels of automation 
in tasks, particularly with regard to navigation systems (Grech & Horberry, 2002). In 
addition, the impact of technology in the shipping industry has also caused a much 
larger number of tasks and a larger amount of stress to ships’ operators (Bielic and 
Zec, 2003). These two factors lead to mental fatigue, which lead to impaired 
information processing and reaction time, increasing the probability of errors and 
ultimately leading to ship accidents (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
In the event of the collision of the bulk carrier Heloise with the tug Ocean Georgie 
Bain, the difficulties in communication among members of the bridge team while 
under way contributed to poor BRM and prevented the bridge team from serving as 
an effective backup for the pilot. Furthermore, in communicating only minimally with 
the crew and perceiving that the bridge crew was not available to assist him, the pilot 
essentially assumed all navigational responsibilities, including that of lookout. This 
situation led to an increase in the pilot's mental workload, which led him to narrow, or 
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limit, his focus of attention to the pleasure craft at the expense of monitoring the Ocean 
Georgie Bain (TSB, 2013).  
Diehl (1991) reported that, may some people debate that it may be as result of the 
presence of the advanced instruments through which operators obtain more and quick 
data and they can make timely decisions. At the same time it can be argued that due 
to advanced instruments, operators are overloaded with information and will not be 
able to reach the second level of SA to make the proper decision. Grech et al., 2008, 
p.123) stated that too high a workload could lead to demands exceeding an operator's 
capacity to cope. The mariner’s high mental workload due to the use of technology 
and long-time monitoring navigational aids equipment can lead to memory loss and 
misperception of data. Therefore, controlling work load is a key factor with new 
technology, training and other forms of procedural guidance needed in order to make 
seafarers aware of the capabilities and limitations of new technologies. 
2.5.1.8. Distraction during the time of berthing operations and its impact on safety   
Grech et al (2008) concluded that the electronic equipment such as ECDIS, AIS, and 
electronic navigational chart display (ENC) are considered significant factors that 
overload, confuse, and distract operators, rather than assisting them. Therefore, the 
advanced instruments and technical innovations require greater knowledge and 
extensive training. In recent years, the use of personal communication devices has 
been also linked to numerous accidents across transportation modes worldwide (TSB, 
2012). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (2011a) reported that many 
accidents occurred due to failure of the ship’s operators to maintain a proper lookout 
due to distraction and inattentiveness, which resulted from repeated personal use of a 
cell phone and laptop computer while they were navigating the vessel.  
The use of personal communication devices (such as cellular telephones) may reduce 
situational awareness. “Cell phone calls from the pilot’s family are threats to ships’ 
safety” (Gard, 2007).   On Wednesday, July 7, 2010, the empty 250-foot-long sludge 
barge, being towed alongside the 78.9-foot-long tugboat Caribbean Sea, collided with 
the anchored 33-foot-long amphibious passenger vehicle DUKW 34 in the Delaware 
River at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The National Transportation Safety Board 
determined that the potential cause of this accident was the failure of the crew officer 
of the Caribbean Sea to maintain a proper lookout due to distraction and 
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inattentiveness as a result of his repeated personal use of his cell phone and company 
laptop computer while he was solely responsible for navigating the vessel. (NTSB, 
2011a) 
According to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (2005) report into 
the grounding of the ATTILIO IEVOLI in the Western Solent, off the south coast of 
England in June 2004, the mobile phone use on the bridge for the majority of the time 
between the pilot disembarking and the vessel grounding was the main contributing 
cause for the accident. Furthermore, they stated that it was known that the Master made 
some, if not all, of the calls during this period. With the remainder of the bridge team 
unclear of their relative responsibilities for navigation, and the master distracted on 
the telephone, no one appeared to have been concentrating on the safety of the vessel.  
2.5.1.9. The excessive speed and its effect on mooring operations safety  
Many accidents have happened due to excessive speed during berthing operations as 
the one described below (Gard, 2014). Case of collision with terminal dolphin is one 
of the best example of breaching the rules when the vessel entered the breakwater at 
8.5 knots even though the maximum permitted speed was only 5 knots. Although the 
Master observed that they were exceeding the maximum speed, the Master did not 
attempt to bring this to the attention of the pilots. Four tugs were requisitioned to assist 
the vessel in berthing at the terminal. Due to the excessive speed of the vessel, the tugs 
had difficulty maintaining speed to keep up with the vessel as she made her way to the 
terminal. Extensive damage was caused both to the ship and to the mooring dolphin. 
The following causes contributed to this incident: (1) the vessel’s speed was excessive 
when trying to connect to the tugs. (2) There was a lack of communication between 
the pilot and the master at many stages while transiting the channel. There was little 
or no information exchanged regarding the docking plan and how the 4 tugs were to 
be put to use and coordinated. (3) The Master did not insist that the pilot did not exceed 
the maximum allowable speed as it entered the breakwater. (4) The pilot, when 
communicating with the tugs, was speaking a language that was not understood by the 
Master. This made it difficult for the Master to have a proper situational awareness. 
(5) The Master was over-confident as to the abilities of the pilot (Gard, 2014).  




A considerable number of research works showed that numerous maritime accidents 
occurred due to boarding and disembarking of the pilot close to the port entrance (P&I 
Club, 2012).  Pilot disembarking early before the ship leaves the port entrance or 
embarking the ship at the breakwater, is a high risk procedure which influences 
negatively on the pilotage operations safety, as it will leave insufficient time for the 
captain of the vessel to exchange information with the pilot, and to arrange the passage 
plan which is considered as one of the most significant factors to achieving safe ship 
berthing. According to Gard (2007), Captain Erik Blom Master of the M/V BLACK 
WATCH, reported that, "I have experienced pilots embarking at the breakwater, not 
giving us time to meet and greet at all, and forcing me more or less to disregard the 
pilot as there is no time to discuss or exchange information. This is very often the case 
in Mediterranean ports. This is a very unsatisfactory situation as the pilot is not 
integrated with the bridge team and sometimes just creates clutter to the organization”. 
One of the best examples of these incidents, has been reported by P&I Club (2012), 
when the bulk carrier with an experienced master was leaving a port to which he had 
been to many times before. The ship left the berth behind schedule during the late 
afternoon and in good weather, when the pilot told the master that he wanted to 
disembark before the designated pilot station. This request turned out later to be for 
the pilot’s personal reasons. The pilot did not leave the master with information of 
what courses to take, what dangers to avoid and/or any information about incoming or 
outgoing traffic. The watchkeeper had accompanied the pilot to the main deck to 
disembark and, during this period, the master was alone on the bridge. No positions 
were maintained on the chart and the master was navigating by ‘eye’. For reasons that 
can only be explained as human error, the master steered the ship the wrong side of a 
navigational mark and it ran onto submerged rocks, which ripped out the double 
bottom tanks. The wreck removal and oil pollution costs were significant.  
Even though  the resolution A.960 (23) adopted by IMO, which recommends that the 
boarding position for pilots should be located, where practical, at a great enough 
distance from the port, still pilots breach the rules and making such errors, which lead 
to maritime disasters and injuries for humans, and damage to the environment and 
properties. It can be seen from the above discussion that embarking and disembarking 
of a pilot close to the breakwater is high risk, it influences the safety of the pilotage 
operation and contributes to maritime accidents, as it will not give the ship's captain 
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and crew members the chance for the exchange of information with the pilot at all, 
and might force the ship’s master more or less to disregard the pilot, as there is no time 
to discuss or exchange information. 
2.5.2 Human factors and maritime accident research  
Over the past decades, maritime authorities have been continuously challenged to 
improve maritime operations performance and safety. The increased numbers of 
maritime accidents during the last few decades have forced the maritime professionals 
and scientists to conduct a numerous studies to identify risk factors and to analyse their 
impact on maritime safety (Özdemir and Güneroğlu, 2015). Maritime safety 
practitioners attempted to find appropriate solutions to minimize human error and 
enhance safety in maritime transportation.  For example, the Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada TSB (1995) in a study of operational relationships between 
shipmasters/watchkeeping officers and marine pilots, reported that the inadequate 
interpersonal communications among the bridge team, lack of adequate information 
exchange, incomplete understanding of the intended manoeuvres, loss of situational 
awareness, absence of monitoring of the ship's progress were the most contributory 
factors to maritime accidents. 
Likewise, Psaraftis et al. (1998) conducted extensive studies, in order to present a 
comprehensive analysis of the human element as a factor in marine accidents.  They 
investigated all accidents involving Greek-flagged ships, over the period of 1984 to 
1994, regardless of the accident’s geographical location. Moreover, all events that 
occurred in Greek territorial waters were similarly investigated, irrespective of the flag 
of the ship involved. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the major cause of 
all accidents was the human factor, and in the majority of cases reviewed, the incidents 
were due to one or more of the following: poor crew competence, lack of 
communication, lack of proper maintenance, and lack of application of safety.  
Moreover, a comprehensive review of literature was conducted by Hetherington et al. 
(2006) to identify the relative contributions of individual and organizational factors in 
shipping accidents. They found that fatigue, stress, health, situation awareness, 
teamwork, decision-making, communication, automation, and safety culture is the 
most frequent contributing factors to maritime accidents. (MAIB) (2004) conducted a 
study of vessel bridge watch keeping to determine the extent to which fatigue, among 
46 
 
other issues, affected marine safety. The study examined all collisions, groundings, 
contacts, and near collisions that had occurred in the United Kingdom between 1995 
and 2003. It concluded that “the current provision of STCW 95 in respect of safe 
manning, hours of work and lookout are not effective. In addition, Investigators found 
that “a third of all the groundings involved a fatigued officer alone on the bridge at 
night.  
Similar studies regarding this matter have shown that the duration between 00:00 and 
06:00 hours is the most dangerous period for ships accidents (Great Britain, 
Department of Transportation, 2004). The same period of time is supposed to be most 
dangerous for maritime accidents as a result of the biological clock within the human 
organism which makes a person subject to heavy sleep during that period of time 
(Fatigue: IMO guidance, 2006). Also Ferguson, et al. (2008) examined the impact of 
brief, unscheduled naps during work periods on alertness and vigilance in coastal 
pilots along the Great Barrier Reef, as the duration of the work period can extend well 
beyond 24 hours. Seventeen coastal pilots were volunteered for the study, they found 
that a pilot’s work environment, irregular and lengthy working hours without a decent 
nap, working at night without rest period, and travelling to and from their jobs impact 
on the alertness of marine pilots and can significantly contribute to fatigue.   
Another study has been carried out by Akhtar and Utne (2014), they constructed a 
Bayesian network (BN) using data from 93 accident investigation reports. It was found 
that a fatigued operator raises the probability of grounding for a large ship in long 
transit by 16 %. Moreover, the probability of a watchkeeper being fatigued was found 
to be 23 %. According to Akhtar and Utne (2014), alcohol misuse is a problem in 
maritime transport, and it also amplifies human fatigue levels, even low alcohol 
exposure significantly impairs the performance of navigators, and contributes to 
accidents at sea. Xhelilaj and Lapa (2010) reported that, quality, quantity and duration 
of sleep can play a significant role in a mariner’s performance.  Moreover, ingested 
chemicals such as alcohol, drugs and caffeine which are used very often among 
seafarers to overcome sleep and boredom can also limit a pilot’s opportunity to obtain 




Macrae (2009) has also carried out accident analysis in two types of shipping 
accidents: groundings and collisions between 1995 and 2000. 30 detailed marine 
accident reports written by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) were 
reviewed. The study revealed that, 76% of shipping accidents caused by human error 
which occurred on the bridge. In addition, the analysis indicated that the most common 
causes of the accidents were due to a lack of communication among the bridge team, 
failure of position fixing, errors in determining the speed, failure to keep adequate 
watch, passage plan errors, and poor judgment of the situation. Moreover, the study 
showed that around 80% of marine accidents which occurred because of human error, 
had traditionally been viewed as a by-product of individual cognitive behaviour or 
occasionally moral issues caused merely by carelessness or ignorance. 
Similar research was carried out by Tzannatos and Kokotos (2009), where all accidents 
involving Greek-flagged ships during the period 1993-2006, accidents were examined 
according to the vessel type, cargo, and location. The findings showed that 63.9% of 
the pre-ISM accidents were due to human error, as opposed to the 51.7% during the 
post-ISM period. As an indication of human source analysis, Tzannatos and Kokotos 
(2009) stated that the captains of the ships were found to be responsible for 41% of all 
accidents and for 72% of all human-induced accidents. In addition, the results of the 
analysis reported that 83% of tanker accidents were caused by the human factor, and 
67% of accidents occurred in restricted areas as a result of human error.  
Tzannatos (2010) conducted similar studies on different incidents of Greek-flagged 
ships during the period of 1993 to 2006. The research provided an analysis of various 
accidents based upon the findings of formal enquiries conducted by the Hellenic Coast 
Guard. According to the investigation, 57.1% of ship accidents were attributed to the 
human element. Furthermore, it was discovered that the captains of the ships were 
responsible for almost all of the frequently encountered groundings and collisions, and 
were involved in 80.4% of the accidents. On the other hand, the engine officers were 
responsible for 8.1% of the incidents, and the bridge officers and crew were 
responsible for 6.8% and 4.7%, respectively. Furthermore, the studies found that the 
incidence of human error had arisen due to of the manning policies being carried out 
by shipping company managers.  
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Furthermore, studies were conducted by Ćorović and Djurovic (2013), they 
investigated the human factor and its impact on maritime safety from psychological 
and organisational aspects. They reported that, health is considered one of the most 
important factors that influence the professional efficiency of seafarers and correlated 
to psychophysical strength, duration of resting, seafarers’ job satisfaction, internal 
relationships and stressful situations. They also found that, psychological problems 
such as impatience, dissatisfaction, and lack of motivation may stimulate intolerance 
between crewmembers, which could also be a result of cultural and religious 
differences. In addition, they pointed out that working and living on a ship with 
employees of an array of nationalities and backgrounds could lead to 
misunderstanding, and operational problems which will have a negative effect on crew 
performance. And consequently, influence vessel safety.  
Another paper was introduced by Chauvin et al. (2013), utilising the Human Factor 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  to determine the contributing factors in 
ship collisions, and jointly used the Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and 
hierarchical clustering methods to analyse the human factors and organizational 
factors in the ship collisions. This tool has been used to classify and analyse factors 
that are mentioned in accidents reports, for 39 vessels involved in 27 collisions that 
occurred between 1998 and 2012. 11 of those were under the conduct of a pilot. The 
results of the study show that most collision accidents occurring in restricted waters 
and involving pilot-carrying vessels are due to decision errors. They concluded that 
problems are mainly related to the inter-ship communications problems such as, 
ambiguities or misunderstandings or to an absence of relevant communication 
between two pilots or between pilot and ship’s crewmember, or between pilots, and 
the vessel traffic service (VTS), and bridge resource management (BRM) deficiencies.  
Another study concerning the human error during ship manoeuvring in restricted 
waters was presented by Gerigk and Hejmlic (2015) in order to find out how stress 
and stressing factors influence the decision-making process of ship’s masters and 
marine pilots during ship manoeuvring in restricted area. They found twenty-four 
difficult situations at sea which are the main stressors influencing the decision-making 
process and the performance consequently the potential for human error during ship 
manoeuvring in restricted areas. They also found that knowledge of port area, 
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experience, number of years of employment as ship master and pilot are significant 
factors affecting the manoeuvring performance in restricted waters. 
A new approach was presented by Özdemir and Güneroğlu (2015), using a novel 
hybrid accident analysis method to analyse marine accident causes which occur in 
complex social and technical reasons. The hybrid method involves the decision-
making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) and Analytic Network Process 
(ANP) method in order to evaluate the importance level of the human factors in 
maritime casualties, and provide a solution for evaluating causes of accidents the in 
marine industry. As result of this study, the most important factors were found to be 
ability, skills, knowledge, physical condition and weather sea condition. 
Ugurlu et al. (2015) reviewed maritime accident reports issued for grounded ships 
between 1993 and 2011, in order to determine the causes of the collisions by using the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). They concluded that, the lack of communication 
and coordination in Bridge Resource Management, position-fixing application errors, 
lookout errors, interpretation errors, use of improper charts, inefficient use of bridge 
navigation equipment, and fatigue, were the most common factors behind collisions. 
In order to reduce the accidents, they suggested to providing more education and 
training opportunities to seafarers, and improving seafarers’ working hours and rest 
breaks. 
A similar study was carried out by Uğurlu et al. (2015a). In this study, collision and 
grounding data registered in GISIS (Global Integrated Shipping Information System) 
were investigated. The database includes the information of the collision and 
grounding accidents during the period between 1998 and 2010 for oil tankers. The risk 
assessments were carried out using the fault tree analysis (FTA) method. They found 
that the main reasons for the accidents originating from human error are as follows: 
for collision accidents, Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREG) violation and the lack of communication between 
vessels; and for grounding accidents, the interpretation failure of the officer on watch 
and lack of communication in the bridge resource management. 
Likewise, Erol and Basar (2015) have examined 1,247 marine accidents occurring in 
the Turkish search and rescue area in the period between 2001 and 2009 by using the 
Decision Tree method.  They concluded that 60% of marine accidents happening in 
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the Turkish search and rescue area are caused by human error, and the main causes of 
the human error are navigational, manoeuvring failure, and carelessness. Technical 
failure and weather conditions followed human error as 18% and 15%, respectively.  
Recently, study was carried out by Uğurlu (2016), in this study questionnaires and 
interviews with 71 pilots, were conducted in order to investigate the pilots’ profile and 
structure of existing pilotage organisations in Turkey, to create an effective pilotage 
organisation model. They found that the commercial–political pressures and low 
salaries negatively affect maritime pilot performance. They concluded that the 
structural deficiencies in pilotage organisations caused commercial pressure on pilots, 
which has negative impact on task management and should be reduced. Moreover, 
they found that dense and irregular working conditions reduced job satisfaction and 
caused physical and social problems, they also found that the working schedule or job 
rotation is one of the most important factors affecting fatigue management, and 
maritime pilot performance.  
2.6 HUMAN FACTOR RISK/ SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODS 
Over the past view decades, maritime risk and safety assessment researches have 
undergone many essential changes, and a considerable number of new approaches 
have been developed to facilitate risk quantification in order to improve maritime 
safety. The early studies in maritime accident research usually adopted very basic 
methods such as statistical and descriptive reviews, case studies and probability 
calculations, while recent studies often used multi-disciplinary approaches, 
comprehensive risk analysis, and system-width viewpoints (Luo and Shin, 2016).  
In recent years, the most frequently used method for risk analysis and safety 
assessment was the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
method.  It was proposed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) to investigate and analyse 
accident causes in the aviation industry, and the fundamental framework of the 
HFACS method was tailored from the Swiss cheese method which was initially 
introduced by Reason (1990) to provide researchers with a tool to identify the latent 
or active failures. The main aim of the method is to provide a schematic framework to 
assist safety practitioners in investigating and analysing human factor in accidents. 
HFACS is a schematic powerful tool to investigate human contributions to marine 
accidents. Recently the HFACS method was successfully extended by (Akyuz et al., 
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2016), introducing a comprehensive schematic framework consisting of four 
schematic levels:  organisational influences; unsafe supervision; pre-conditions for 
unsafe acts, and the actual unsafe acts in order to analyse the role of the human error 
in accidents. 
In the past decade many different approaches have been developed to address the 
maritime safety problems. Maritime accident research based on accident statistics has 
had significant effects on safety management practices in the industry. However, they 
are, on their own, unable to manage the uncertainty in data, failing to look at the overall 
picture of maritime safety analysis, as a result, a considerable number of developed 
approaches and different techniques have been used to quantify the risks in maritime 
transportation including fuzzy logic, Bayesian networks (BNs) evidential reasoning, 
Monte Carlo simulation, Markov chains and genetic algorithm to model risks in this 
dynamic and data-scarce application area have been put forward (Yang et al., 2013). 
 Yang et al. (2013) concluded that the formal safety assessment (FSA) provided by 
IMO is the primary method that is currently being utilised for the analysis of maritime 
safety, which provides a reasonable and integrated framework to facilitate maritime 
safety analysis, including the development of new risk-modelling and decision-
making methods to address uncertainty in data as well as new cost–benefit analysis 
approaches to facilitate the implementation of maritime regulations. Furthermore, 
research on design for safety, risk-based inspection, traffic safety evaluation, 
evacuation and rescue simulation, fire risk estimation and human reliability analysis 
(HRA) has been also applied in the last decades.  
2.6.1 Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) methods 
 The way of identifying and quantifying human error related risks in the maritime 
industry has undergone a transformation in the past decades. In recent research, there 
are many approaches that have been used for facilitating human error identification 
and human reliability analysis.  HRA techniques have been an essential research issue 
in safety critical systems in the new century, it has been widely conducted to tackle 
specific difficulties in challenging maritime safety (Yang et al., 2013a). “HRA is a 
tool used to evaluate human reliability as well as the uncertainty of data concerning 
human factors and the complexity of the human behaviours” (Zhou et al., 2018).  It is 
regarded as one of the most important methods that have been used to improve human 
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performance and to describe the human contribution to risk, which includes a series 
of methods to identify sources of human errors and to predict the likelihood of their 
occurrence (Boring, 2008).  
 HRA has been employed since the early 1980s. It has become notable after the Three 
Mile Island accident in 1979, from which the method has become familiar to the 
nuclear industry, and has been utilised in many different industries (Kirwan et al., 
2008).  The HRA aims to assess and provides a good collection, interpretation and 
application approach to human failure data, resulting in enhancing human 
performance, and mitigating potential human errors within the system, including in 
the maritime industry, in a shipping company or onboard a ship (Cepin, 2008). It 
involves the use of qualitative and quantitative methods to assess the human 
contribution to risk (Holroyd & Bill, 2009), where quantitatively it facilitates to obtain 
HEPs, and qualitatively it identifies potential human errors in an incident/accident 
investigation (Subramaniam, 2010).  The following subsections provide a summary of 
some of those tools identified as being of potential use to human factor identification 
and quantification.  
2.6.1.1 First Generation Methods 
Some of the methods developed and used were a well-known first generation HRA 
techniques, including, Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain 
and Guttmann, 1983), Success Likelihood Index Methodology (SLIM) (Embrey, 
1983), (ASEP), and Human Cognition Reliability (HCR) model, (Hannaman et al., 
1984), etc. (Holroyd & Holroyd, 2009). These tools were the first to be developed to 
assist risk assessors predict and quantify the likelihood of human error. The first 
generation HRA techniques utilized a simple error taxonomy and "fits/doesn't fit" 
dichotomy to correspond error state to error identification and quantification (Boring, 
2005). These approaches tend to be atomistic in nature; they encourage the assessor to 
break a task into component parts and then consider the potential impact of modifying 
factors such as time pressure, equipment design and stress. By combining these 
elements the assessor can determine a nominal human error potential (HEP).  
First generation methods focus on the skill and rule base level of human action and 
are often criticised for failing to consider such things as the impact of context, 
organisational factors and errors of commission (Subramaniam, 2010). Despite these 
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criticisms they are useful and many are in regular use for quantitative risk assessments. 
The first generation of the HRA methods are proposed based on the premise that 
inherent deficiencies lead to humans failing to perform tasks just like mechanical, 
electrical or structural components do (Marseguerra et al., 2007). This generation is 
represented by the THERP method (Zhou et al., 2018), etc. (Kim and Bishu, 2006).  
One of the first HRA methods developed and used was the Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction (THERP), in 1961. The first meeting to discuss HRA was held in 1964. 
The first large scale application of HRA was carried out in 1972, when THERP was 
used to assess the impact of estimated human errors in a probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) of two nuclear power plants, referred to as the WASH-1400 reactor safety 
study. The method has been extensively used in the USA and in the UK nuclear 
industry, it has been also been successfully applied in many industries including 
nuclear, chemical, aviation, rail, medical and maritime to the other sectors such as 
offshore and medical sectors for assessing human reliability that deals with task 
analyses error identification and representation, as well as the quantification of HEPs 
(Kirwan, 1994). Kirwan et al (1997) conducted validation to an independent validation 
of THERP along with two other methods (HEART and JHEDI). They found that no 
one technique out performed the others, and all three achieved a reasonable level of 
accuracy. 
The advantages of using the THERP method, are that designed to be a quick and 
simple method for quantifying the risk of human error. It is a general method that is 
applicable to any situation or industry where human reliability is important. In 
addition, it is a flexible, quick, and easy human reliability calculation method, which 
allows the user suggestions on error reduction, it requires relatively limited resources 
to complete an assessment, and it can also be easily integrated with fault tree reliability 
methodologies.  
The disadvantages of the THERP method, are that the error dependency modelling is 
not included, it requires an enormous effort to obtain reliable HEPs and greater clarity 
of description to assist users when discriminating between generic tasks and their 
associated Error Producing Conditions (EPCs); there is potential for two assessors to 
calculate very different human error reliability (HEPS) for the same task, also the 
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method lacks information about the extent to which tasks should be decomposed for 
analysis.  
Success Likelihood Index Method (SLIM) tool is an expert judgement method which 
was first developed by Embrey (1983) for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and has become popular in the mid-1980s and remains so, particularly in less safety 
critical environments than major hazard industries. SLIM is an approach utilized to 
assess human error probabilities using structured expert judgment. The SLIM provides 
a quick tool to predict human error and evaluate human error probability (HEP) that 
occurs during the completion of a specific task. This tool provides a structured means 
for experts to consider how likely an error is in a particular scenario (Embry et al, 
1984). However, the method, like other expert judgement tools, does have 
shortcomings, the weakness of this method is the subjectivity in the process of experts’ 
judgments causing difficulties in ensuring consistency (Akyuz, 2016). To remedy this 
problem, Park and Lee (2008) developed a method where an Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) method was used to estimate HEP, known as AHP-SLIM, which 
quantifies the subjective judgement and confirms the consistency of collected data”. 
Also, study was conducted by Akyuz (2016), using a fuzzy based SLIM technique 
which provides more accurate estimation during human error quantification. In the 
proposed approach, while the SLIM is utilized to estimate HEP, the fuzzy sets deal 
with the vagueness of expert judgments and expression in decision-making during the 
weighting process of performance shaping factors (PSFs).    
The method, like other expert judgement tools, does have users and has been evolved 
to address the early problems that were identified with the method. According to 
Holroyd & Bill (2009), SLIM is a flexible tool and appropriate for application in major 
hazard sectors. It facilitates gross cost benefit evaluations to take place. It is found that 
the main criticisms of SLIM are that it requires an expert panel to perform an 
assessment, its methods are poorly structured resulting in various results for different 
analysts, it is resource intensive, and there is a lack of theoretical foundation on its 
quantification procedures. The mixed reviews of SLIM suggest that if the method is 
rigorously employed and the experts are sufficiently observed to reduce bias, then it 
can be beneficial. 
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 In general, the disadvantages of the first generation HRA methods can be described 
as follows: they have generally recognised shortcomings in a scarcity of data, 
insufficient treatment of performance shaping factors (PSFs), inadequate proof of 
accuracy, inadequate psychological realism, lack of consistency in treating error of 
commission, inadequate treatment of dynamic situations, a mechanical view of 
human, high level of uncertainty, lack of systematic task analysis structure and 
inadequate error reduction strategies (Hollnagel, 1998, Kristiansen, 2005,  Kim and 
Bishu, 2006).  Second generation HRA methods have therefore been developed to 
overcome such difficulties by appropriately taking into account the contextual 
influence of a task and by being equipped with the more powerful ability of 
incorporating expert judgments to deliver quantitative human failure analysis results. 
Although attractive, these methods have still exposed some shortcomings in their 
practical application (Yang et al., 2013a).  
2.6.1.2. Second Generation Methods  
The development of ‘second generation’ tools began in the 1990s and is on-going, 
including, Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 
1998), and A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) (Cooper et al., 
1996), Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 
1988), SHERPA (Embrey, 1986), and Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Human 
Reliability Assessment (SPAR-H) (Gertman et al., 2004), and there are also other 
methods (Holroyd & Bill, 2009).    
The second generation approaches consider the context as the most crucial factor 
affecting human performance failure and hence focus on the relationship between 
context and associated human error probability (HEP). The literature shows that 
second generation methods are generally considered to be still under development but 
that in their current form they can provide beneficial insight into human reliability 
issues (Holroyd & Bill, 2009). Kirwan et al. (2008) reports that the most prominent of 
the second generation tools are the ATHEANA, and CREAM methods. The 
ATHEANA approach is defined as a method for obtaining qualitative and quantitative 
HRA results. It is the assessment method for the performance of safety operation 
(Holroyd & Bill, 2009). 
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 ATHEANA was developed to assess the performance of safety operations, 
particularly for the probabilistic safety assessment of reactors in nuclear power plants, 
however the approach is suitable for application in other industries. It uses error 
forcing contexts (EFCs), which are defined as a compositions of working conditions 
and other influences that make an operator error more likely, to obtain qualitative and 
quantitative HRA results. It utilizes psychology, human factors, engineering 
knowledge and probabilistic risk assessment for retrospective and prospective 
analyses. It takes into account ergonomics, psychology and accidentology in 
modelling management system behaviour and safe system failure in the operation of 
nuclear power plants. It utilizes consistent configurations/orientations (CICA) of the 
system (Holroyd & Bill, 2009).  
The benefits of using ATHEANA are that it is capable of estimating HEPs for various 
conditions of events and that it allows for a focused approach in predicting specific 
error and significant factors influencing that specific error. ATHEANA is an approach, 
which attempts to solve the problem of including EOC [errors of commission] in PSA 
in an extensive way. If the method is properly applied, the methods that comprise 
ATHEANA should be able to yield significantly more insight into the nature of human 
actions. ATHEANA can be used to develop detailed qualitative insights into 
conditions that may cause problems. It provides a systematic way of exploring how 
action failures can occur (Holroyd & Bill, 2009).    
Meanwhile, the disadvantages of applying ATHEANA are that there are a limited 
number of ATHEANA applications and rigorous methods are applied in identifying 
the influencing factors used for quantification purposes (Forester et al., 2004). The 
ATHENA method is difficult to use and very costly. The guidance is too complex and 
depends too much on subject matter experts. The measurement method is weak, and 
the quantitative results are not proven. The quantification is extremely dependent on 
expert judgement, thus properly has low reliability as a method.  
 Hollnagel (1993) developed CREAM and the method is still under development. 
CREAM was first proposed for nuclear power plant applications (Jung et al., 2001, 
Tang et al., 2014) and was adopted by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) in the early 1990s to predict human error (Calhoun et al. 
2014). It is based on a set of principles for cognitive modelling with detailed 
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classification of erroneous actions. Hollnagel (1998) provides comprehensive details 
on the principles of CREAM, classification and the methods of assessment, both 
retrospective and prospective.  
The main advantages of CREAM are that it provides a well-structured systematic 
approach for identifying and quantifying human error, CREAM can be used 
retrospectively to analyse and quantify error, and prospectively to identify potential 
human error for an incident/accident that is possibly encountered. In recent years the 
method has become one of the most common methods and widely applied in many 
industries. In particular, for the maritime sector, researchers have applied the method 
to examine human reliability in maritime activities (Akyuz and Celik, 2015).  
In order to overcome some of the shortcomings of the human reliability analysis 
methods, a new approach has been developed, it is the use of combined methods and 
coupled analysis. For example, an advanced CREAM and a human reliability 
quantification model was proposed by Subramaniam (2010) in order to address some 
of the shortcomings of the generic HRA and FSA methodologies that exist 
independently in the management of oil tankers to prevent oil spills. In this study a 
DEMATEL model, which allows for an inclusive understanding of relationships and 
interdependencies among the Common Performance Conditions (CPCs), and an 
integrated AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS model for determining the selection of appropriate 
risk control options are integrated into CREAM.  
Yang and Wang (2012) also conducted a study in order to develop a generic method 
by modifying the CREAM methodology. In the paper, fuzzy evidential reasoning and 
Bayesian inference logic are integrated into the CREAM methodology to facilitate the 
quantification of human failure in the marine industry. Likewise, a similar study was 
introduced by Yang et al. (2013a) to extend the traditional CREAM approach by 
incorporating fuzzy evidential reasoning and Bayesian network techniques to facilitate 
human reliability quantification in marine engineering. In addition, an application of 
the CREAM method into the cargo loading processes of LPG tankers has been 
implemented by Akyuz and Celik. (2015). In the paper, the main focus of this research 
is to predict human error potential for identified tasks and to determine required safety 
control levels on board LPG ships. As a result, Akyuz (2015) has recently introduced 
an approach to measure human error probability in the gas inerting process of crude 
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oil tankers. The paper provides a CREAM quantification approach on the case of a 
critical shipboard operation.  
Furthermore, later, for making human error probability quantification in CREAM 
rational, and to quantify human error probability in maritime domain, a modified 
CREAM methodology based on an Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach and a 
Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) technique was 
proposed by Xi et al. (2017). This was the first time the method addressed the data 
incompleteness in HEP, given that the previous relevant studies mainly focused on the 
fuzziness in data. The findings provided useful insights for quantitative assessment of 
seafarers' errors to reduce maritime risks due to human errors.  
2.6.2 Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
Most of the aforementioned approaches and the traditional approaches such as FTA, 
ETA, Failure Mode, FMECA and Bow-Tie have been frequently used in human 
reliability analysis of critical systems and have widely enriched the risk analysis 
literature. However, due to their incapability  in addressing human-related risk factors 
associated with the system operation, multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
methods such as the AHP and other assessment methods are nowadays widely used in 
many industrial sectors to overcome the previously mentioned drawbacks  (John et al., 
2014). The MCDM is a procedure that facilitates decision making processes, such as 
choosing, ranking or sorting actions. It is considered as one of the most significant 
types of decision-making studies.  
The development of ‘MCDM’ was officially established in the 1970s, as a conference 
on MCDM was held by Cochrane and Zeleny at Columbia University in South 
Carolina in 1972 (Figueira et al., 2005). There are two main techniques to the MCDM 
method: Multi-attribute Decision Making (MADM) and Multiple Objective Decision 
Making (MODM). The MODM analyses decision problems where the decision field 
is continuous, such as mathematical programming problems with multiple objective 
functions. While the MADM, concentrates on problems with discrete decision fields 
where the decision alternatives have been predetermined.  
MCDM is one of the most recognised branches of decision making studies 
(Triantaphyllou, 2000). The MCDM can be categorized depending on the type of data 
used such as deterministic, stochastic, fuzzy and combined MCDM approaches. 
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Another method of categorising MCDM methods is according to the number of 
decision makers involved in the decision process, including a single decision maker 
and a group of decision makers MCDM methods. 
 In general, the advantages of using MCDM methods is that the choice of objectives 
and criteria that a decision maker made initially can be further reviewed and modified 
if they are felt to be inappropriate. Another advantage of MCDM is that it facilitates 
the assessing process of the MCDM method used for administration purposes 
(Dodgson et al., 2009). The difficulties of applying  MCDM method is the conflicts 
among criteria, where different criteria represent different dimensions of the 
alternatives and incommensurable units, where different criteria could be associated 
with different units of measurement (Triantaphyllou, 2000).  
There are many various MCDM techniques developed to tackle real-world complex 
issues involving multiple criteria decision (MCDM) problems and these differences 
do not mean that one method is a better or worse methods, however each method has 
its own characteristics, advantages and disadvantages and some techniques are more 
appropriate to solve particular decision problems than others (Mohagheghi et al., 
2017). An appropriate MCDM method to solve a decision making problem can only 
be selected once all the elements relating to the concerned problem have been designed 
in detail (Bufardi et al., 2004). There are some commonly known methods which use 
the MCDM approach to make decisions, which are briefly described in the following 
subsections. 
2.6.2.1. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The AHP technique is first introduced by Saaty (1980) in order to solve multiple 
criteria decision problems. It utilised a pairwise comparison technique to obtain 
relative weights of criteria base upon a hierarchical structure. Analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP) was recognized as the major method of decision making in the field of 
management engineering after the 1980’s since professor Saaty of University of 
Pittsburgh developed the AHP method in the 1980’s (Lee and Kim, 2013). The 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
method which is rigorously concerned with the scaling problem and what sort of 
numbers to use and how to correctly combine the priorities resulting from them (Saaty, 
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1990). The main aim of the method is to calculate the importance-weight of the 
criteria, and to obtain relative performance measures of the alternatives (Saaty, 1980).  
The AHP technique is suitable for dealing with complex systems that require making 
a choice from among several criteria, which provides a comparison of the considered 
options. One of the main advantages of this the method is the relative ease with which 
it handles multiple criteria. In addition to this, the AHP approach is easier to 
understand and it can effectively handle both qualitative and quantitative data. 
Moreover, it also has the capability to check and minimise inconsistencies in expert 
judgements, by computing a Consistency Ratio (CR) (Riahi et al., 2012). It is worth 
mentioning that a number of studies have been conducted by utilising the AHP method 
(Saaty, 2003). This method has been proven to be a powerful supporting tool for 
solving a wide variety of complex decision problems in different domains. Therefore, 
AHP method will be applied in this study to evaluate the relative importance of the 
human (HCFs) and more detail will be discussed in the later chapter (chapter 5).  
2.6.2.2 Decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL)  
The Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method was 
developed by the Geneva Research Centre of the Battelle Memorial Institute (Fontela 
and Gabus, 1976; Gabus and Fontela, 1973). It’s introduced to build the network of 
relationships map for illustrating the interrelations among factors/criteria (Liou et al., 
2007). Recently this method has proven to be a more successful tool for measuring 
and illustrating the causal relationships among interdependent factors (Özdemir, 
2015), it has been widely used to display the cause and effect groups of a system (or 
subsystem) by applying matrices and digraphs to visualize the structure of complicated 
causal relationships (Tzeng et al., 2007; Lin and Wu, 2008; Jeng et al., 2012; Elham 
et al., 2013). This method will be used in this study and more detail will be discussed 
in the chapter (chapter 5). 
2.6.2.3. Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
The technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), is one of 
the well-known ranking methods for MCDM that has been commonly used in solving 
decision-making problems (Ding, 2011). It was initially proposed by Hwang and Yoon 
(1981) to help in selecting the best alternative, and with a limited number of criteria 
as a simple ranking method in conception and application. The primary concept of the 
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TOPSIS method is that the preferred alternative should not only have the shortest 
distance from the positive ideal solution (PIS), but also have the farthest distance from 
the negative ideal solution (NIS)  (Hung and Chen, 2009). The positive ideal solution 
comprises all best values obtained of criteria, while the negative ideal solution 
comprise for the all worst values attained of criteria (Wang, and Chang, 2007). It is 
worth mentioning that numerous research study have been conducted by using 
(TOPSIS) to solve decision-making problem in various fields. This method is simple 
and less complex to use compared to other methods. Such advantages make this 
technique an appropriate method to be used in this research, in addition, it will assist 
the decision makers to choose the best countermeasures for mitigating human errors, 
and, preventing accidents from happening again. Thus, it will be presented as 
beneficial to the maritime industry.  
It is worth mentioning that there are many other techniques available for decision-
making methods such as the Analytic Networks Processes (ANP), Evidential 
Reasoning (ER), and so on. Nevertheless, given the strength of the three 
aforementioned methods (AHP, TOPSIS, and DEMATEL) in tackling complex 
problems and their ability to effectively evaluate the human factor that contributes to 
the occurrence of maritime accidents during pilotage operations, these techniques have 
therefore been utilized in this research. Such powerful methods have been fully utilised 
in this research and will be discussed in more detail in forthcoming chapters (chapters 
5, and 6).  
2.7 LITERATURE GAPS IDENTIFIED 
In the literature, a gap still exists with regard to the studies on human factors and 
maritime pilotage accidents. It was limited attention given to human related risk 
factors in the pilotage operations area. In recent years many research projects, 
regarding the maritime risk management issue have been conducted from several 
aspects, by using different methods in order to reduce the occurrence of maritime 
accidents in open sea areas, however it appears from a review of the literature that 
little research has been done in the maritime domain on issues related to the pilotage 
operation safety analysis issue, and until now, few studies have employed an 
appropriate evaluation method to examine how human factors contribute to the 
maritime pilotage accidents.  
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 The primary research gap was the lack of the comprehensive framework to 
evaluate (e.g., human related risk factors identification, assessment, and 
mitigation) safety performance in the pilotage operations. Currently, the 
attention that is given to human related risk factors’ measurement in this area 
is limited and needs further investigation. There is a distinct need for a new 
human-related measurement tool not only to meet the need of port stakeholders 
but also to develop diagnostic instruments to port and pilotage systems capable 
of supporting decision-making in solving complex pilotage operations 
problems in an uncertain environment. 
 The second research gap was related to the need for using a decision-making 
methods to overcome the shortcomings of the previous studies by introducing 
a new approach to identify the relative importance among accidents’ human 
causal factors in maritime pilotage operations, by taking subjective judgments 
of decision-makers into consideration. In spite of quantifying accidents’ 
human causal factors in maritime pilotage operations being type of multi-
criteria decision making (MCDM) problem, there is a limited (MCDM) study 
which focused on this kind of problem. 
 The third research gap identified was the lack of studies to examine the causal 
relationships and interdependencies among the human factors contributed to 
the pilotage accidents. Most of the previous research studies frequently ignored 
to evaluate the causal relationships among the human factors which 
contributed to the pilotage accidents, and few of these studies focused on 
analysing the interaction between accident causation factors using MCDM 
method. 
 The forth research gap identified was the lack of studies examining the risk 
mitigation measures in the pilotage operations environment using a decision-
making methods. In addition, limited studies have examined the efficiency of 




Within this context, this study will identify the human causal factors that affect 
maritime safety, with a particular emphasis on the pilotage operations. Moreover, this 
research will address the lack of appropriate measurement methods addressing the 
pilotage human error-related risk by proposing an integrated AHP and DEMATEL 
method, which allows for an inclusive understanding of independency relationships 
and interdependencies among the human factors contribute to the maritime pilotage 
accidents. Finally, the research will be concluded with an integrated AHP and TOPSIS 
method for determining the selection of appropriate risk mitigation measures to 
improve the safety and efficiency of maritime pilotage operations performance. 
2.8 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the concept of the maritime pilotage operations is described. This is 
followed by a brief description of human factors being a part of the human error 
element. Various studies that have been conducted related to human factors are also 
reviewed in this research. The role of the human factor in maritime pilotage accidents 
and detailed analysis of past pilotage incidents/accidents from 1995 to 2014 are 
presented in order to learn lessons from these past accidents and to learn from them 
what went wrong and how to avoid similar incidents. Brief descriptions of risk/safety 
assessment methods are provided. Finally, the research gap which will be addressed 













CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter aims to describe research methods that can adequately address the 
research questions in the previous chapter based on the research gaps found in the 
literature review. Thus, this chapter makes a link between the previous chapters 2 
(literature review) and the following chapter 4 (pilotage human factor related risk 
identification) and then chapter 5 (causal factors assessment) and 6 (risk mitigation 
measures for pilotage performance improvement). As the interests of this research 
comprises all three steps of the safety/risk assessment processes, namely risk factors 
identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation, one research method is not able to 
sufficiently cover the entire topic of finding optimal solutions that will ensure safety 
performance of maritime pilotage operations and reduce the human related risk . 
Rather, selection of appropriate research methods for each step will be more desirable, 
which eventually leads to Chapters four, five and six which are at the core of this 
thesis. 
Meanwhile, this chapter also helps for the selection of the appropriate methodology to 
validate and further develop the proposed model of this research. According to Blaikie 
(1993), “research methodology is a study which is discusses how theories are 
generated, and how particular theoretical perspectives can be related to particular 
research problems'' This chapter mainly deals with the whole issue of the research 
design, including research strategy and design, research methods, sampling selection, 
data collection and analysis techniques. Figure 3.1 provides an illustrative view of a 
methodological framework for the purpose of this research upon which the research 
methodology will be directed. 




Figure 3.1: Proposed methodology of pilotage operation safety performance 
improvement   
3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN 
Research design can be described as the basic research plan or method, which aims at 
responding to research questions and to seek the validity and viability of the research 
(Lewis et al., 2007). In this research, the researcher applied a hybrid research 
approach, comprised of qualitative and quantitative approaches in a sequential 
exploratory approach to elicit the key factors that are considered a significant and 
influencing the safety performance of pilotage operations.  In this study in order to 
satisfy the purposes of this research and meet the objectives of the researcher, both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are employed to identify, assess and mitigate 
human related risks in the pilotage operations environment. This thesis partially adopts 
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more than one method to collect data, such as interviews, questionnaires, and 
documents, more than one data sources and more than one method to analyse the data.   
In this research, the causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents were ascertained 
through a combination of primary and secondary source data. Primary data collection 
involves collecting new data, whereas secondary data collection concerns the 
collection of existing data. In this thesis in order to identify the human error related 
risk associated with the pilotage operations, literature review, questionnaire surveys, 
and interviews are adopted. To verify the comprehensiveness and validation of the 
identified risk factors as well as to examine the appropriateness of the risk 
classification method, questionnaire surveys have been conducted with experienced 
experts belonging to maritime industries of different geographical area from both the 
UK, and the Mediterranean. 
Another questionnaire survey was used for the data collection in risk assessment and 
mitigation stages. The data collection method applied in this thesis is mainly based on 
expert judgements. The obtained risk data are used as inputs of the proposed 
conceptual decision making framework to understand the priority of risks and 
evaluation of currently implemented risk mitigation measures. From the discussion, 
human factor measurement can be viewed as a typical multicriteria decision making 
(MCDM) problem under uncertainty as it involves multiple criteria of both 
quantitative and qualitative features to solve multi-dimensional and complicated 
problems. This study uses an MCDM approach as a data analysis technique such as 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP), DEMATEL, and technique for order preference by 
similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS). Full details about research methods and research 
techniques will be discussed in the subsequent sections.   
3.3 METHODOLOGY FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS  
This section presents a detailed explanation of the data collection and analysis methods 
used in the research. For the purpose of systematically identifying and understanding 
the relevant risk factors, it is necessary to employ an approach involving the use of 
both qualitative and quantitative methods to obtain and examine the risks along with 
justification. The first sub section describes the data collection method in each pilotage 
safety/risk assessment process.  More specifically, the first phase of questionnaire 
surveys and interviews covering the key concepts of the identified risk factors will be 
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conducted to validate the identified risk factors (HCFs) that were extracted from the 
existing resources, and to explore other contributory factors and potential causes 
which may contribute to accidents as well as the validation of the proposed 
classification method.  
The second and third phase of the questionnaire survey will be conducted to quantify 
the level of importance and interrelationships of the identified risks factors. The 
current implemented measures in the real-time context and the rules and regulations 
adopted by maritime organizations were reviewed, and empirical study (questionnaire 
surveys) were conducted to extract identified pilotage risk mitigation measures for 
further evaluation. Moreover, the last questionnaire survey is designed to acquire the 
priority ratings of identified measures for mitigating pilotage risks. The forthcoming 
sub-section presents the data analysis methods in each risk management phase. Table 
3.1 describes the methodologies for data collection and data analysis, which involves 
the three main risk management steps, and the related approaches and purposes of 
















Table 3.1: Summaries of the research methods for data collection and analysis 
Steps Approaches Purpose 
 
Risk factors identification 
Literature review  
(previous studies and  maritime 
accident investigations reports 
regarding pilotage operations 
events) 
To identify the existing risks 
causal factors contributing to 
pilotage accidents (HCFs) 
   Empirical studies  
Questionnaire survey,  telephone 
and face to face semi-structured 
interview 
To investigate validation of 
identified risk factors and explore 
if there are more risk factors that 
are not mentioned in previous 
studies.   
          Questionnaire survey,  
               interviews 
To investigate the reliability and 
validation of risk classification 
method, and further explore the 
appropriateness of the developed 
hierarchy model 
Risk assessment          Empirical studies 
(AHP questionnaire survey) 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) method 
To determine the relative weights 
and rank the importance of the 




             Empirical studies  
(DEMATEL questionnaire 
survey) 
Decision Making Trial and 
Evaluation Laboratory 
(DEMATEL) method. 
to identify the relationships 
among factors 
Risk mitigation measures 
identification 
To review the existing articles, the 
rules and regulations adopted by 
maritime organizations 
To identify the current 





 Empirical studies 
          (questionnaire survey) 
To validate the identified risk 
mitigation measures and explore 
the current implemented risk 
mitigation measures via maritime 
experts  
Risk mitigation measures 
evaluation 
         Empirical studies  
(TOPSIS questionnaire survey)  
Technique for Order Preference 
by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) method 
to rank and select the most ideal 




3.3.1. Data collection method 
This study conducts three types of data collection methods: online/offline 
documentation (secondary data collection), questionnaire surveys (primary data 
collection) and interviews (primary data collection). Secondary data collection 
concerns the collection of existing data, whereas primary data collection involves 
collecting new data. Due to the lack of the research done in this area, and to understand 
the research problem it is required to use an approach involving the use of multiple 
methods. In order to identify and understand the human factors that influence the 
pilotage safety performance, it is necessary to conduct an approach involving the use 
of both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect and investigate the risk source 
along with justification due to the limitation of the existing research in this field.  
In this thesis, empirical studies have been conducted to gain an understanding of 
human related risk factors that lead to accidents in the maritime pilotage operations 
area, and to identify the currently implemented risk mitigation measures. Empirical 
studies were conducted separately for chapters four, five, and six, respectively.  This 
study employs different types of structured questionnaire surveys for data collection 
(i.e. qualitative HCFs data collection, AHP questionnaire for HCFs weight, 
DEMATEL questionnaires for HCFs interdependency, TOPSIS questionnaire). 
The first sub-section introduces the data collection methods in the risk factors 
identification phase. In this stage questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews 
are conducted to identify risk factors as well as to construct an initial hierarchal 
structure as a taxonomy and test the validity of the appropriateness of the risk 
classification model. The second subsection discusses the data collection methods in 
the risk assessment phase. This step proposed another two questionnaire surveys B 
and C to evaluate the weight and assign the priority and relationships among the 
human related risk factors.  The third subsection describes the data collection methods 
of risk mitigation measures identification, validation, and evaluation.  Some sources 
of evidence i.e., careful literature review, rules and regulations adopted by maritime 
authorities, and questionnaire surveys with experts from maritime industries are 
utilized in order to identify the current implemented risk mitigation measures 
(RMMs). Then the questionnaire survey was conducted to analyse those identified 
measures by ranking their priority.  
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 This study employs a questionnaire survey because, questionnaire surveys can be 
considered as one of the main tools for collecting data to quantify the opinion and 
behaviour of individuals (Bryman and Bell, 2011). A questionnaire as an efficient tool 
to collect data is composed of structured questions that become data and can be 
statistically analysed. This study employs different types of structured questionnaire 
surveys for data collection (i.e. qualitative HCFs data collection, AHP questionnaire 
for HCFs weight, DEMATEL questionnaires for HCFs interdependency, TOPSIS 
questionnaire). 
 The advantages of a surveys and questionnaires is that data collection does not require 
a skilled interviewer to be present. The research questionnaire method is useful for 
quantitative and qualitative data collection because it reaches a wide variety of 
respondents through electronic media with less time spent to complete the survey and 
less cost (Saunders et al., 2012). In contrast, there are drawbacks of the questionnaire 
surveys: they cannot ask more questions that are not prominent to respondents, there 
is a risk of missing data, and they cannot gather further data (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
In order to avoid these drawbacks, questionnaires need to be short and easy to answer 
(closed questions) (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
For the purpose of this research as data required is qualitative and would require using 
an exploratory technique to probe for information clarification, a semi-structured 
qualitative interview method with marine experts was conducted. Qualitative 
interviews such as semi-structured interviews are an appropriate method for an 
exploratory study to seek what is taking place and to find out new insights (Saunders 
et al., 2012). Therefore, a semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method 
for this type of research (exploratory study), and has many advantages. It is reliable 
and efficient to extract maximum information from the interviewee and suitable to 
create a huge amount of data. In a semi-structured interview there is more flexibility 
for the interviewer to investigate the issues that arise during the interview and 
questions can be adapted. These advantages were presented by Saunders, (2009). This 
was further confirmed by Saunders et al, (2012) and Creswell and Creswell, (2017). 
3.3.1.1 Data collection methods in risk factors identification and classification 
To conduct the risk factors identification, the research continues with the empirical 
studies including the key definitions of (risk sources) the human factors that affect the 
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operators who are performing ships’ berthing operations (HCFs).  Chapter four 
presents a detailed description of data analysis and taxonomic diagram validation in 
the risk factors identification phase. Many methods can be utilised for identifying risk 
factors such as, interviews, relevant document review, group meetings, and historical 
data collection (Water, 2007). A literature review has also been used by researchers to 
identify the risks in the maritime sector (Moreton, 2000; Subramaniam, 2010; Saeed, 
2015; and Xi et al., 2017). This research first reviewed the relevant literature including 
the official documentation, historical data of the human factor in maritime pilotage 
accidents, and other published materials related to pilotage incidents/accidents from 
reliable organisations in order to identify the human factors related risk associated 
with ship operations in the pilotage environment and marine ports in the form of 
qualitative data. As has been mentioned in Chapter 2 and based on Saunders et al, 
(2009), the advantage of the literature review is that it saves time since it has already 
been collected, and it is also less expensive than other methods. It is also likely to be 
of higher-quality, and the data can be used in conjunction with the data collected 
through other qualitative methods such as experts' judgements.  
In this thesis through conducting a literature review in Chapter 2 human factors were 
identified in the first phase of the qualitative data collection. After this, to validate the 
identified risk factors and explore other potential contributory causal factors that play 
a major role in maritime accidents during pilotage operations a questionnaire survey 
and interviews involving 25 professional captains who have served long periods 
onboard a variety of vessels have been conducted. Thereafter, a panel of experienced 
experts belonging to maritime fields were invited to take part in order to develop and 
validate a structural hierarchy risk taxonomic diagram. 
In a survey research, a sample of the people is significant because the success of this 
type of study is dependent on the representativeness of the sample with respect to a 
target population of interest to the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Saunders 
(2009) suggested different techniques for the sampling design such as a probability 
sampling method (simple random, systemic, stratified random and multi-stage cluster 
samplings) and a non-probability sampling method (convenience, purposive, snowball 
and quota samplings). The non-probability sampling method is using a sample that has 
not been selected using a random selection method (Bryman and Bell, 2007). This 
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type of sampling is more suitable for in-depth qualitative research (Saunders et al., 
2012).  
 This research uses purposive sampling and snowball sampling. In purposive or 
judgmental sampling the method enables researchers to use their judgement to select 
cases that will best enable them to answer research question(s) and meet their 
objectives and, in snowball sampling, a researcher makes initial contact with a small 
group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these to establish 
contacts with others (Saunders et al. 2007).  This study targets the maritime industry 
as the population. 
 In order to obtain reliable views on a wider scale and to obtain multiple points of 
view, the participants of this study were selected from a variety of backgrounds and 
different geographical areas within the maritime domain. The respondents were 
chosen based on the following criteria: The first criterion for the selection of the 
(experts) participants was that they must hold a master mariner certificate of 
competency (an unlimited master licence). The second criterion, experts must be 
professionals who belong to the maritime industry including; professional ships’ 
captains who had served long periods on board a variety of vessels in shipping 
companies; experienced senior marine pilots and tug masters who had been working 
long periods in different ports companies. They were selected as the study focuses on 
pilotage operations and they are the main operators who are performing and play a 
significant role in achieving safe and successful piloting and berthing operations. 
Thus, they are key for avoiding marine accidents, so they could provide views on their 
performance through their long practical experience and observations during maritime 
pilotage operations, as well as giving significant information regarding the human 
element factors contributing to maritime accidents. Additionally, they can judge their 
associated pilotage operations performance, if they had faced any abnormality or 
difficulties during their tasks, and they can explain regarding the situation and the 
actions that were taken to handle the situation during the performed pilotage 
In addition, the participants included maritime educational institution staff who have 
a good understanding of marine operations risk research. Moreover, insurance and port 
company managers who are professionals in assessing and managing risks, and who 
could provide factual information and broader data regarding human errors and causes 
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of maritime accident that might occur during pilotage operations. The main factor in 
selecting these experts was based on their expertise that they have contributed in the 
fields related to the human risk factors. The criteria ensure that the professionals are 
sufficiently senior and knowledgeable to answer the questions and are able to provide 
reliable technical information and opinions on the research topic. Thus, their responses 
will give robustness to the study and can be relied upon in explaining the study 
objectives. 
 In this research structured questionnaire was developed with the purpose of 
investigating the effect of human factors on the safety of pilotage operations, and 
identifying the accidents’ causal factors in pilotage operations from the experts' 
perspective. Initially a draft version of the questionnaire was designed in line with 
research questions and the relevant studies to be completed in 30 minutes. The 
questionnaire designed for this stage of study used closed-ended questions including 
12 items, to validate the existing factors and opened-ended questions to explore other 
potential contributory causal factors that might influence safety performance of 
maritime pilotage operations. 
In order to investigate the feasibility, content validity of the developed risk factors and 
consent of its design, the proposed questionnaire was first examined by three ships’ 
captains with education level PhD degree who have a good understanding of marine 
operations risk research and are highly knowledgeable of human related risk 
associated with pilotage operations. They were asked to test the context and investigate 
the precision of questions in order to establish suitable questions to reach the final 
questionnaire. Based on their feedback, the final draft of the questionnaire was 
developed for data collection. Ethical approval was also obtained to further validate 
the questionnaire content and participant consent. A sample copy of this questionnaire 
is shown in Appendix II. 
Questionnaire surveys were conducted with twenty-five experienced seafarers to 
verify the extent to which any of the risk factors (HCFs) might impact on pilotage 
performance and contribute to maritime accidents. The number of responses was 
deemed acceptable for this study, as Saaty (2001) reported that just a small sampling 
size is required if the data collected are gathered from the experienced experts. This is 
due to that fact that experts should share consistent beliefs and thus reduce the 
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necessity for a large sample size. The detailed information on the experts and sample 
selection process are described in chapter 4. For further information, please refer to 
chapter 4. 
12 Statements were made and participants were asked to answer each statement using 
the following 5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree; disagree; neither agree nor 
disagree; agree; and strongly agree. This, as advocated by Saunders et al. (2012), can 
allow the participants to clearly express their perceptions with an adequate level of 
agreement with the statements given. The five-point Likert scale as a common 
measurement tool is considered the most widely used technique for scaling data in 
questionnaires, providing the respondent with a number of possible options from 
which to make a selection (Field, 2013). This method has been employed because, it 
is much easier for the researcher to analyse the data and for the potential participants 
to stay focused on the statements given and carefully respond to the questions.  Based 
on the Likert measurement, the quantitative data generated from the questionnaire has 
been analysed using the basic descriptive statistics. As pointed out by Woo et al., 
(2011), descriptive statistics is one of the statistical analysis methods for describing 
attributes in seaport research.  
In order to investigate the human factors that can affect pilotage operations’ safety, 
and to collect broader data regarding contributing factors to maritime accidents, a 
number of interviews were also carried out with experts belonging to different 
maritime sectors. For the purpose of this research as data required is qualitative and 
would require using an exploratory technique to probe for information clarification 
(Saunders et al, 2012), the method used in this study was a semi-structured qualitative 
interview method. Initially the requests for conducting interviews were sent, to 10 
professional experts with more than 10 years’ working experience from a variety of 
backgrounds and different geographical areas within the maritime domain, by 
letter/email depending on which addresses were known. However, 6 professionals 
among them replied positively to interview requests.  Interviews were held face-to-
face or telephonically. Of the six interviews, three interviews were conducted by 
telephone because of distance constraints. The details of the interview plan, sampling, 
related questions and interview administration are explained in chapter 4.  For further 
information, please refer to chapter 4.  
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Finally, and based on the obtained results, twenty-five factors have been identified and 
then summarized into a final hierarchy structure, which provides a comprehensive risk 
database to risk/safety pilotage operations research. 
Behind doing this, and after having identified the contributory factors of the pilotage 
accidents (HCFs) and before conducting the further larger-scale risk assessment 
survey (to measure their weight priority and inter-relationships), these risk factors 
(HCFs) are designed in a hierarchal order forming the contributory factors of the 
pilotage accidents (HCFs). Questionnaires were conducted and distributed to the 
“validation team” by email to ensure the applicability and appropriateness of the 
hierarchy structure.  
In this important step and based on previous maritime safety studies related with 
human factors and risk classification model, with assistance of two experienced ship’s 
captains a hierarchal structure as a taxonomy is initially constructed, those experts 
were academic with education level PhD degree from an educational institution, staff 
who have more than 10 years teaching and researching experience and have a good 
understanding of marine operations risk research. They had also served long periods 
on board a variety of vessels which are navigating and visiting sea ports worldwide.  
First of all, the two experts were invited to construct the preliminary taxonomy and 
provide their opinion with respect to the level of each factor. They were asked to help 
in categorising and placing the accident causal factors in the correct position in the 
taxonomy. They were asked to classify twenty-five factors which can represent their 
associated main factors (categories) and sub factors and if necessary, modification, 
removal, division and combination are allowable. Through the iterations and 
feedbacks, some factors (HCFs) were modified, removed, and combined. Instead of 
twenty-five factors identified, the experts selected only twenty-one factors and 
classified the factors into five main group factors, each group was then divided into 
several sub-factors (see chapter 4).  
Thereafter, to assure the validity and confirm the reliability of the developed hierarchy 
diagram, a panel consisting of six experienced experts belonging to the maritime sector 
were consulted. Emails distributed questionnaire and face-to-face and telephone 
interviews with the validation team were subsequently conducted. The experts were 
77 
 
all experienced ship masters who have been working in shipping and port industries 
for more than 10 years. They were asked to review and validate the effectiveness of 
the developed taxonomy and to confirm if the identified factors were grouped in 
accordance with their characteristics and grouped factors were presented in a hierarchy 
properly. Finally, experts agreed and the developed hierarchy diagram was accepted 
without any modification. The identified risk factors are summarized into a final 
hierarchy structure, which would be followed by the analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) for ranking the set of criteria raised. The details of the identification and 
classification process, are explained in chapter 4.  For further information, please refer 
to chapter 4. 
3.3.1.2 Data collection methods in risk assessment stage  
Following the questionnaire development procedures described in the previous 
section, the questionnaire surveys B and C in respect of risk assessment stage are 
constructed to elicit expert opinion on the pilotage operations human risk factors 
regarding their weight priority and inter-relationships.  Draft copies of the suggested 
questionnaires, AHP questionnaire for HCFs weight, and DEMATEL questionnaires 
for HCFs interdependency were sent to the supervisory team to be approved. Based 
on the comments of the supervisory team, the questionnaires were adjusted and then 
the final versions were completed. In this study, the developed questionnaires were 
sent via email to the experienced experts from the maritime field with more than 10 
years working experience. The participants of this study were selected from different 
geographical areas within the maritime domain.  Full explanations and discussion in 
respect of those two questionnaire survey procedures are presented in Chapter five.  
3.3.1.3 Data collection methods in risk mitigation measures identification and analysis  
The current implemented risk mitigation measures will firstly be identified, validated, 
and finally evaluated. Based on the results obtained from the risk assessment phase of 
this thesis, in order to identify the risk mitigation measures in the pilotage  operation, 
firstly the most relevant studies that can reflect the latest information about the current 
situation of the last implemented risk mitigation measures in maritime pilotage are 
reviewed.  Followed by reviewing the recommendations, regulations and rules adopted 
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by maritime authorities for maritime pilotage safety performance improvement, and 
questionnaire surveys with marine experts are conducted.  
In order to identify the relevant risk mitigation measures with regard to the identified 
risk factors, the current implemented measures in the real-time context and the rules 
and regulations adopted by maritime organizations were reviewed. In order to explore 
mitigation measures that have not been mentioned in the literature and other 
documentation, a further questionnaire survey was conducted. 
 Following the same procedure of developing the questionnaire survey above, 
questionnaire surveys have been conducted to validate and identify more risk 
mitigation measures. The developed questionnaires D were sent to the experienced 
experts with more than 10 years’ working experience from a variety of backgrounds 
and different geographical areas within the maritime domain, from both the UK, and 
the Mediterranean maritime industries.  The implemented risk mitigation measures 
were introduced to the experts, and they were asked to decide whether the identified 
measures are relevant or not and to identify more risk mitigation measures.  In 
addition, these experts were asked if they would be willing to accept the invitation to 
view the survey in advance to evaluate these identified measures. In the last phase, 
depending on the results obtained from above questionnaire, another questionnaire 
survey was conducted with experts aiming to evaluate the efficiency of the identified 
risk mitigation measures with relation to each risk factor. The finalised questionnaire 
D is attached in Appendix IIII. Full explanations and discussion in respect of those 
two questionnaire survey procedures are presented in Chapter 6.  
3.3.2 Data analysis methods  
Data analysis is considered one of the most important steps in any research study 
because it investigates and clarifies the data collected through the research process so 
that conclusions can be reached. As Yin (2009) stated, some specific methodologies 
and techniques are required to analyse collected data in order to produce high quality 
results. In this sense, to reduce potential analytical difficulties, as Yin (2014) pointed 
out, researchers should organise a clear strategy for data analysis to ensure using 
appropriate analytical tools that serve the ultimate research aims. For this study, as 
discussed earlier, a mixed methods strategy was chosen as an appropriate method in 
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this research. As a result, the process of analysis commenced firstly with the use of 
AHP and DEMATEL methods to analyse the survey results from questionnaire B and 
C respectively and further TOPSIS has been utilized to analyse the survey results from 
questionnaire D. For the purpose of ensuring the reliability and consistency of the 
gathered data, a series of tests (e.g. consistency check) should be conducted prior to 
carrying out the evaluation of risk factors and mitigation strategic research. The 
procedure of applying each model and producing a high-quality data analysis will be 
presented in Chapter five and Chapter six.     
3.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has explained and introduced the various research designs in an effort to 
lay down the basics for the research. It has presented the main philosophical views 
behind the research methodologies. Different research perspectives, research types, 
data collection methods, data collection techniques and data sources were described. 
The chapter explains in detail the reasons behind the selection of research methods 
and techniques for the present study. In this chapter, various research methodologies 
were reviewed based on the previous studies. Based on the literature study, the 
appropriate methodologies for this research were identified and outlined. The 
techniques for the data collection and analysis by conducting the empirical studies 
have been described in this chapter.  
 There are three main parts of the data collection methods, which are: (1) data 
collection methods in risk factors identification, validation, and classification (2) data 
collection methods in the risk assessment phase, and (3) data collection methods in 
risk mitigation measures identification, validation and evaluation.  In the first part, the 
risk factors are identified through literature review, the historical data of the accident 
reports of the maritime accident/ incidents investigations reports and then the 
validation, exploration, and categorization of the identified risks are done through 
questionnaire survey and interview with both industrial and academic experts. Next, 
another two questionnaire surveys are conducted for the assessment of risk factors. In 
the last part, the implemented risk mitigation measures are identified and validated by 
conducting the empirical studies (e.g. questionnaire survey). 
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 In order to evaluate the identified risk mitigation strategies, a mitigation-measures 
questionnaire survey is conducted. This enables the researcher to select the most 
efficient risk mitigation measures. The techniques for the analysis of data are based 
on the employment of combined AHP, DEMATEL and TOPSIS for the risk 
assessment and mitigation strategy evaluation.  In the next chapter the significant 
contributory factors of the pilotage accidents (HCFs) are identified and a preliminary 
model with a hierarchal structure as a taxonomy for causal factors contributing to 















CHAPTER FOUR: RISK FACTORS IDENTIFICATION AND 
CLASSIFICATION 
4.1 SUMMARY 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a comprehensive risk factors identification 
model within the context of the maritime pilotage operations. This chapter describes 
the methods and techniques used to identify and classify the human factor related risks 
influencing the maritime pilotage operations safety. In this research, the identifying of 
the human causal factors that contribute to pilotage accidents (HCFs) was 
accomplished through a combination of primary and secondary source data. After 
having identified the causal factors of pilotage accidents, a taxonomy is then 
developed and validated.  
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
The extensive review of the literature in Chapter 2 provides an outline for critical 
insight into the maritime related risks factors. Additionally, the literature review of 
maritime accidents and safety/risk analysis and their use in the marine and other safety 
critical industries, in addition to the experts’ perspectives, has provided a valuable 
input, as it indicates the type of human casual factors (HCFs) that need to be addressed.  
The visibility of the human factor related risks is one of the most challenging aspects 
of pilotage operations risk/safety management, it is therefore, essential to 
comprehensively identify human related risk factors existing in this area. Identifying 
the major causes of accidents and taking proper measures to mitigate further potential 
accidents are necessary for controlling the risks threatening the safety of pilotage 
operations. Within this research the term ‘HCFs’ is used to describe the human causal 
factors contributing to pilotage accidents which are not directly related to the risk 
factors applying to the a ship navigating in the open sea areas. Nevertheless, the same 
has been applied to address this problem.  
Firstly, to build a new organized classification model in the context of pilotage 
operations, the identification of potential human causal factors (HCFs) is conducted. 
Initially, based on a literature review including the previous related studies and marine 
accident investigation reports, then a questionnaire survey and interviews with marine 
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experts were carried out. The procedure for human factor related risks identification 
and classification is one of the most significant steps in the pilotage risk/safety 
assessment process.  
 
 







4.3. THE ACCIDENTS HUMAN CAUSAL FACTORS (HCFs) IDENTIFICATION 
AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESS 
This chapter presents the first step of the risk assessment process, i.e. human factors 
contributing to the maritime pilotage accidents identification and classification. 
Identification of the relevant pilotage operations human related risk factors is the vital 
step for employing efficient risk management in the maritime industry. This study 
consisted of three main steps as shown in Fig. 4.1. Firstly, this research started with 
identifying the human relate risk factors that have been addressed in the relevant works 
of literature (shown in Chapter two), in addition, as mentioned previously, this study 
reviewed the previous relevant studies which have been conducted related to human 
factors and maritime accidents and other published materials such as analysis of 
various reports of investigations into real world maritime incidents relating to vessels 
under pilotage operations during the period 1995 and 2015.  
The main philosophy behind it is to obtain an understanding of the concept of 
accidents, and to determine the causes and contributory factors which may negatively 
influence mooring operations’ safety and play a central role in the causal chain of 
maritime accidents. As determining the root causes of the accidents is extremely 
important in improving the maritime safety and mitigating the possibility of its 
occurring in future (Ugurlu et al., 2015). Consequently, this step enables the decision 
maker to provide extra and reliable evidence regarding the human factors contributing 
to pilotage accidents. 
To ensure that all the causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents (HCFs) are 
identified, survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews with experienced 
marine experts were carried out in this study, attempting to validate and test the 
feasibility of the selected factors, as well as to explore new potential causes that may 
affect pilotage performance. This step leads up to in a composite the human causal 
factors affecting (HCFs) safety performance in the marine pilotage environment. After 
having identified the 25 risk factors (HCFs) and based on previous maritime safety 
studies related to human factors with assistance of maritime experts, a preliminary 
hierarchical structure for these factors (HCFs) was developed. The developed 
hierarchical structure of the identified risk factors is then modified and further 
validated through experienced marine experts. 
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4.3.1 Empirical study for risk factors (HCFs) identification  
Identification of critical risks for pilotage operations is a challenging problem, due to 
insufficient availability of data and the limitation of information. It is also very 
difficult to investigate the risks that influence ship masters and marine pilots’ 
personality characteristics on their attitudes towards risk, and the probability of error 
in maritime pilotage operations, due to the lack of evidence. Therefore, identifying the 
risk factors that might influence on human performance can be studied by using expert 
methods. As Long (2014) has explained the benefit of empirical studies is to verify 
current existing or newly proposed collected evidence about research on the basis of 
empirical data. 
 In this research in order to identify the human causal factors that impair the efficiency 
of pilotage performers, the primary research method was conducted in two phases. 
The first phase dealt with data collection by means of a survey, the second stage 
consisted of activities related to face-to-face and telephone interviews with 
professionals experts belonging to various sectors of the maritime industry. The 
researcher tried to combine, integrate and apply mixed methods to benefit from the 
advantages of each method and obtain accurate and reliable results.  
4.3.1.1. Questionnaire survey 
4.3.1.1.1 Procedure for developing questionnaire survey and sample selections 
 In this research a structured questionnaire was designed with the purpose of 
investigating and identifying the human factors influencing the safety performance of 
pilotage operations, and identifying the accidents’ causal factors in pilotage operations 
from the experts' perspective. The data was obtained and content validity was 
performed to improve the clarity of the developed questionnaire. At first and based on 
secondary source data, a draft version of questionnaire was designed to be completed 
in 30 minutes. In order to investigate the feasibility, content validity of the developed 
risk factors and consent of its design, the proposed questionnaire was first examined 
by three ships’ captains with education level PhD degree who have a good 
understanding of marine operations risk research and are highly knowledgeable of 
human related risk associated with pilotage operations. They were asked to test the 
context and investigate the precision of questions in order to establish suitable 
questions to reach to the final questionnaire. Based on their feedback, the final draft 
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of the questionnaire was developed for data collection. Ethical approval was also 
obtained to further validate the questionnaire content and participant consent. A 
sample copy of this questionnaire is shown in Appendix II.1.  
Once the questionnaire was developed initially it was sent to professionals to be 
completed electronically through an online survey tool as well as distributed by e-
mails. However, because of the difficulty of finding experts in this field, this study 
used purposive sampling and the snowball sampling method for the sampling 
processes. In purposive sampling, it is assumed that a researcher depends on his or her 
own knowledge when selecting members of the population to be included in the 
sample (Saunders et al. 2007).  The Snowball sampling method is a non-probability 
sampling technique (Black, 2010), in which a researcher begins with a small 
population of known members and extends the sample by asking those initial 
participants to identify others that should participate in the study. Snowball sampling 
is commonly used when it is hard to identify individuals of the required population 
(Saunders et al., 2007), and the experts are difficult to reach (Yang et al, 2016).  
In this study at first one ship’s master and two experienced senior marine pilots from 
different geographical areas within the maritime industry (UK, and Mediterranean) 
who were known and available were located for the questionnaire survey. They were 
asked to distribute the questionnaire and provide a named list of experts in this 
working environment for more questionnaire surveys. The respondents were requested 
to complete an item survey with responses collated anonymously. Finally, only 25 
survey responses were completed and returned. The number of responses was deemed 
acceptable for this study, as Saaty (2001) reported that just a small sampling size is 
required if the data collected are gathered from experienced experts. This is due to that 
fact that experts should share consistent belief and thus reduce the necessity for a large 
sample size. The detailed information of the experts is described in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. 
4.3.1.1.2 Sample Characteristics  
In order to obtain reliable views on a wider scale and to obtain multiple points of view, 
the participants of this study were selected from a variety of backgrounds and different 
geographical areas within the maritime industry. The respondents were chosen based 
on the following criteria: The first criterion for the selection of the (experts) 
participants was that they must hold a master mariner certificate of competency (an 
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unlimited master license). The second criterion, experts must be professionals who  
belong to the maritime industry including; professional ships’ captains who had served 
long periods onboard a variety of vessels; experienced senior marine pilots and tug 
masters who had been working long periods in ports and performed pilotage 
operations.  
 In addition, maritime educational institution staff who have a good understanding of 
marine operations risk research. Moreover, insurance and port company managers 
who are professionals in assessing and managing risks, and who could provide factual 
information and broader data regarding human errors and causes of maritime accident 
that might occur during pilotage operations.  
The main factor in selecting these experts was based on their expertise that they have 
contributed in the fields related to the human risk factors as illustrated in Figure 4.2 
and 4.3. The criteria ensures that the professionals are sufficiently senior and 
knowledgeable to answer the questions and are able to provide reliable technical 
information and opinions on the research topic. Thus their responses will gives 
robustness to the study and can be relied upon in explaining the study objectives. 
4.3.1.1.3 Questionnaire structure  
The research question that formed the basis for this study was:  How does the human 
factor contribute to maritime accidents. The questionnaire consisted of three parts, 
closed and open-ended questions as following: 
Part A. Feedback and professional background 
This section contained a set of questions intended to obtain information about the 
respondents’ background, to define the position held by the respondents and practical 
experience. The figure. 4.2, and 4.3 show the distribution of respondent’s occupation 
and work experience. 
Part B.  Validation of pilotage operations related risk factors (HCFs) 
As has been discussed previously, the previous studies and the analysis of the past 
marine accident investigation reports showed that the main cause of the accidents 
which occurred was the human factor, and in the majority of cases reviewed this was 
due to human error.  For this reason, the questionnaire survey is conducted with the 
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experienced seafarers to verify the extent to which any of the existing risk factors 
(HCFs) might impact on pilotage performance and contribute to maritime accidents. 
12 Statements were made and participants were asked to answer each statement using 
the following 5- points Likert scale: strongly disagree; disagree; neither agree nor 
disagree; agree; and strongly agree. This, as stated by Saunders et al. (2012), can allow 
the participants to clearly express their perceptions with an adequate level of 
agreement with the statements given. This method has been employed because, it is 
much easier for the researcher to analyse the data and for the potential participants to 
stay focused on the statements given and carefully respond to the questions which 
would be followed by the  Analytic hierarchy Process (AHP) for ranking the set of 
criteria raised. 
Part C.  Exploration of additional risk factors (HCFs) from the participants’ view point 
In this part of the questionnaire, in order to explore if any other remaining factors were 
yet to be determined, participants were asked their opinion to add any other factors 
that may affect pilotage operations’ safety performance. The question was as follows: 
From your experience do you know any additional risk factors (HFCs) that might 
negatively affect pilotage operations’ safety performance? , Have you had any issues 
or incidents in the past affecting the safety of the ship piloting? These particular 
questions were asked in order to provide the participants of the survey the opportunity 
to give their views through their observations and long practical experience during 
pilotage operations about the influential human factors and causes which might 
contribute to maritime accidents. Each participant was able to add any comment they 
felt necessary. 
4.3.1.2 Interviews  
In order to investigate the human factors that can affect pilotage operations safety, and 
to collect broader data regarding contributing factors to maritime accidents, a number 
of interviews were carried out with experts belonging to different maritime sectors. 
Initially the requests for conducting interviews were sent to 10 professionals by 
letter/email whichever addresses were known. However, 6 professionals among them 
replied positively to interview requests.  Interviews were held face-to-face or 
telephonically. Of the six interviews, three interviews were conducted by telephone 
because of distance constraints.  
88 
 
In this approach the interviewer requires a fair degree of understanding about the 
subject area to be able to know when to probe further, what to ask and to understand 
clearly the answers provided (Fletcher et al., 2003; Saunders et al., 2012). In this study 
the interviews were conducted by the author himself and were done individually and 
there was no obligation to take part. It is worth mentioning that the author has worked 
as a senior pilot in one of the biggest commercial ports in the Mediterranean Sea and 
held a first-class category licence which allows him to piloting all types of ships and 
unlimited tonnage, for almost 12 years in the period 2000-2012. The writer has gained 
long-term experience and sufficient practical knowledge related to pilotage operation 
issues. As a result, it was possible during the interview to adjust questions and to ask 
supplementary questions to follow up the themes and statements from the respondents.   
The questions in the interview do not have to be asked in the same order as in the 
interview guide. The interview method was flexible and gave the interviewer more 
options to add any comment felt necessary during the interview. It also provided an 
opportunity to correct misunderstandings. Respondents also had considerable freedom 
to formulate answers in their own way. Each interview started with a brief introduction 
by the interviewer, explaining to the respondents the main purpose and usefulness of 
the discussion. This was to gain the interviewees’ trust while making them feel 
comfortable at the same time, so as to achieve their honest and significant contribution.  
The main question that formed the basis for this study was, how does the human factor 
influence pilotage operations’ safety performance? The interview is divided into three 
parts: 1) the interviewee is asked to think of the human factor he considers to be the 
risk factor that might influence negatively on pilotage operations performance, the 
interviewee is asked to describe a real case from his own experience that was 
particularly challenging, 2) the interviewee was also asked to validate the factors that 
are presented in the developed questionnaire and suggest additional factors, 3)  issues 
related with risk mitigation measures were also discussed in the interviews. Each 
interview was conducted for approximately 60 to 90 minutes. Notes were taken during 
the interview since it was considered the best way to document the results. Lastly, 





4.3.1.2.1 The interviewee’s background 
The telephone interviews were held with two senior pilots, and one tug master who 
had been working in one of the biggest ports in the Mediterranean for more than 20 
years. One telephone interview was held with the Director of Loss Prevention Standard 
P&I Club who has served 9 years onboard a variety of vessels, and sailed as master on 
gas tankers. Subsequently, he worked as marine superintendent for an oil/gas/chemical 
ship Management Company, followed by a spell as an external independent surveyor. 
For the last five years he has worked as internal surveyor for Standard P&I Club and 
took over as Director of Loss Prevention in 2013.  
A face to face interview was conducted with an experienced senior pilot who has been 
working in shipping and port industries more than 25 years. He has served long periods 
onboard a variety of ships, four years as ship master, two years as marine operations 
and safety manager, and 20 years as a marine senior pilot in the port of Liverpool and 
currently working as a lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University. In addition, a 
face to face interview was also held with a master mariner who has vast experience as 
a director in the maritime sector, he worked for a long period of time as a marine pilot 
in one of the most significant ports in the Middle East. In addition, he has held many 
positions such as: harbour master, director of maritime affairs, assistant chairman of 
port, and acting chairman of port management. All the professionals experts 
mentioned above are sufficiently senior and knowledgeable to answer the questions, 
and are able to provide reliable technical information and opinions on the research 
topic 
4.3.1.3 The survey results  
Twenty-five survey responses were received. In this section, feedback and results from 
questionnaire responses were analysed and presented in this section. This section will 
be structured into three sub-sections, the first relating to professional background, the 







4.3.1.3.1 The survey professional background 
The first part of the questionnaire question was addressed in order to obtain 
information about the respondents’ background, to define the position held by the 
respondents, and the period of their practical experience.  
 The survey respondents’ position 
The pie chart shown in fig 4.2 illustrates the position held by the survey respondents. 
It is highlighted that the survey participants belonged to various sectors of the maritime 
industry, 40% of respondents were pilots, 32% were ship masters, whereas 8% were 
tug masters, and the rest were managers or insurers or academics. The majority of the 
respondents were ship masters and pilots who have the overall responsibility of ship 
berthing. 
                                
                    Fig. 4.2 The survey respondent’s profession and position 
 
The survey respondent’s experience 
The survey respondents were asked to provide information about their background and 
to outline a bit about the time period they have spent at sea so far. The intention for 
the question was to uncover the respondents’ experience in years. The results show 
that almost half of the respondent had between 8 and 12 years of experience, whilst 























7 years of experience. Meanwhile, 32% of respondents had over 20 years experience 
in the maritime field (Figure. 4.3). 
 
 
                                Figure 4.3 The experience period of the respondents. 
This study utilised a questionnaire containing three parts, A, B and C. Part B consists 
of twelve items related to the identified risk factors (HCFs), closed ended questions 
were designed to verify the extent to which any of the identified risk factors (HCFs) 
affect performance and contribute to maritime accidents. For the purpose of this 
research, 12 Statements were made and 25 participants were asked to answer each 
statement using the following 5 point Likert scale. This method was adopted to capture 
the degree of importance of the identified risk factors (HCFs). This, as stated by 
Saunders et al. (2012), can allow the participants to clearly express their perceptions 
with an adequate level of agreement with the statements given. Sekaran, (2000) has 
also pointed out that ‘a Likert’ scale is a widely accepted technique to reflect the 
amount of agreement of disagreement with a variety of statements about some beliefs, 
attitudes, person or objects.   
 Based on the Likert measurement, the quantitative data generated from the 
questionnaire has been analysed using the basic descriptive statistics. As described by 
Shannon (2000) and Saunders et al. (2007), descriptive statistics is a statistical analysis 
method for describing attributes. According to Saunders et al. (2012), in research, the 
three most frequently used tools of statistical measurement are median, mean and 
standard deviation. Therefore, the data collected from the questionnaire survey was 
analysed employing a variety of statistics, including; Cronbach's Alpha, frequencies, 
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value of mean, standard deviation, value of median, and Cronbach's Alpha. 
Cronbach’s alpha tests to see if multiple-question Likert scale surveys are reliable. 
Cronbach's Alpha  
Cronbach’s alpha, α (or coefficient alpha), developed by Lee Cronbach in 1951, is the 
first process used in statistical analysis and the most common measure of ‘internal 
consistency’ (reliability). It is most commonly used when you have multiple Likert 
questions in a survey/questionnaire that form a scale and you wish to determine if the 
scale is reliable (Yin, 2014). Cronbach’s alpha will tell you if the test you have 
designed is accurately measuring the variable of interest. It should be mentioned that 
the reliability of the questionnaire survey is closely associated with its validity. A 
questionnaire survey cannot be valid unless it is reliable. Accordingly, ‘internal 
consistency’ (reliability) test was carried out to test whether the study measures the 
required items and the reliability of the received responses. 





Where: N = the number of items,  
c̄ = average covariance between item-pairs.  
v̄ = average variance. 
While it’s good to know the formula behind the concept, however, in this study, the 
reliability of the obtained results was evaluated by using the Cronbach's Alpha (α) 
method (Sijtsma, 2009) by employing the SPSS Statistics. It is most widely used 
because the method is much easier to use in comparison with other estimates as it only 
requires one test administration (Sijtsma, 2009).   
 
Cronbach’s Alpha ranges from 0 to 1, and the measurement instrument is considered 
to be more rigorous as long as this indicator is closer to 1 (Chomeya, 2010; Field, 
2013). The overall Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the data set in this study is 0.961, 
which indicates that the chosen item is consistent and reliable (see table 4.1). It can be 
concluded that the survey obtains a high level of internal consistency (reliability).  
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                         Table 4.1 the reliability test for the questionnaire survey 



















Table 4.3 shows the frequency and percentage of the survey participant’s response 







Agree Total Percent 
Lack of effective communication and language 
barriers (HCF1) 
0 0 0 60% 40% 25 100.0 
Lack of team work  (HCF2) 4% 4% 4% 40% 48% 25 100.0 
Failure to exchange the information  (HCF3) 0 0 0 88% 12% 25 100.0 
Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan  
(HCF4) 
0 0 8% 64% 28% 25 100.0 
 Distraction  (HCF5) 0 0 4% 52% 44% 25 100.0 
 Lack of situation awareness  (HCF6) 0 0 0 84% 16% 25 100.0 
 Lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational 
equipment knowledge  (HCF7) 
0 0 0 60% 40% 25 100.0 
 Failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in 
COLREG (HCF8) 
0 0 8% 64% 28% 25 100.0 
Pilot boarding and disembarking too close to 
breakwater (HCF9) 
0 0 8% 56% 36% 25 100.0 
 Mental and physical work load (HCF10) 0 0 12% 48% 40% 25 100.0 
 Stress (HCF11) 0 0 8% 72% 20% 25 100.0 
 Fatigue (HCF12) 0 0 8% 68% 24% 25 100.0 
 
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for the risk factors (HCFs) 
Risk factors (HCFs)  
Sum  Mean 
 
Midian SD 
Lack of effective communication and language barriers (HCF1) 25 4.60 5 0.500 
Lack of team work  (HCF2) 25 4.24 4 1.012 
Failure to exchange the information  (HCF3) 25 4.88 5 0.332 
Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan  (HCF4) 25 4.56 5 0.651 
 Distraction  (HCF5) 25 4.48 5 0.586 
 Lack of situation awareness  (HCF6) 25 4.84 5 0.374 
 Lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational equipment  
knowledge  (HCF7) 
25 4.60 5 0.500 
 Failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in COLREG (HCF8) 25 4.56 5 0.651 
Pilot boarding and disembarking too close to breakwater (HCF9) 25 4.48 5 0.653 
 Mental and physical work load (HCF10) 25 4.36 4 0.700 
 Stress (HCF11) 25 4.64 5 0.638 





Tables 4.4 illustrates the Sum, weighted Average and Standard Deviation (S.D.), and 
the ranking of the identified human related risk factors on the basis of expert 
judgements. In the questionnaire survey, the experts were asked to answer at which 
point they would mark to agree with or disagree with the given statements using a 
five-point Likert scale (i.e. 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= neither agree nor 
disagree, 4= agree and 5= strongly agree).  
The average of the Likert scale will be 3 which can be calculated by (1+2+3+4+5)/5), 
therefore, where the mean average above 3 will show an agreement (extremely 
influence, strongly satisfied) with the statements meanwhile the mean average below 
3 will indicate overall disagreement (do not influence, strongly dissatisfied) with the 
statements (Table 4.2). Though the mean average is most frequently applied as a 
measure of central tendency compared to other measurements such as median, 
however, applying the mean alone will not be sufficient to describe and to give clear 
information and a frequency distribution about the data. Therefore, one of the 
important points that must be considered is measuring the standard deviation which is 
considered as a much more accurate and detailed estimate of dispersion or variation. 
Moreover, the small value of standard deviation indicates the tendency of data to 
similarity and homogeneity. The mean for each of these questions is above 4 which 
indicates that respondents ‘mostly agree’ and also what makes it more important is the 
fact that the standard deviation is far below 1 which shows that participants share the 
same belief and there is not any polarisation of their views.   
In this study the significance of each identified risk factor is ranked to suggest the 
significant and influential factors to pilotage operations. The results analysis according 
to the statistical means demonstrated that the weighted average values of the 12 risk 
factors are almost very high which clearly demonstrates agreement among the 
participants that the aforementioned risk factors are significant and contributing 
factors to maritime accidents.  Nevertheless, although the invited participants 
consisting of experts from different academic and industry fields and countries, the 
results reflect the consensus of their opinion. This implies that the experts have similar 
perspectives on the determined causal factors (HCFs) and their effects on the safety 
performance of the pilotage operations.  
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4.3.1.4 Findings from the survey and interviews   
The second part of the questionnaire was to know to what extent the human factors 
affects maritime pilotage safety performance. The finding of the survey and interviews 
in the current study show that most of the participants share common beliefs and 
agreed that the abovementioned risk factors influence the safety performance of 
pilotage operations (table 4.3 and 4.4). In this section, data collected from the survey 
responses were collected and presented in the following sections: 
4.3.1.4.1. Lack of effective communication and language barriers and their effects on 
pilotage operations   
The participants of the survey were asked to express their views on language problems 
and poor communication and their impact on pilotage operations safety. This item in 
the survey assessed the respondent’s views on whether or not they felt that accidents 
occurred during pilotage operations because of lack of effective communication and 
misunderstanding between the pilots, and the ship’s crewmember as result of language 
problems. Data from the survey shows that most of the participants agreed with the 
statement that the lack of effective communication due to poor language of crew 
members or pilot is a significant cause which negatively affects the safety of pilotage 
operations.  
The same questions were asked to the interviewees. The responses collected from the 
interview participants strongly support the statement, and the sweeping majority of the 
interviewees agreed that the low-level English language skills of the operators 
resulting in ineffective communication and this ineffective communication negatively 
affects the safety of the pilotage operations. The interview participants confirmed that 
the proper knowledge of English clearly facilitates communication and leads to fewer 
accidents.  
One interviewee reported that when English language skills are insufficient, this will 
lead to an increase of misunderstandings and lack of communication between the pilot 
and ship crew members, the language barrier is a significant risk factor which impedes 
communication among members of the bridge team. He stressed the fact that English 
has conquered seas worldwide and has become necessary to communicate onboard 




Most of the interviewees confirmed that efficient pilotage is mainly dependent upon 
the effectiveness and understanding of the communications between the pilot and the 
bridge team members, between master and crewmembers as well as between pilot and 
assistant parties such as shore staff, mooring boats and tugs when manoeuvring. It was 
further stated that, during ship berthing when crewmembers, ship’s captain and pilot 
onboard ships do not speak the same language, and English language communication 
ability is insufficient, this increases the risk of misunderstandings, and can cause 
undesirable situations which will negatively affect the safety of ship berthing.  
One of the interviewees who is working as a senior pilot, when he illustrated his 
experience with an Asian captain, stated that during the manoeuvring whilst on board 
a ship he was unable to communicate with the captain because of the language barrier, 
the captain consistently said "Yes Mr. pilot" whilst he did not understand. This resulted 
in an undesirable situation for the captain and he was very disturbed because the cadet 
on board the ship had to translate the pilot’s instructions to him.  
An important point raised by the senior pilot was that, “I find with some of the crews 
that if they are not really good at English they have to translate into their own language 
before they can interpret and then they respond having translated back to English. That 
translation take a lot of the time, creates misinterpretation, doesn’t create the required 
response, does not create the required action, and that can induce errors. Language is 
always the cause, it’s causation for sure in incidents”. The senior pilot went on to state 
“how do I manoeuvre and conduct the safe navigation and berthing of the vessel if I 
do not have a line of communication with the prime member of the bridge team". 
One expert mentioned that, you can’t expect every tug master and the other assistant 
parties in every port to be able to speak in the English language, as that will simply 
not be the case and consequently, during ship berthing the port pilot will communicate 
with the port/tugs in a different language that the ship’s staff will not understand, 
making it difficult for the ship’s master and crew members to recognise the pilot’s 
actions and to monitor any subsequent actions taken by those external parties, as well 
as to be fully aware of the situation. As a result, the safety of the ship’s manoeuvring 
will be negatively affected. 
A study has been carried out by Hsu (2012) showed that when a pilot is communicating 
to external parties, such as vessel traffic services (VTS), tugs or linesmen with a 
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language that cannot be understood by the ship’s master on the bridge, the pilot should, 
as soon as practicable, explain what was said to enable the ship’s master and bridge 
personnel to understand and monitor any subsequent actions taken by those assistant 
parties. However, in this study during the interview one expert senior pilot presented 
an alternative view to the previous respondent and mentioned that “bridge team need 
to be informed of the action of the pilot/ tugs, how the vessel is going to be 
manoeuvred, they need that information, the ship’s master needs to know continuously 
about what’s happening with his vessel.  That won’t happen, if the pilot and tug master 
are talking in their common language, the pilot in a lot of situations will not have the 
opportunity and the time to tell the master in advance what he is going to tell the tug 
master. During manoeuvring you don’t want that distraction, so if the pilot is talking 
to tug master and watching the vessel and the tug, the last thing he wants to do is to be 
distracted and have explain to the master what action he is going to do”. 
One of the interviewees who is working as Director of Loss Prevention Standard P&I 
Club, stated that, “many accidents occur during the ship berthing because of the 
communication between pilots and assisting tugs with a language not understood by 
the ship master, and ship masters often have too much confidence and trust in the 
pilot’s abilities. However, the pilot is a human being and can make mistakes. As result, 
in order to avoid the risk of collision, the master must ensure that he is familiar with 
all commands and expected actions during the manoeuvring. He went on to state that, 
“I think, certainly having a common language helps, whether it’s English, French or 
any other language. Speaking a common language is undoubtedly the greatest 
facilitator of communication on board a ship and contributes considerably to pilotage 
safety”. Therefore, a common working language during pilotage maneuvering should 
be used.  
This issue was confirmed by results obtained in the TSB study of operational 
relationships between ship masters/watch keeping officers and marine pilots (TSB, 
1995). This study showed that the lack of a common working language is often a 
problem, in various ports, the pilot will communicate with the port tugs in a different 
language which the crew will not understand, and hence they may not be aware of 




4.3.1.4.2. Lack of team work and its effect on pilotage operations safety 
The finding of the survey in the current study (table 4.3 and 4.4) show that most of the 
participants share common beliefs and agreed to the statement that the lack of team 
work is a contributory causal factor for pilotage accidents.  
The participants of the interviews were also asked to express their views on the above 
statement.  Most of the experts interviewed confirmed that failure of pilot, ship’s staff, 
and assisting parties (tugs masters, VTS, and shore personnel) to work with each other 
cooperatively, or failure to create an effective relationship on the bridge of a ship 
between pilot and ship’s captain can cause undesirable situations during ship berthing, 
which will negatively effect on the safety of the pilotage operations.  
It was further confirmed that, efficient teamwork is mainly dependent upon interactive 
co-operation, co-ordination and effectiveness of the communication between the pilot 
and the ship’s crewmembers and between pilot and assistant parties. These three 
factors are considered as very significant for achieving effective and safe mooring 
operations, which rely heavily on effective team working. 
 
4.3.1.4.3: Master/Pilot exchange information (MPX) and its effects on pilotage 
operations safety 
The previous marine accidents investigation reports show that a considerable number 
of accidents occurred due to the failure to exchange the information between pilot and 
master before manoeuvring commences. The marine experts were asked to verify and 
confirm the above statement made in the literature review. The finding show that all 
of the participants share common beliefs and agreed with the statement, as the results 
show that the majority of the respondents believe that the exchange of information 
between pilot and master is significant for ensuring an effective berthing operation. 
While 88% of the respondents strongly agreed, and 12% agreed with this statement 
(Table 4.4). 
When the interviewees were asked to express their views on the master-pilot exchange 
of information, they confirmed that failure to exchange the information prior to the 
commencement of a manoeuvre is a crucial risk factor and negatively affects the safety 
of the pilotage operations, and in order to ensure effective and safe piloting operations, 
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both the ship’s master and pilot should exchange information prior to the 
commencement of a manoeuvre. 
One Expert interviewed confirmed that marine pilots and ships’ crewmembers need 
to obtain the right information regarding details of the passage and berthing plan, as 
knowledge of these will assist both the pilot and the ship’s master, to be aware of the 
whole situation and enable them to easily identify the ship’s manoeuvring 
characteristics, and quickly assess the skills needed to make the correct decision and  
prepare a proper and effective berthing plan to control the ship and  handle it to its 
destination successfully and safely. This opinion was confirmed by MAIB (2013) in 
their annual report, in order to maintain overall situational awareness when navigating 
with a pilot, it is critical that information is exchanged regularly so that all members 
of the bridge team are aware of the pilot's intentions and can provide assistance or 
timely advice and observations.  
One expert marine captain pointed out that before entering the port and starting 
manoeuvring, the ship’s master and pilot must provide accurate information regarding 
the manoeuvring and how it will be conducted in order to avoid the risks and to ensure 
safe passage and successful manoeuvring. He went on to state that the pilot master 
exchange should have covered most of the principals, how the vessels is going to be 
manoeuvred, where, when, at what point and what they should expect. 
 One of the interviewed participants had a different opinion, as he believed that; it was 
unnecessary to constantly exchange information. He gave an example that if the vessel 
comes regularly to the port, it is well known by the captain and the pilot knows the 
ship's characteristics and how it should be manoeuvred, then the exchange of 
information may be limited to any defects or if there is anything new that the pilot 
needs to know about. Another example he suggested was, in the event that there was 
anything out of the ordinary which would lead to the pilot having to adjust how the 
operation will be conducted. However, he confirmed that, both the ship’s master and 
pilot should prepare a passage and berthing plan prior to the commencement of the 
manoeuvre. 
Nevertheless, one interviewed senior pilot stated that "every manoeuvre is different 
even if the same ship is in the same berth and the exchange of information between 
pilot and master is significant for ensuring effective berthing operations". This is an 
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opinion was supported by Armstrong (2007, p.3) who stated that, there are many 
variables including wind, tide, visibility and draught. Even the same ship in the same 
berth behaves differently each time, the pilot handle some kinds of ships he sees for 
the first time, and others he guides frequently".  
4.3.1.4.4. The passage plan and its effect on Pilotage operations safety 
How far do you agree with statement that many berthing accidents occur as a result of 
performing manoeuvring without a plan? The questionnaire intended to obtain 
information on whether the responses support the statement that failure to prepare a 
passage plan before manoeuvring commences is a contributing factor to maritime 
accidents.  
The above results shown in Table 4.4 highlighted the views of respondents towards 
the ship’s passage and berthing plan and its effects on pilotage operations safety. The 
survey results show that only 8% neither agreed nor disagreed whilst 28% of the 
respondents strongly agreed and 64 % agreed that in order to ensure effective and safe 
piloting operations, both the master and pilot should prepare a passage and berthing 
plan prior to the commencement of the manoeuvre. 
During the interviews the same question was asked. Most of the interviewed 
participants confirmed that establishing the ship’s passage and berthing operation plan 
is a contributing factor to reducing the risk of marine accidents during pilotage 
operations.  According to the perceptions of the pilots and captains interviewed, failure 
to prepare a proper manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel is considered to be an 
unsafe act, and a contributing factor to maritime accidents. This fact was further 
supported in Gard (2014); and the previous marine accidents investigation reports, 
where it was noted that a considerable number of accidents occurred due to the lack 
of berthing planning. The grounding of M/V Tundra on 28 November 2012, was one 
of the best case examples that demonstrate how the failure of preparing a passage plan 
could contribute to the accidents (TSB, 2014). 
One professional senior pilot stated that in order to ensure effective and safe piloting 
operations, after exchanging information and before manoeuvring commences, the 
pilot and master should give an outline of the ship’s suggested passage and berthing 
operation plan and how the manoeuvre will be conducted. The pilot and master should 
agree and be satisfied with the overall final plan. He considered that the primary task 
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for the ship’s master and pilot is to provide accurate information regarding the 
manoeuvring and how it will be carried out in order to avoid the risks and to ensure a 
safe passage plan and successful manoeuvring. 
4.3.1.4.5. Views on distraction and its effect on Pilotage operations safety 
Distraction during pilotage operations is one of the biggest contributory factors to 
maritime accidents. The participants of the survey were asked to express their views 
on the above statement and whether they agree that distraction can affect pilotage 
operations safety performance. Data from the survey shows that most of the 
participants agreed with the statement. The same questions were put to the 
interviewees. The responses collected from the interview participants strongly support 
the statement, and all participants interviewed agreed that distraction negatively 
affects the safety of the pilotage operations.  
One experienced expert stated that ship’s crewmembers or pilot are often distracted 
while they are performing the manoeuvring as a result of many reasons such as the use 
of personal communication devices (such as mobile phones), or when the operator 
concentrating too much on one navigational instrument such as radar or ECDIS as a 
result of unfamiliarity with the electronic navigational equipment knowledge. This 
point of view was confirmed by Grech et al (2008) (MAIB) (2005), and (NTSB, 
2011a).  
4.3.1.4.6. Lack of situation awareness and its effect on Pilotage operations safety 
Several research studies and an analysis of a considerable number of pilotage accidents 
shows that lack of situation awareness (SA) of the surrounding environment during 
pilotage operations is a high risk factor and one of the main contributory factors of 
marine accident. Poor shared situation awareness in the bridge team has a negative 
influence on the safety performance of pilotage operations. 
The participants of the survey were asked to express their views on the above 
statement.  Data from the survey shows that most of the participants confirmed that 
the loss of situation awareness of crew members and pilot during ships piloting is a 
significant risk which contributes to maritime incidents.  
The same questions were asked to the interviewees. The responses collected from the 
interview participants, strongly support the statement, and the sweeping majority of 
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participants considered it as one of the most significant human causal factors that 
contribute to the marine casualties and negatively affects the safety of the pilotage 
operations. 
When one experienced pilot was asked about the causes of the loss of situation 
awareness, he stated that, during manoeuvring, lack of planning and lack of exchange 
of information between the pilot and captain of the ship due to lack of communication 
and poor language of the pilot or ship’s bridge staff, are significant causes for the loss 
of situation awareness.  
One of the interviewed experts mentioned that the ship’s master or pilot might lose the 
awareness of the situation as result of distraction due to the use of electronic devices 
and mobile phones during the manoeuvring. In addition, the mariner’s mental high 
workload due to momentary task distraction and of using the new technology and long-
time monitoring of navigational aids equipment can also lead to memory loss and 
misperception of data. Therefore, controlling work load is a key factor with new 
technology, training and other forms of procedural guidance needed in order to make 
seafarers aware of capabilities and limitations of new technologies.  
4.3.1.4.7. Lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational equipment knowledge 
and its effect on pilotage operations safety 
A fact described previously in the literature review is that  ineffective use of the 
navigational equipment such as, ECDIS, AIS, Echo Sounder, RADAR, and GPS, etc., 
as a result of a lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational equipment 
knowledge, is considered a high risk and has a greater potential to cause major 
accidents. 
The participants of the survey were asked to express their views and whether they 
agree on the above statement. The question intended to investigate whether the lack 
of experience and poor knowledge of the use of navigational aids during pilotage 
operations is a cause and contributing factor leading to maritime accidents. The 
findings of the survey in the current study (table 4.3 and 4.4) show that most of the 
respondents agreed to the above statement, they believe that the lack of familiarity 
with the electronic navigational equipment knowledge and inability to use these aids 
influence the safety performance of pilotage operations and can lead to maritime 
accidents.   
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The interviewees were asked to give their opinions on the importance of using the 
technology during the pilotage operations. One of the interview participants reported 
that, good using of navigational aids such as AIS, RADAR, GPS, and ECDIS, is 
important and necessary, particularly when the vessel passes through narrow passages 
in the dark and under poor weather conditions. However, berthing operations inside 
the port particularly close to the berth, do not require the use of such navigational aids. 
It is worth mentioning by experts that the chance for human error increases when 
things are complicated, new, and unfamiliar. One senior pilot pointed out that when 
electronic navigational equipment knowledge skills are insufficient, this could lead to 
an increase in risk, which can lead to undesirable situations during pilotage operations.  
He went on to state that, the chance for human error increases when things are 
complicated, new, and unfamiliar, and it can result in the bridge team being fully 
unaware of the position of the ship and leading to loss of the whole situation 
awareness, particularly when the vessels navigate through narrow canals or while 
underway, inbound/outbound from/to ports and channels in the dark or under poor 
visibility conditions. Wrong handling of navigational electronic equipment when 
entering or leaving the port (e.g. ship on route of collision not acquired on the Radar, 
pilot or ship’s master fail to observe the information and set warning distances on the 
Radar, or vessel’s course and position are not efficiently monitored and plotted on the 
electronic chart), can negatively affect pilotage operation safety and lead to marine 
disasters. 
One of the interviewees reported that the use of technology is considered one of the 
most important issues. However, if the crew are unfamiliar with them and do not know 
how to set them up, they will make wrong decisions because they may be obtaining 
the wrong information from them. The use of technology is definitely helpful for pilot 
and ship’s crewmembers to avoid collisions and grounding as long as it is being used 
properly, however, it is not if they are putting too much reliance on it. Particularly, if 
the ship’s crewmembers are not properly trained and experienced in using technology, 
they will make wrong decisions as a result of wrong information they are obtaining. 
This was confirmed by Armstrong (2007, p.2), who stated that electronic aids are 
helpful for the pilot and ship’s master to make their tasks easier, more accurate and 
safer, however, they should not be totally dependent upon them. 
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4.3.1.4.8. The excessive speed of ship during berthing operations and its impact on 
safety 
How far do you agree with the statement that many berthing accidents occur because 
the speed of approach is too high?  
The above item intended to examine whether the excessive speed of a ship during 
berthing operations is one of the influencing factors towards maritime causalities. Data 
from the survey shows that 64% of the respondents strongly agree, and 28% agree 
with the statement that approaching the port at high speed is risky and could lead to 
maritime accidents. Meanwhile only 8% neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.4). 
 During the interviews the same question was asked. One pilot confirmed that safe 
speed is a contributing factor to safety during ship berthing and failure to proceed with 
safe speed as stipulated in COLREG is high risk and can negatively affect operation 
safety and lead to marine disasters.  However, in order to control the ship steering, 
high speed sometimes is needed, particularly, in severe weather conditions.  
 
4.3.1.4.9. Boarding and disembarking of pilot too close to breakwater   
The feedback of accident investigations reports indicated that the boarding and 
disembarking of the pilot too close to the breakwater is a contributory factor of the 
pilotage accidents. The participants of the survey were asked whether they agree with 
this statement, and how this action might affect pilotage safety. Data from the survey 
shows that almost half of the respondents strongly agree and 36% agree that many 
incidents occur as result of the pilot boarding and disembarking close to the port 
entrance. Meanwhile, 8% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.4). 
Two participants of the interviews were asked the same question and they confirmed 
that the boarding and disembarking of the pilot close to the port entrance is a risk and 
that could lead to dangerous situations and considered it to be one of the main factors 
contributing towards maritime disasters particularly, when the captain of the ship has 
not obtained the competence in coming so close to the port entrance or is not familiar 
with the port area. They also stressed the fact described previously in the literature 
review that when the pilot embarks at the breakwater there is insufficient time for the 
captain of the vessel to exchange information with the pilot, thus there is not enough 
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time to prepare the ship berthing plan and this results in an undesired situation for the 
pilot and ship's master.  
4.3.1.4.10. The mental and physical work load and its effect on Pilotage operations 
safety 
The increased workload is often presented as a predominant concern in pilotage 
operations. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, the mariner’s high mental 
workload due to the use of technology and continuous monitoring of navigational 
equipment can lead to memory loss and misperception of data especially if the ship’s 
operators are fatigued or not sufficiently trained. Analysis of a considerable number 
of pilotage accidents also reveals that the excessive mental and physical workload is 
a contributing factor to human error and has a negative impact on performance which 
in turn can lead to maritime disasters. 
The participants of the survey were asked in the questionnaire to express their views 
on the above statement. The rationale behind the question was to assess the perspective 
and views of respondents whether the factor mentioned above impacts pilotage 
operations safety. The result of the questionnaire indicates that most respondents 
believe that the above-mentioned factors increase the probability of errors and 
influence  the pilotage performance and are contributing factors to naval accidents 
(Table 4.3 and 4.4). 
 During the interviews the same question was asked. The question was to which extent 
high physical and mental workload affects the ship’s crewmembers’ and pilot’s 
performance. There is a general consensus among all the pilots and captains 
interviewed that this factor plays a significant role in marine accidents. Most of the 
interviewed participants confirmed that increasing the level of mental and physical 
workload during the manoeuvring negatively influences the ship’s crewmembers and 
pilot’s performance and plays a significant role in marine accidents causation. 
 One expert stated that, because of the lowering of the number of staff, and increasing 
the level of automation in tasks, particularly with regard to navigation systems, ships’ 
crewmembers perform many more tasks than before. In addition, nowadays maritime 
pilots on the bridge are exposed to information from several sources, from crew verbal 
instructions, from multiple instrument displays, and communication systems which 
have increased the work burden. Moreover, the complexity of the maritime pilotage 
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operations and large number of tasks, such as long-time monitoring of navigational 
aids equipment, speaking on handheld radio to tugs operators, mooring boats and shore 
personnel, required high levels of skills, concentration, accuracy, and greater 
knowledge, and proficiency and need to be carried out at simultaneously. All of these 
factors can lead to an increase in the pilot's mental and physical workload, which in 
turn negatively influences the pilot’s performance and plays a significant role in the 
marine safety of the pilotage operation. 
4.3.1.4.11. Stress and its effect on pilotage operations safety 
The previous study shows that stress can influence the decision-making process of the 
pilot and ship’s master, particular during ship manoeuvring in restricted areas (Gerigk 
& Hejmlich, 2015).   
The experts in this study were asked, whether they agree with the statement that many 
berthing accidents occur as a result of stress. The above question was intended to 
obtain information on whether the responses support the statement. Data from the 
survey shows that 72% of the respondents strongly agree, and 20% agree with the 
statement. Meanwhile only 8% neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.4). 
 The same question was asked in interviews with a ship’s master and senior pilot. They 
asserted that, handling a large vessel in constrained waters such as a port or narrow 
channel is a high-risk task and the pilot with the ship’s master assigned to that task 
have a responsibility to handle the ship to its destination safely, because of the 
complexity of maritime pilotage operations and the large number of tasks involved 
which require high levels of skill and concentration and need to be carried out 
simultaneously. Additionally, piloting ships in harsh working conditions. Moreover, 
the short time allocated to achieve the tasks has increased the level of stress for the 
pilotage operators, and consequently the risk of error increases. 
Moving different types of large vessels in constrained waters is a high-risk task and 
the pilot assigned to that task has a responsibility to handle the ship to its destination 
safely. In addition, Introducing the new technology in the shipping industry and, which 
need a high level of accuracy, proficiency, high level of skills, and intelligence, and 
due to the number of tasks which need to be carried out at simultaneously such as 
speaking on a handheld radio to tugs operators and shore personnel; furthermore, the 
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short time allocated to achieve the task, has increased the work burden, and level of 
stress for the pilot.  
Moreover, the unique environment of seafaring is characterised by harsh working 
conditions including the excessive noise vibration coming from the main engines, 
manoeuvring devices such as the steering gear, the auxiliary systems such as the 
heating ventilation and air conditioning units, heat and bad weather, increase in stress 
level and fear, also impact and impair the performance of pilots and ship’s 
crewmembers during manoeuvres, which in turn contributes to the maritime accidents 
(Grech et al., 2008, p.91). The complexity of the task required high levels of skills and 
concentration. 
4.3.1.4.12. Fatigue and its effect on pilotage operations safety 
A fact described previously in the literature review was that fatigue during pilotage 
operations is considered a high risk and has a greater effect on seafarers and potential 
to cause major accidents.  The participants of the survey were asked to express their 
views and whether they agree on the above statement. The question intended to 
investigate whether fatigue is a contributing factor leading to maritime accidents. The 
results of the survey presented in the tables above (table 4.3 and 4.4) show that most 
respondents agreed with the above statement, they believe that fatigue negatively 
influences the performance of ship handlers and contributes to maritime accidents 
The findings indicate that most of the surveyed and interviewed respondents feel that 
fatigue impairs pilot and crew members’ performance and contributes to maritime 
disasters. 68% of survey participants strongly agree with the statement and 24% agree. 
Meanwhile, only 8% neither agree nor disagree (Table 4.4). 
 When the interviewees were asked to express their views on fatigue and whether they 
agree with the statement that fatigue impairs the performance of pilots and ship’s crew 
members and contributes to maritime disasters during ships pilotage, most of the 
participants share common beliefs and agreed with the statement made in the literature 
review. 
 One expert captain pointed out that “Certainly fatigue leads to less concentration and 
makes one more prone to making errors, but if the person is suitably trained and 
experienced he will be sure that he is not fatigued.”, he went on to state that 
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“Crewmembers have work/rest hours regulations to ensure that they are not fatigued 
(whether they follow/comply is a different matter), but pilots do not comply with the 
regulation and are often overworked and rushed from ship to ship”. 
 An interviewee senior pilot presented an alternative view to the previous respondent 
and mentioned that, "fatigue can be an issue but if the work pattern of a pilot is 
properly organised, then they should not be fatigued. Also, he reported that fatigue for 
crew members was more serious, particularly because before they get to the port, they 
have probably been in the bridge for twelve or more hours, working at night without 
a rest period and an adequate nap”. 
4.3.1.5: The findings of the part C of the questionnaire  
From your experience do you know any additional causal factors that might affect 
pilotage operations performance? Have you had any issues or incidents in the past 
which affected the safety of the ship piloting? 
In the above questionnaire a particular question was asked in order to provide the 
respondents of the survey and interviews the opportunity to give their views through 
their observations and long practical experience on board ships about the human 
element factors which might affect the safety performance of the pilotage operations. 
 In addition to the 12 aforementioned contributing factors, the experts have highlighted 
additional serious human element factors which can lead to maritime accidents. These 
factors presented in the table below (table 4.5) include the following:    
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     Table 4.5 Contributory causal factors of the maritime pilotage accident 
  
                
Ships piloting was considered as one of the most complex tasks. It requires high 
standards of professional ship handling skills. According to the perceptions of  most 
of the experts interviewed, a lack of ship handling skills, due to lack of experience, 
and improper training, was identified by experts as one of  the most significant factors 
that may adversely affect the safety of manoeuvring. It is considered among the most 
important causes of accidents in pilotage operations. Therefore, Marine pilots and all 
ship’s handlers should possess high levels of ship handling skills and navigational 
experience. The Collision of Ursine with the Pride of Bruges, in King George Dock, 
Hull, on the east coast of England on the 13th November 2007, during ship berthing, 
demonstrated how the shortcomings of ship handling knowledge and lack of 
experience of pilot and ship’s master affected the safety of manoeuvring and 
contributed to the accident (MAIB, 2008a). 
Ship handling is defined as an acquired art practised by harbour pilots, ship’s masters 
and officers of proper control of a ship while underway, especially in harbours, around 
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docks and piers (Armstrong, 2007, p.1). However, Murdoch et al., (2012) described 
ship handling as an art rather than a science, but a ship handler who is familiar with 
the science will be better at their art and this will enable them to easily identify a ship’s 
manoeuvring characteristics, and quickly assess the skills needed to control the ship. 
The most basic thing to be understood in ship handling is to know and anticipate how 
a ship behaves under all circumstances and what orders should be given in order to 
make the ship behave and move exactly the way you want her to (Murdoch et al., 
2012). 
One expert pilot stated that, during ship piloting, marine pilots are employed on board 
ships to give navigational advice to captains and guide vessels into or out of port 
safely. The pilot is also responsible for giving commands to assisting parties such as 
tugs, shore mooring men, mooring boats, and giving his instructions to the ship’s 
master. He must have a good knowledge of ships handling, because failure of the pilot 
to give precise instructions, or any flawed commands that the pilot gives to the tug’s 
masters, or any wrong orders given to the helmsman, engine room, or the fore and aft 
stations, could result in an undesirable situation and could affect the safety of the 
mooring operation and cause marine accidents.  
One interviewed expert stated that, the ship’s captain is responsible for giving orders 
to the ship’s crew, officers on the bridge, and officers at the ship’s bow and stern on 
what the pilot has suggested or instructed; an accident in pilotage is likely to occur as 
a result of failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot’s directions during 
manoeuvring .This conclusion was supported by Darbra et al. (2007), who stated that 
these occurrences (e.g. incorrect interpretations, refusal, rejection, intervention by 
master, etc.) are quite frequent making the pilot’s task much more difficult and 
increasing the potential of accidents. 
Experienced experts attributed this mistake to many reasons such as, an ineffective 
working environment and poor relationship on the bridge of a ship between the pilot 
and ship’s captain and failure of pilot and ship’s master to exchange information and 
establish  a proper passage and berthing plan prior to piloting vessel. The other reason 
that might lead the master of the ship to interfere or refuse the pilot’s advice or 
instructions during the period of ship piloting, is when the pilot is not qualified or 
gives wrong commands. However, according to the expert’s opinion the ship’s master 
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of the piloted ship should have a good relationship with the pilot and be confident that 
the pilot is doing his duties correctly and should not interfere and challenge the pilot 
or give conflicting orders unless the pilot’s actions are clearly negligent, or he is 
behaving irresponsibly, because failure of ship’s master to follow the pilot’s 
directions, is considered very hazardous and can affect ship navigation safety and 
contribute to disaster in ports. 
According to the perceptions of one of the experts interviewed, the lack of skills of the 
crewmembers on board ship, tugs masters, and shore mooring personnel is considered 
high-risk and can negatively influence the operations and contribute to pilotage 
accidents. During berthing operations, operators’ work characteristics such as 
professional skills and work attitudes, are very significant factors that can affect ships’ 
navigation safety. For instance, failure of crewmembers on board ship to carry out the 
pilot’s instructions regarding anchoring, and engine requests precisely results in high-
risk situations and can cause accidents, or when the pilot or master gives orders 
regarding steering and those orders are not carried out by the helmsman correctly, this 
failure can affect the safety of the ship berthing.  
One expert mentioned that, during berthing operations many factors affect ship 
handling. For example, communication failure from the bridge to the engine room or 
vice-versa, or to the fore and aft stations could result in an undesirable situation.  
Mutual misunderstanding in the bridge could be another ship posing a potential 
accident threat, when the pilot or master gives the order regarding steering, and this is 
not carried out correctly by the helmsman. Therefore, during ship handling, to be 
protected against the mutual misunderstanding, and support bridge team situation 
awareness, Pilot and bridge staff should be communicating with each other in 
sufficient detail to allow all to achieve a mutual understanding and close the loop. This 
opinion was confirmed by Grech et al., (2008, p.79) and TSB (2013a), they stated that 
rudder commands should be given by the pilot or master, and repeated by the 
helmsman clearly and loudly, and re-confirmed by the senders, this strategy is called 
closed-loop communication. This is the best method to ensure that a command is being 
followed and is a vital part of the bridge team management (Gard, 2007).  One example 
was described by Murdoch et al (2012) which demonstrate how the mistakes of 
operators could contribute to the accident, when the pilot gave the orders and the 
helmsman applied them incorrectly. The pilot commanded starboard helm, however 
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the helmsman applied port helm. By the time this mistake was discovered, the vessel 
was swinging towards rather than away from the berth. 
As has been mentioned previously, the interaction and interdependence, in addition, 
the multiplicity of the entities who are performing ships berthing operations add to the 
complexity of the task. Handling ships such as large passenger ships, container ships 
with towering deck cargo, high free board car carriers, mammoth tankers, and deep 
draught bulk carriers are considered complex tasks, and cannot be handled and treated 
the same way as small cargo ships (Armstrong, 2007, p.1). 
One expert pilot mentioned that, it requires intense concentration and special attention, 
as well as high standards of professional skills, and an adequate number of powerful 
tugboats. The pilot stated that, ineffective use of tugboats is one of the causes of marine 
accidents in ports. Practically, the factors affecting the quality of tugboat operations 
include the number of tugboats, the horsepower of the tugboat, and the operating skills 
of tugboat drivers. There is need for the assistance of sufficient numbers of powerful 
tugboats, which are necessary, particularly in adverse weather conditions.  
The main purpose of tugboats is to assist ships, such as pushing and towing the vessels. 
Tugboats play a significant role in assisting vessels in berthing alongside and 
unberthing from the berth, and as a result, failure to use sufficient numbers and 
sufficiently powerful tugboats, is considered high-risk and can negatively affect the 
manoeuvring and contribute to a ship’s berthing accident. In addition, improper use of 
tugs as a result of lack of skills of tugboats’ masters is considered by the interviewed 
experts as a high risk and can affect the manoeuvring negatively and contribute to a 
ship’s berthing accidents.  
For instance, failure of the tugs’ masters to correctly follow the pilot directions (e.g. 
incorrect interpretations, refusal, rejection, and intervention), or a delay between the 
pilot’s order and the execution of the order can affect the safety of manoeuvring. 
Furthermore, failure of the tug’s masters to carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely 
with respect to position and towing power could also affect manoeuvring safety or 
delays in securing a tug as a result of lack of skills of mooring parties, putting time 
pressure on the crew and thereby increasing the risk of the vessel sailing in unsafe 
conditions.  As result, the compliance of tugs operators, shore-side mooring personnel 
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and mooring boats with the instructions of the Pilot effectively, will support a safe and 
efficient mooring operation. 
Piloting ships in bad weather conditions, and navigating vessels outside published 
guidelines or draft limits is also considered by experts as a high risk and contributing 
factor to maritime accidents. One of the interviewees who has vast experience as a 
senior pilot in one of the biggest ports in the Mediterranean, mentioned that, piloting 
ships in adverse weather conditions frequently happened due to many reasons. One of 
these reasons is the commercial pressure, which is usually attributed to port 
authorities’ administration managers, ship’s owners, charterers, and agents. The 
interviewed considered it a high risk and affect negatively on the pilotage operations 
safety.  
During berthing operations the ineffective monitoring of the tugboats masters, 
mooring boats, and shore mooring personnel performance and vessel’s progress is 
considered by experts a high risk and contributing factor to maritime accidents. 
Therefore, good observing is considered by experts as one of the most significant 
factors for achieving effective and safe mooring operations.  
Ship’s crewmembers, and assisting parties (tugs masters, VTS, and shore personnel) 
must work together with the pilot in good teamwork with the objective of guiding the 
ship safely to its berth and not just rely on the pilot during berthing operations. This is 
considered crucial, particularly when a vessel is operating in intense fog and poor 
visibility conditions in restricted waters or congested areas.  
Hetherington et al (2006) stated that failure to comply with regulations is the major 
contributory factor for many maritime disasters and the majority of human errors have 
been caused. Based on this statement, this issue raises the question, why are the pilots 
and ship’s staff making errors in spite of the rules and regulations? In this study this 
question was asked to a captain who has a long period experience in the maritime field. 
According to the expert, lack of experience and proper training is the root cause of 
errors. Governing bodies, such as ships companies and port authorities still fail to 
implement the principles of IMO regulations. Nevertheless, port states cannot check 
what is happening while the ship is under navigation, so they can only check whatever 
they see on paper which will always be fine. Port control is doing whatever they can, 
however, the issue here is that even though on paper everything is fine, it does not 
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mean that in realty the crew is following the procedures and regulations and have high 
standard of training. There is still no real occupation standards/ certification/ 
measurement of competence for pilots and mariners who are performing pilotage 
operations. 
One interviewed pilot stated that, an increasing number of regulations does not equate 
to safer operations, rather, a change in mentality is what required. A continuous 
improvement in pilots and crew members’ safety culture and standard of training can 
minimize the number of marine accidents caused by human error.  Enforcement and 
implementation of the IMO legislation is considered an important factor that affects 
the human element and pilotage operations safety.  
It can be justified to say that the IMO has been successful in addressing many issues 
related to pilotage operations safety and often recommended the ships operators to 
comply and fulfil the requirements of the adopted rules and regulation. The IMO 
resolution A. 960 (23) is one of the most important of the pilotage operations safety 
regulations, nevertheless, the issue of interpretation and lack of enforcement prevent 
its full success. Governing bodies, such as governments and port authorities in some 
countries still fail to control the principles of IMO A. 960. Enforcement and 
implementation of the IMO legislations is considered an important factor that affects 
the human element and pilotage operations safety. 
The IMO is incapable of effective control and has absolutely no powers of 
enforcement. Therefore, in order to implement and enforce regulations in a good order, 
other players, such as flag states, regional Port States Control (PSC) authorities and 
classification societies should play key roles in the implementation and enforcement 
of maritime safety regulations and establish an advance monitoring system. (Akyuza 
and Celik (2014a). 
4.3.2 DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK FACTORS 
(HCFs) TAXONOMY 
The literature review showed that many researchers have identified several 
different maritime accidents risk classification methods, sources, or types (Yee 
et al., 2005; O’Connor and Long, 2011; Wang et al., 2013a; Chauvin et al., 
2013; and Akhtar and Utne, 2015, Akyuz et al., 2016; Akyuz, 2017 and Fu et 
al., 2018). However, the literature review also showed the lack of a common 
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methodology or consensus among researchers that can outline a universally risk 
factors classification. The lack of a standard classification for pilotage 
operations has resulted in a research gap due to the conception of risks. Thus, it 
is necessary to establish a standard vocabulary that can be used to assess and to 
identify hman related risk factors in pilotage operations for a strategy with the 
most potential to mitigate risks. While there are risk factors taxonomies being 
used in assessment in other safety-critical industries around the world, in the 
maritime industry in particular pilotage operations, human relate risk factors 
(HCFs) taxonomy is a relatively new concept and it is important to develop a 
risk taxonomy first 
This section describes the human-related risk classification technique used in this 
study. Classification of the relevant pilotage operations human-related risk factors is 
the vital step for employing efficient risk management in the maritime industry. Risk 
classification enables the interpretation (Ugurlu et al., 2015), and facilitates the 
evaluation. In addition, it helps risk managers to understand the events and the 
circumstances from which they arise (Pak et al., 2015). 
In this study, in order to classify the human relate risk factors (HCFs) and create a new 
taxonomy, three main steps has been conducted. Firstly, this research started with 
identifying the risk factors that have been addressed in the relevant works of literature 
(shown in Chapter two), in addition, as mentioned previously, this study reviewed the 
previous relevant studies which have been conducted related to human factors and 
maritime accidents and other published materials such as analysis of various reports 
of investigations into real world maritime incidents relating to vessels under pilotage 
operations during the period 1995 and 2015. 
 And to ensure that all the causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents (HCFs) are 
identified, survey questionnaire and semi-structured interviews with experienced 
marine experts were carried out in this study, attempting to validate and test the 
feasibility of the selected factors, as well as to explore new potential causes that may 
affect pilotage performance. This step leads up to in a composite of the twenty-five 
human causal factors (HCFs) affecting safety performance in the marine pilotage 
operations environment. These factors are presented in the table 4.4 and 4.5. After 
having identified the contributory human causal factors of the maritime pilotage 
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accidents (HCFs), a preliminary hierarchical structure for these factors (HCFs) was 
developed. The developed hierarchical structure of the identified risk factors is then 
modified and further validated through experienced marine experts as illustrated in 
Table 4.6.  
This research presents a modified comprehensive taxonomy and classification 
approach to decompose the unstructured human risk factors to strengthen the 
knowledge base in pilotage risk assessment. The hierarchical decision model is a 
proper application for effectively introducing MCDM problems. In addition, in a 
complex decision-making issue, the hierarchical decision model is a beneficial tool 
and facilitates the complexity to be simplified (Yeo et al., 2014). Furthermore, the 
model easily adds or modifies new data in a flexible and instant way (Yang et al., 
2009). 
4.3.2.1 The contributory factors of the pilotage accidents classification and validation 
process  
To develop the taxonomy for the contributory causal factors of pilotage accidents the 
following steps were performed in this chapter: 
After having identified the twenty five contributory factors of the pilotage accidents 
(HCFs) and based on previous maritime safety studies related to human factors and 
risk classification model, with the assistance of two experienced ship’s captains, a 
hierarchal structure as a taxonomy is initially constructed. The experts were academics 
with education level PhD degree from an educational institution, staff who have more 
than 10 years teaching and researching experience and have a good understanding of 
marine operations risk research. They had also served long periods on-board a variety 
of vessels which are navigating and visiting sea ports worldwide.  
 First of all, the two experts were invited to conduct a review and evaluate the 
preliminary taxonomy and provide their opinion with respect to level of each factor. 
They were asked how the grouped factors should be presented in a hierarchy properly, 
and to help in categorising and placing the accident causal factors in the correct 
position in the taxonomy. The main questions in the interviews were asked to classify 
twenty-five factors which can represent their associated main factors (categories) and 
sub-factors and the questions were:   
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Do you think the main group factors (categories) and their sub-factors are well 
classified?” 
“Could you classify the main factors to represent their associated sub-factors?”, and 
if necessary, modification, removal, division and combination are allowable. 
Through the iterations and feedbacks, some factors (HCFs) were modified, removed, 
and combined. For instances, they combined the error factors with the same meaning 
in accidents' causal factors into a new one. This research found that the factors “using 
mobile phones” and “distraction” have a relatively similar meaning with regard to 
error factors which are more likely to influence the occurrence of an accident. Hence, 
these two factors were combined into one factor named distraction. Also, the blind 
trust and reliance on the pilot during berthing operations and lack of team work. In 
addition, improper/ inadequate use of tugs and failing to inspect the tug’s towing 
equipment. Finally, instead of twenty-five factors identified, the experts selected only 
twenty-one factors and classified the factors into five main factor groups , each group 
was then divided into several (4 or 5) sub-factors as illustrated in Table 4.6.  
Thereafter, to assure the validity and confirm the reliability of the developed hierarchy 
diagram, a panel consisting of six experienced experts belonging to the maritime 
sector were consulted. Emails distributed and face-to-face and telephone interviews 
with the validation team were subsequently conducted. The experts were all 
experienced ship masters who had served long periods on-board a variety of vessels, 
including two academics with education level PhD degree from a maritime 
educational institution staff who have good experience in maritime risk assessment 
research, two senior pilots currently working in different ports companies in the UK 
with a bachelor degree, one who has 30 years of marine experience and is currently 
working in the port of London and one senior pilot who has worked for a long period 
of time on a variety of ships, four years as ship master, two years as marine operations 
and safety manager, 20 years as a marine senior pilot in the port of Liverpool and is 
working as a lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University. 
One expert is a Master Mariner with education level of bachelor degree, who has vast 
experience as a director in the maritime sector, he worked also for a long period of 
time as a sea pilot in an Asian port. In addition, he has held many positions such as, 
harbour master, director of maritime affairs, assistant chairman of port, and acting 
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chairman of port management. One expert is an insurance company manager, he sailed 
as a master mariner on gas tankers, consequently worked as a marine superintendent 
for an oil/gas/chemical ship management company, followed by a spell as an external 
independent surveyor, and the last five years worked as an internal surveyor for 
Standard P&I Club and took over as Director of Loss Prevention in 2013. They were 
asked to review and validate the effectiveness of the developed taxonomy and to 
confirm if the identified factors were grouped in accordance with their characteristics. 
Finally, the experts agreed and the developed hierarchy diagram was accepted without 
any modification as shown in table 4.6.  
In the hierarchical model, the overall goal is illustrated in the first level. That is, the 
most contributory causal human factors of maritime pilotage accidents. This structure 
consist of five group main factors and each one is divided into sub-factors. The main 
factors are the criteria, which are, (F1, F2, F3, F3, and F4). The sub-factors are sub 
criteria which are, F1: (F11, F12, F13, F14 and F15), F2: (F21, F22, F23, and F24), 
F3: (F31, F32, F33, and F34), F4: (F41, F42, F43, and F44), and F5: (F51, F52, F53, 















Table 4.6: The hierarchy for the contributory causal factors of pilotage accidents 
(HCFs) 
Factors Sub-factors  
1 F1 




F11 Lack of teamwork  1 
F12 lack of  effective communication and Language barriers  2 
F13 
Failure to exchange the information between pilot and 
ship’s master prior to pilotage operation. (Master/Pilot 
exchange information (MPX)) 
3 
F14 Lack of situation awareness 4 
F15 
The master’s and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the  
tugboats drivers, mooring boats, and shore mooring 






Lack of ship handling skills due to improper training 
and lack of experience. 
6 
F22 




Lack of skills of the crewmember onboard ship, tugs, 
and shore mooring personnel. 
8 
F24 Improper/ inadequate use of tugs. 9 
3 F3 
Instructions and  
orders failure 
F31 Failure of pilot to give precise instructions. 10 
F32 










Orders regarding anchoring, steering, and engine 




Rules and regulations 
noncompliance 
   F41 









Piloting ships in bad weather conditions or navigating 
vessels outside published guidelines or draft limits. 
16 
F44 
Poor boarding arrangements (e.g., pilot boarding and 
disembarking too close to breakwater) 
17 
5 F5 
Individual- task interaction 
factors 
F51 Fatigue. 18 
F52 Mental and physical workload. 29 
F53 Distraction during the time of berthing operations 20 
F54 Stress 21 
 
4.3.3 CONCLUSION  
This chapter recognises pilotage risk factors identification and classification as 
significant process for conducting an efficient risk assessment. The literature review, 
the questionnaire survey, and interviews serve as a base and guide to strengthening the 
knowledge base for pilotage human related risk factors identification. In this study in 
order to identify the risk factors (HCFs) that affect pilotage operations safety as 
completely as possible, a careful literature review, together with a considerable 
number of maritime pilotage accident reports were carefully investigated. 
Questionnaire surveys and a series of emails as well as in-depth interviews with 
experienced experts were carried out to validate and test the feasibility of the selected 
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factors, as well as to explore new potential causes that may effects pilotage 
performance. This step led up to in a composite the human causal factors of the 
pilotage accidents (HCFs).  After having identified the contributory factors of the 
pilotage accidents (HCFs) and to develop a structural hierarchy risk taxonomic 
diagram, interviews with experienced experts belonging to the maritime sector were 
established. A preliminary hierarchical structure consisting of 25 risk factors (HCFs) 
was developed. The developed hierarchical structure of the identified risk factors was 
then modified and further validated through experienced marine experts.  
 In the thesis, a hierarchical human error related risk classification is presented, which 
consists of five different risk categories. Thereafter, those five main categories of risk 
factors were further divided into twenty one sub-factors. The empirical studies in this 
chapter were carried out to make an inference about the experts’ opinions in order to 
capture the risk factors in a more comprehensive and reliable way. Meanwhile, the 
importance of the performance of the identified risk factors and developed 
classification model for the pilotage operations was addressed.  
Despite the invited participants consisting of experts from different fields and 
countries, the finding reflects the consensus of their opinion. This indicates that the 
experts have similar views on the aforementioned causal factors (HCFs) and their 
effects on the safety of the pilotage operations. The main challenges are: how the 
relevant causal factors (HCFs) to decision makers have to be dealt with; how the causal 
factors (HCFs) are measured, controlled, and managed. The problem with the studies 
above is that they could conclude that all risk factors could be considered “critical”, 
when the respondents were assessing each of them separately. Therefore, a ranking is 
missing that reflects the perceived degree of importance of risk factor in relation to 
each other. Without such ranking, decision makers are not able to determine the 
relative importance of risk factors and will have difficulties in determining the right 
and appropriate measures to overcome them. In the next chapter, the captured risk 
factors can be assessed by applying both AHP and DEMATEL models to discover the 
priorities, and select the most important causal factors which influence a pilotage 





CHAPTER 5 A HYBRID APPROACH TO THE ASSESSING OF HUMAN 
FACTORS IN MARITIME PILOTAGE OPERATIONS USING AHP AND 
DEMATEL METHOD 
5.1 SUMMARY  
This chapter aims at proposing a generic risk assessment model for pilotage 
operations, to evaluate the human related risk factors influencing the safety of 
maritime pilotage operations, using a hybrid approach of two methodologies. The 
proposed model is a key part in the human-related risk management framework for 
pilotage operations. Assessing human related risk factors influencing the safety 
performance of operators and determining the root causes of maritime pilotage 
accidents when there is uncertainty and a complex operations environment, is 
considered a type of multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) problem in nature. 
Thus, this chapter introduces a new methodology, based on the combination of the 
AHP and DEMATEL techniques, in order to apply them for solving an MCDM 
problem, in order to address the human factors affecting maritime pilotage operational 
safety, with the aim of developing appropriate solutions for reducing human error and 
improving the quality and efficiency of pilotage operations’ performance, and thus 
subsequently mitigating the occurrence of pilotage accidents in the future.  
 First, the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) is applied to determine the relative 
weights and rank the importance of the human factors that affect pilotage operation 
safety, and then the DEMATEL method is applied to identify whether there are 
relationships among the factors. This methodology is found to be particularly useful 
in dealing with the limited availability of data in the maritime domain and the 
complexity that exist in the quantitative analysis of human errors.  
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
The complexity of the human attitude involved in human operations results in 
difficulties in quantifying human factors/human errors and reliabilities of performance 
in maritime pilotage operations. In recent years many research projects regarding the 
maritime safety related risks have been conducted from a range of perspectives and 
several aspects in order to reduce the occurrence of potential human errors in maritime 
operations systems, but it appears from a review of the literature that a little research 
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has been done in the maritime domain on issues related to human errors and pilotage 
operation safety issue, and until now, few studies have employed a decision-making 
method to evaluate the weight and rank the importance of human factors which 
influence pilotage operation safety. This results in concern for the precision of pilotage 
accident causal factors weight assignment, uncertainty in identifying the root causes 
of pilotage human error and debates on the results of maritime pilotage safety 
measurement, demonstrating a significant research gap needing to be addressed.  
The problem with the previous studies is that they could conclude that all risks or 
challenges could be considered “critical” or “important”, when the respondents were 
assessing each of them separately. Therefore, a ranking is missing that reflects the 
perceived degree of importance of factors for accidents’ human causal factors in 
relation to each other. Without such ranking, stakeholders are not able to determine 
the relative importance of factors and will have difficulties in determining the right 
strategies to overcome them.  
Therefore, in order to solve this problem, to produce more realistic and reliable results, 
this study aims at introducing a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method, the 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method. The proposed methodology in this 
chapter overcomes the shortcomings of the previous studies by introducing an AHP 
approach to identify the relative importance among accidents’ human causal factors in 
maritime pilotage operations, by carrying out pairwise comparison among the (HCFs) 
as a whole, by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into consideration.  
In addition, the limitation of the previous studies is that in recent years, international 
maritime authorities, scholars and practitioners have made a significant amount of 
effort to evaluate the human factor in order to identify root causes of human error and 
accident causations in the shipping transportation industry in order to improve safety 
at sea; however, most of these research studies often overlooked evaluating the causal 
relationships among the human factors contributing to the pilotage accidents and few 
of these studies focused on analysing the interaction between accident causation 
factors with a systematic method (Wang, 2015). 
 As has been mentioned previously, using assessment methods, which disregard 
evaluating the influencing relationship between accidents’ causal factors, can lead 
analysts to risk either underestimating the factors that can have a high influence on the 
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others or overestimating factors that do not have much influence. Yang et al. (2013b) 
stated that using an assessment method that ignores the relationships and 
interdependence between factors is not always feasible for solving real-world 
problems. As a result, the decision-makers will have difficulties in determining 
appropriate causal factors affecting pilotage operations’ performance that need to be 
improved. Consequently, right strategies cannot be taken to mitigate the human errors 
effectively in the marine pilotage operations area.  
 Therefore, in this study, in order to address these issues successfully, and find more 
reasonable results, an MCDM method, such as the decision-making trial and 
evaluation (DEMATEL) method is utilised, taking subjective judgments of decision-
makers into consideration.  The DEMATEL method is chosen to do further analysis. 
This analysis results in the identification of the complicated cause and effect 
relationships among the risk factors affecting pilotage operations. 
This research implies both analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and decision-making trial 
and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) methods for the following reason: A hybrid 
approach of two or more methodologies has been proven to be a powerful supporting 
tool for solving such complex decision problems. The significance of the proposed 
methodology is that it can help analysts in determining the most important contributing 
factors that may affect the pilotage operations’ safety, and therefore should be the most 
developed. In addition, the proposed hybrid method provides a comprehensive 
illustration of relationships among the factors, and assists analysts to identify the 
influence of each factor to the others, as well as enabling decision-makers in 
determining whether a factor belongs to a cause or an effect group and which causal 
factor needs to be first improved. As a result, countermeasures can be taken to reduce 
the human errors during maritime pilotage operations, thus subsequently preventing 
or at least mitigating maritime accidents in the future. 
This approach will facilitate the decision-making process for choosing appropriate 
strategies and take preventive/corrective actions in later stages for mitigating risks 
influencing pilotage operations. An analysis of the identified human factors (HCFs) 
influencing pilotage operations safety performance is conducted on real cases. The 
proposed methods is validated using case studies in major ports in the UK and 
Mediterranean from different marine expert perspectives.  The results indicate that the 
126 
 
hybrid approach, attempting to use quantitative modelling for dealing with the 
dependency and interdependency problems, for facilitating the quantification analysis 
of human factors in maritime pilotage operations can be successfully fulfilled.   
 In the next section, literature with regard to these two decision-making methods is 
introduced, and previous studies that used the methodology are reviewed. In section 
5.4, the research methodology for the proposed novel hybrid MCDM model with a 
detailed description of each step is illustrated.  In addition, the advantages of integrated 
AHP and DEMATEL methods are discussed. A case study of applying both AHP and 
DEMATEL methods on human factors in maritime pilotage operations is illustrated 
in Section 5.5, and 5.6. Finally, the conclusion is presented in section 5.7.  
5.3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE METHODS 
5.3.1 Overview on Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method was recognized as one of the major 
methods of decision making in order to solve multiple criteria decision problems in 
the field of management engineering after the 1980s since Professor Saaty of the 
University of Pittsburgh developed the method in the 1960s (Lee and Kim, 2013). The 
AHP approach is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method, a common and 
widely used method in decision-making and rating tasks, which is rigorously 
concerned with the scaling problem and what sort of numbers to use and how to 
correctly combine the priorities resulting from them (Saaty, 1990). It is an appropriate 
application when comparing the importance of an element against that of another 
element at the same level in the hierarchy tree structure, using a typical pairwise 
comparison technique to acquire relative weights of criteria based upon a hierarchical 
structure (Saaty, 1980).  
One of the best advantages of this method is its capability to check and minimize 
inconsistencies in expert judgments, by computing a Consistency Ratio (CR) (Riahi et 
al., 2012). In addition to this, the AHP approach is easier to understand and it can 
effectively handle both qualitative and quantitative data.  AHP is an effective tool that 
is proven to be appropriately applicable for dealing with MCDM problems and allows 
the decision-maker to obtain both subjective and objective aspects of a decision (Saaty, 




The AHP method in the individual tools and hybrid MCDM in the integrated methods 
were found as the first and the second methods in applications (Mardani et al., 2015).  
The AHP approach has been proven to be a successful tool for measuring 
independency among elements in the complex decision problems in various 
applications. It is noteworthy that a number of studies have been conducted by utilising 
the AHP method. AHP has been applied by Celik and Cebi (2009), in order to identify 
the role of human error in shipping accidents, by Saeed (2015) to select the most 
important of nontechnical skills required for deck officers’ in the crisis situations, by 
Zhang et al. (2012), to establish a risk hierarchical structure and to identify the 
significant influencing factor of an inland waterway transportation system. Lee and 
Kim (2013) used Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to analyse the relative importance 
of the risk factors of the marine traffic environment, Pak et al., (2015) to identify the 
factors that can affect port navigational safety, and Ugurlu et al. (2015) in order to 
determine the causes of ships’ collisions,  by Fu et al (2018) to investigate the relative 
importance of potential risk influencing factors of the Arctic maritime transportation 
systems and others, and by Saeed et al (2019) in the development of a taxonomy of 
merchant marine deck officers’ non-technical skills (NTS). 
5.3.2 Overview on DEMATEL 
The Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method was 
developed by the Geneva Research Centre of the Battelle Memorial Institute (Fontela 
and Gabus, 1976; Gabus and Fontela, 1973). It was introduced to build the network of 
relationships map for illustrating the interrelations among factors (Liou et al., 2007). 
Recently this method has proven to be a more successful tool for measuring and 
illustrating the causal relationships among interdependent factors Özdemir and 
Güneroğlu (2015); Elham et al. (2013). The DEMATEL technique is the most 
significant application to be applied in the multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
field to display the cause and effect groups of a system (or subsystem) by applying 
matrices and digraphs to visualize the structure of complicated causal relationships 
(Tzeng et al., 2007; Lin and Wu, 2008; Jeng, 2012).   
The DEMATEL method is an effective and innovative tool that is proven to be 
appropriately applicable for dealing with MCDM problems in an uncertain and 
complex operations environment (Liou et al., 2007; Tzeng et al., 2007). One of the 
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greatest advantages of using DEMATEL is that a huge sample size is not required for 
analysis (Yang et al., 2016). It is provides more realistic solutions and more accurate 
results by combining the qualitative subject matter expert opinion with the quantitative 
in a systematic method (Lin and Tzeng, 2009). Besides the results from the final step 
of DEMATEL, it could also be combined with other multi criteria decision making 
methods (Saaty, 1996), like Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), (ANP) and Technique 
for Order Performance by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS).  
Given the strength of the DEMATEL method in tackling complex problems and its 
ability to effectively identify the relations among the factors within a system and 
determine the level of interdependence between them, as well as its capability to 
capture the cause and effect relationship successfully (Yang et al., 2008), the 
DEMATEL technique has therefore been widely applied in many domains including 
engineering (Hori and Shimizu, 1999; Seyed-Hosseini et at., 2006), business (Wu, 
2008; Hu et al., 2009; Noori and Amiri, 2009;) education (Tzeng et al., 2007), Airline 
safety measurement (Liou et al., 2007), maritime operations (Topcu, 2008; Xi et al., 
2017) and others. 
5.3.3 The application of the integrated AHP and DEMATEL technique 
This study uses the integrated MCDM method, AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) and 
DEMATEL technique to combine their desired properties for facilitating the 
quantification analysis of human risk factors in maritime pilotage operations. The 
proposed methodology in this chapter overcomes the shortcomings of the previous 
studies by introducing AHP and DEMATL approaches to obtain the importance and 
weights of influence of each factor by carrying out pairwise comparison among the 
factors. 
This research implies both analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and decision-making trial 
and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) methods for the following reason: Firstly, the 
integrated method has not yet been applied for identifying the relative importance and 
determining the mutual influence relationships among human factors in maritime 
pilotage operations. Secondly, the above-mentioned approaches have the capability of 
quantifying the subjective judgments of the respondents in a way that can be measured 
and evaluated (Sara et al., 2015). Thirdly, the approaches are proven to be 
appropriately applicable for dealing with MCDM problems in an uncertain and 
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complex operations environment and can effectively handle both qualitative and 
quantitative data.  The major advantage of integrating AHP and DEMATEL methods 
is that the decision maker such as practitioners and regulators (port authorities, 
shipping companies’ operators, and government) can continuously improve the 
pilotage’ performance effectively and efficiently from the short-term and long-term 
perspective, by determining the interrelationships among the risk factors and enables 
the decision-maker to clearly understand which factors have mutual influences on one 
another to be managed. 
 The integration of an MCDM technique can provide more practical solutions, 
(Mandal & Sakar, 2011). Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages 
(Mohagheghi et al., 2017). The AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) is applied to 
determine the relative weights and rank the importance of the human factors that affect 
pilotage operation safety. However, it assumes that the factors are independent and 
fails to consider their interactions and dependencies. Therefore, the technique of The 
Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) is applied to 
overcome this imperfection and provide a comprehensive illustration of relationships 
among the factors, taking the dependence among the factors into consideration.  
It is worthwhile mentioning that the AHP method enables a complex problem to be 
structured and presented in a simple hierarchy form and allows assessing the 
consistency of the performed pairwise comparison expert judgements, by computing 
a Consistency Ratio (CR) (Riahi et al., 2012), which is not possible to evaluate with 
the method of DEMATEL. On the other hand, the advantage of using the DEMATEL 
method is that it can effectively analyse the mutual influences (both direct and indirect 
effects) among different factors. The proposed innovative approach using the 
DEMATEL method plays a significant role in visualizing the interrelationships 
between factors via an IRM and enables the decision-maker to clearly understand 
which factors have mutual influences on one another. 
The approach of using both methods is increasingly being used for various problems 
in many fields and a wide range of areas.  An integrated approach of the AHP and 
DEMATEL has been proven to be a successful and powerful tool for measuring 
dependency and interdependency among elements in the complex decision problems 
in various applications. In addition, utilisation of AHP technique together with 
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DEMATEL method has been widely extended in many different disciplines, such as 
developing the competencies of managers (Kashi, 2015), selection of allied hospitals 
in outpatient services (Ortíz et al., 2016), supply chain performance (Najmi and 
Makui, 2010), personnel estimation (Roy et al., 2012), supplier selection (Chang et 
al., 2011).  Sara et al. (2015) used a combined method of the AHP and DEMATEL to 
assess carbon capture and storage (CCS) barriers in the ROAD project. The AHP was 
used to extract the relative weights of (CCS) barriers and DEMATEL was used to 
investigate interdependency among them. Wu and Tsai (2012) applied the AHP and 
DEMATEL approach to evaluate the criteria in the auto spare parts industry in Taiwan, 
and based on the diagraph derived from the DEMATEL, they suggested a long-term 
improvement opportunity for the auto spare parts industry.  
5.4 THE METHODOLOGY  
A hybrid MCDM techniques based on a combination of the AHP and DEMATEL for 
assessing accidents’ human causal factors in pilotage operations is proposed. The AHP 
(Analytic Hierarchy Process) is first used to evaluate the weight and rank the 
importance of the identified human causal factors that affect pilotage operation safety, 
while the DEMATEL method is applied to determine whether there are relationships 
among the factors. The proposed risk assessment model and procedures to this novel 
hybrid MCDM method are schematically shown in Figure 5.1 and each step is 





  Figure 5.1: A generic risk assessment model for pilotage human-related risk factors 
 
5.4.1 The process of an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
This section focuses on risk assessment using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
method. In this study the AHP approach is employed to determine the most important 
human causal factors which are influencing pilotage operation’s safety, and causing 





                               Figure 5.2 the general framework of AHP process             
                                                                                       
Generally, AHP consists of three key principles: firstly, hierarchy framework, 
secondly, priority analysis and finally, consistency verification. Figure 5.2 shows the 
AHP method in five steps: (1) determine the objective of the problem, (2) form the 
hierarchical structure of the problem, (3) produce judgment data by pairwise 
comparison (4) calculate the priorities vector and check the consistency, (5) calculate 
the relative weight and confirm the consistency of the entire hierarchy. The process is 
presented as follows. 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) method in this study is employed to evaluate 
the weight and rank the importance of human factors that influence pilotage operation 
safety performance and cause maritime accidents.  In order to achieve this aim, the 
first step is to develop a generic hierarchical structure based on the identified risk 
factors. Each factor and sub-factor was obtained, based on the information collected 
from the literature review, analysis of marine accidents investigations reports, and 
experienced marine experts’ perspectives. This step has been done in the last chapter 
(chapter 4).  
Relative weights of human causal factors’ independency at the same level can be 
obtained using pair-wise comparisons. Conducting the AHP based questionnaire 
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survey to obtain the experts’ judgement and opinions, the significance of the identified 
risk factors will be explored. The decision is made based on scores obtained by 
pairwise comparisons between the factors, in other words, the higher score, is the more 
important factor.  The ratio scale of assessment used for the pairwise comparison 
between factors of each hierarchy is 1 to 9 scale (Saaty, 1994) as shown in Table 5.1. 
 The experts are requested to give their judgements, and before proceeding with the 
“Pair-wise Comparisons” technique, an expert has to understand the ratio scale 
measurement (Table 5.1). This table contains two parts which describe the numerical 
assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each number. The first part is on 
the left side which explains “IMPORTANT”, while the right side is the second part of 
the table which describes “UNIMPORTANT”. It’s used for comparing factors with 
each other.  The importance is rated from 1 to 9. An expert is required to give a possible 
judgment to all questions based on his/her expertise and experience in the maritime 
pilotage operations.  
The decision makers should compare each element with the other by using the 
fundamental scale for pair-wise comparisons as shown in Table 5.1. Pair-wise 
comparison starts with comparison between two selected elements at the same level 
to get the relative importance between them. To select the most important factor, the 
expert will be asked to underline accordingly the rate of importance of each factor and 
sub-factor in the given column. For instance:  only one number either on the right or 
the left of the scale for every comparison as shown in the example at the beginning of 
the questionnaire survey (see appendix III). It is important to note that the respondents 
have to be careful not to get logical contradiction on these questionnaires for pairwise 
comparison. This logical contradictions of a respondent is measured as inconsistency 




                 Table 5.1: Ratio scale for pair-wise comparisons (Saaty, 1994)
         
In this step, to conduct the pair-wise comparison matrix, at first, set up n criteria in the 
row and column of a n ×n matrix. The number of matrixes at each level depends on 
the number of elements at that level of hierarchy and the order of the matrixes at every 
level depending on the number of elements at the lower level that it connects to. 
Comparison of the decision elements is organized into matrices. These matrixes 
consist of n columns and n rows; it is a square matrix (i.e. ‘A’ matrix) as shown in 
equation (5.1). Each element of the matrix represent the preference of the factor in row 
i to the factor in column j.  
Where i, j = 1, 2, 3,…, n and each aij is the relative importance of attribute Ai to 
attribute Aj. For a matrix of order n, n (n-1)/2 comparison is necessary. 
If i = j on the comparison matrix, then the value will be 1, because in this case, the 
related factor is compared with itself. If Ai is judged to be of equal relative importance 
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Then, in order to determine the priorities from each pairwise matrix and to obtain the 
importance of each factor, the eigenvector method was used.  The local weights of 
factors can be calculated by using the following equation;   






)𝑛𝑗=1  , i, j, = 1, 2, 3, …, n)                                                                                (5.2)           
Where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 represents the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order 
n. 
According to Saaty (1980), the eigenvector approach is the most proper method to 
determine the priorities from each pair-wise matrix. The eigenvectors for priorities can 
be calculated by the Average of Normalized Column (ANC) method. After the 
comparison matrix was completed, the process of normalisation started. According to 
Muhisn et al (2015) the ANC process can be done by applying three steps as follows:  
 1) Sum of each column in matrix   
 2) Each element of matrix is divided by the sum of its column 
 3) Normalized principle of Eigen vector and that can be done by add the element in 
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Since the normalised matrix is performed, to confirm the consistency of the pairwise 
judgement, the consistency verification is employed, which is considered as one of the 
most important tasks of the AHP approach. It is included to compute the consistency 
ratio among the pair wise comparisons (Riahi et al., 2012). In case that inconsistency 
ratio (CR) of pairwise comparison is zero, it means that respondents keep consistency 
perfectly. A good consistency is (a score <0.1). If inconsistency ratio (CR) is more 
than 0.10, it means lack of consistency (Saaty, 1980). A decision maker should review 
the pairwise judgements and is should be repeated or disregarded. The CR value is 









                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                









                                                                                                                                                          
Where CI represents the consistency index, RI is the average random index (Table 
5.2), n is the matrix order and λ max is represents the maximum weight value of the 
n-by-n comparison matrix A.       
    Table 5.2: Value of RI Random Index of (AHP) Process (Saaty, 1990)                
 
It is important to mention that the weights obtained are local weights at the same level. 
In multilevel structures, further calculations needs to be conducted to obtain the 
normalised weights of the bottom level factors by multiplying their local weights with 





5.4.2 The process of the DEMATEL method  
In this section a novel technique is introduced to investigate the relationships among 
the human causal factors by using DEMATEL method. The suggested proposed 
method plays a significant role in providing a comprehensive illustration of influential 
relationships among the human factors contributing to maritime pilotage accidents. 
The process of the proposed method is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
                                 Fig. 5.3.The DEMATEL process 
 
The DEMATEL method and the calculation steps are described below according to 
number of sources (Liou et al., 2007; Tzeng et al., 2007; Lin and Wu, 2008; Wu, 2008; 
Jeng, 2012) as follows: 
Step1: Direct-relation matrix is calculated in this step. In this study it is supposed that 
there are “E” experts and “n” is the causal factors related to the pilotage accidents. 
First, to obtain a direct relation (Average) matrix; pair-wise comparison based on 
expert judgments in terms of the influence of the factors is carried out. Before 
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measuring the relationship between the different accidents causal factors and 
proceeding with the “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique, an “E” expert has to 
understand the ratio scale measurement used in this study. Table 5.3 below describes 
the numerical assessment together with the meaning of each number. It is used for 
evaluating the influence level and determining the values of relationships between 
different factors.  
                                       Table 5.3 Evaluation scale  
                     
 
A comparison scale has been designed as a pair-wise comparison scale with five 
levels, where scores ranging from 0 to 4 with ‘‘no influence (0)’’, or ‘‘low influence 
(1)’’, ‘‘medium influence (2)’’, ‘‘high influence (3)’’, and ‘‘very high influence (4),’’ 
respectively. The “E” experts are required to give a possible judgment and to evaluate 
the influence level among the factors based on his/her expertise and experience. The 
experts are asked to score the level of direct influence they believe each factor “i” 
exerts on every other factor “j”, as indicated by “𝑎𝑖𝑗”. The scores by each expert will 
give us “n× n” non-negative answer matrix 𝑋𝐾 = (𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝐾) n× n  with “1≤ K≤ E” “. Thus 
“ X1 , X2,   … , XE, ” are the answer matrices for each of the “E” experts, and each 
element of “ XK ” is an integer denoted by “𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝐾 ”. The diagonal elements of each 
answer matrix “ XK ” are all set to zero. 
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Then, as a result of these evaluations, a direct relation matrix would be created by each 
respondent, and then the average matrix “A” for all expert opinions can be computed 
by averaging “E” experts’ scores as follows: 
                                              (5.4)                                                 
Step 2: Normalize the direct-relation matrix: based on the direct- relation matrix “A”, 
the normalised direct-relation matrix “M” can be obtained using equations (5.4) and 
(5.5) (Wu, 2008). 
    M=A ×D                                                                                                                                 (5.5) 
                                                                                                                        
Step 3: Obtain a total-relation matrix 𝑇 and its sum of rows and columns. 
 After the normalised direct-relation matrix “M” is obtained, the total relation matrix 
T can be acquired by using equation (5.6), in which the “𝐼” is denoted as the identity 
matrix (Lin and Wu, 2008). 
                                                                                                (5.6) 
In eq. (5.7), “𝑅𝑖” and “𝐶𝑗” demonstrate the sums of rows and columns in the matrix 𝑇 
in which 𝑡𝑖𝑗  indicates the interdependent relationships value of each pair of evaluated 
factors. The influence of total relation matrix T is represented by𝑅𝑖, 𝐶𝑗, 𝑅𝑖+𝐶𝑗and 𝑅𝑖- 
𝐶𝑗. The 𝑅𝑖 is the factor that influences others, while the 𝐶𝑗, is the factor influenced by 
others.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The horizontal axis vector (𝑅𝑖+𝐶𝑗) is made by adding vector 𝑅𝑖 to vector 𝐶𝑗 which 
shows the state of the relationship among the factors, whereas the vertical axis of 
(𝑅𝑖−𝐶𝑗) is built by deducting vector 𝑅𝑖 from vector 𝐶𝑗 which displays the state of 
influence among the causal factors. The horizontal axis value   𝑝𝑟𝑖
+ (𝑅𝑖+ 𝐶𝑗) is called 
‘‘Prominence’’, which exhibits the total important influence of the factor on and by 
others. High prominence indicates that the factor influences other factors strongly 
while other factors also strongly influence it, while the vertical axis value 𝑝𝑟𝑖
− (𝑅𝑖- 𝐶𝑗 
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) is called “Relation”. Similarly, the vertical axis (𝑅𝑖- 𝐶𝑗) separates the factors into 
cause and effect groups. When the value of 𝑅𝑖- 𝐶𝑗 is positive, the factor belongs to the 
cause group, which dispatches the influence to other factors, whereas when the value 
of 𝑅𝑖- 𝐶𝑗  is negative, the factor, belongs to the effect group, which receives the 
influence from the other factors. The component with the highest positive value of 
(𝑅𝑖+ 𝐶𝑗) and (𝑅𝑖- 𝐶𝑗) can be named as the master dispatcher and the component with 
the lowest value can be named as the master receiver.  
 
                                                             (5.7) 
 
 
Step 4: Obtain a threshold value (b) and construct a digraph:  
In this step, a threshold value is obtained to construct a digraph. In order to reduce the 
complexity of the network relationship map (NRM), it is necessary to set a threshold 
value (b) in matrix T. The aim of setting a threshold value (b) is to remove some 
negligible effects indicated by the factors of matrix T. The threshold value can be 
decided by experts through discussion (Yang et al., 2013), and can also be acquired 
by using a mathematical equation (Özdemir et al., 2015). In this study, the threshold 
value was set up mathematically, by calculating the average of the value of 𝑡𝑖𝑗, where 
𝑁 indicates the total number of factors (𝑖 ×𝑗). Only the factors whose effect values of 
𝑡𝑖𝑗 are greater than the threshold value can be selected and transformed into a causal 
relationship diagram (Tzeng et al., 2007).  
𝑏 =
𝑁
                                                                                                          (5.8)      





5.5 A CASE STUDY FOR THE WEIGHT AND RANK THE IMPORTANCE OF 
THE HCFs USING AHP METHOD 
The objective of this study is to select the most important factors that contribute to the 
occurrence of maritime accidents during pilotage operations. Given the strength of the 
AHP method in tackling complex problems and its ability to effectively determine the 
relative weights of the human factors that contribute to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents, it (the AHP technique) has therefore been utilized in this study. 
Using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method in this study will be beneficial to 
the maritime industry as an indicator to assess the human element causing human error 
during maritime pilotage operations, and providing a better decision-making 
methodology in the future. The process is presented as following subsection. 
5.5.1 Develop a hierarchal structure for pilotage accidents’ causal factors 
The first step is to construct the problem into a hierarchy including a goal, set of 
criteria and sub-criteria. The hierarchy is structured on different levels from the top 
level, indicating the main objective in the decision-making process (the goal), the 
criteria in the middle, and the alternatives at the bottom. The criteria are divided into 
sub-criteria or sub-sub-criteria if necessary. However, as the AHP method is employed 
only for the risk assessment in this research, thus the decision alternatives are not 
carried out in the hierarchy (The alternatives are not necessary in this study). 
Therefore, the main factors and the sub- factors in Fig.5.4 in this study correspond to 
the basic AHP structure.  
This structure consists of five main factors and each one is divided into sub-factors. 
That is, the most contributory causal human factors of maritime pilotage accidents. 
The main factors are the criteria, which are, (F1, F2, F3, F3, and F4). The sub-factors 
are sub criteria which are, F1: (F11, F12, F13, F14 and F15), F2: (F21, F22, F23, and 
F24), F3: (F31, F32, F33, and F34), F4: (F41, F42, F43, and F44), and F5: (F51, F52, 
F53, and F54). The reason behind applying this process is to enable interpretation 




            Figure 5.4 Hierarchal structure for pilotage accidents causal factors 
 
5.5.2 Constructing a pair wise comparison and performing judgment 
Once a hierarchical framework is created, to assign a weight, pairwise comparisons 
between the causal factors is conducted. A copy of the suggested questionnaire was 
sent to the supervisory team in the middle of January 2017. Based on the comments 
of the supervisory team, the pairwise comparisons questionnaire was adjusted. Once 
the questionnaire was approved, the final version was completed. AHP uses a simple 
Pair-wise Comparison technique to determine weights and ratings (Saaty, 2008), so 
that the decision-makers can focus on just two factors at the same time 
(Mahmoodzaden et al., 2007). In this study, as previously explained, the pair wise 
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questionnaires were sent to the experts. The ratio scale of assessment for the pairwise 
comparison between factors is used, for comparing factors with each other (Saaty, 
1994), as shown in Table5.2. 
It was pointed out that the AHP method is a subjective methodology and a large 
number of experts are not required if the data collected are gathered from the experts 
with sufficient knowledge and experience (Saaty, 2001). The pair wise questionnaire 
was sent to experts belonging to various maritime sectors to contribute their 
judgments. In order to increase the valid response rate, the respondents were contacted 
in advance to determine if they would agree to participate in our survey, and each 
expert had to understand it before completing the pair-wise comparisons. Experts are 
required to give a possible judgment on all questions based on their expertise and 
experience. 
 The experts were experienced ship masters who had served long periods on-board a 
variety of vessels, including five senior pilots currently working in different port 
companies in UK and Mediterranean, one expert who is an insurance company 
manager, and one ship’s captain with education level PhD degree from a maritime 
educational institution, staff all with more than 10 years working experience. 
Experienced professionals were selected to be the sample, as they are aware of the 
importance of the hazards and risk factors they are involved with, and due to their 
ability to compare and define which risk factors have priority over others. 
All responses were collected and recorded, but while feedback of seven experts was 
received in this study, only five participants’ results were considered as two 
participants’ weighting data was disregarded as a result of a lack of consistency in 
light of the AHP formula. Once a pairwise judgement is performed, comparisons of 
the decision elements are organised into matrices; eigenvectors (relative value vectors) 
are then calculated. The weight vector of the comparison matrix provides the priority, 
then the consistency ratio is calculated.      
 5.5.3 Eigenvector (Priority) (w) 
In order to determine the priorities from each pairwise matrix and to obtain the 
importance of each factor, the eigenvector method was used. The eigenvector 
(priorities) is calculated by using equation (5.2).  
144 
 
Table 5.4 illustrates the eigenvector (priorities) for the causal factors. For example, to 
calculate the priority of bridge team management failure (F1), it can be done by 
applying three steps as follows: 
1) ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗                                                                                                                                         
1+1/2+1/3+1/3+3= 5 





                                                                                                                                                     
1
9.33







𝑗                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
0.11+ 0.13 +0.09 + 0.09 + 0.20 = 0.62 and divided this sum by the number of 




 = 0.12 
Each value of the matrix in the Table 5.4 is based on one expert’s opinion. If several 
experts are involved, the geometric mean is used to find the averages of the judgments 
before calculating the eigenvectors. The weight value of the factor F1is found as 0.12, 
and the same process to calculate the weight of the other factors F2, F3, F4, and F5 
were applied (see Table 5.4).  











                Table 5. 4.  Normalised status of the five main causal factors comparison 
                            matrix and weight 
Consistency ratio CR = 0.2 
 
5.5.4. Perform the consistency 
Since the normalised matrix is performed, to confirm the consistency of the pairwise 
judgement, the consistency verification is employed, which is considered as one of the 
most important tasks of the AHP approach according to Muhisn et al., (2015). It is 
included to compute the consistency ratio among the pair wise comparisons (Riahi et 
al., 2012). When the Consistency Ratio (CR) of pairwise comparison is zero, the 
respondent keeps consistency perfectly. A good consistency is (a score <0.1). If CR is 
more than 0.10, it means a lack of consistency (Saaty, 1980). A decision maker should 
review the pairwise judgements and each should be repeated or disregarded. To 
calculate CR, each column of the comparison matrix is multiplied to calculate the 
weighted aggregate matrix (AW) as follows:   

















































































Then, each element of the weighted Aw is divided by the priority vector element to 
calculate the Aw/w value.  The CR value is calculated by using equations (5.3).   







     Lambda Max λ = 5.12      
 𝐶1 =  
5.12−5
5−1




 = 0.02                                                                                       
Where CI represent the consistency index, RI is the average Random Index (Table 
5.2), n is the matrix order and λmax is represent the maximum weight value of the n-
by-n comparison matrix A. 
Determining the suitable value of (RI) from the table of random index of AHP as 
shown in Table 5.2, for the matrix size of five, the random index will be RI = 1,12, 
after that calculate Consistency Ratio (CR). For instance, the calculation to 
consistency test for the main CR = 0.02.  As the value of CR is less than 0.1, the 
judgements are acceptable. 
In this study to evaluate the weight of the five main causal factors and the twenty-one 
sub-factors presented in the hierarchical structure, a comparison matrix was created.  
Each value of the matrix in the tables is the geometric mean of five expert judgements. 
The geometric mean is used to find the averages of the judgments before calculating 
the eigenvectors, in this study, exile software was used to calculate the priority 
(eigenvector) and consistency CR. Table 5.6- Table 5.11 represents the priority weight 
of all pilotage accidents human causal factors. Consequently, the relative importance 
among the five main causal factors categories and the twenty-one sub-factors are 
shown in Fig. 5.5, and Fig. 5.6. The software calculated the eigenvector of priorities 
and the C.R 
It is important to mention that the weights obtained are local weights at the same level, 
it is necessary to obtain global weight for each of the sub-factors, which have an effect 
on the main goal and form the basis for further analysis, this has been conducted by 
multiplying the local weights of sub-factors by main factors weight value, which is the 
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ones of their associated upper level factors. For example, the weight of sub-factor F21 
(lack of ship handling skills) can be obtained by multiplying main F2 by F21 (= 0.30 
×0.39 = 0.117). 
 
5.5.5 Results and discussion     
           
            Table 5.5: Weight and consistency ratio of the 5 main causal factor 
 
     Consistency Ratio (CR) = 0.04 
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          Table 5.6. Weight and consistency ratio of sub-factors (F1)  
                                          
                                        Consistency Ratio (CR) = 0.01                   
                
            Table 5.7. Weight and consistency ratio of sub-factors (F2)    
 
                                                             Consistency Ratio (CR) = 0.01 
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                     Table 5.8. Weight and consistency ratio of sub-factors (F3)    
 
                                                                  Consistency Ratio (CR) = 0.04 
 
                                                   
                        Table 5.9. Weight and consistency ratio of sub-factors (F4)    
 
                                                            Consistency Ratio (CR) = 0.03 
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                      Table 5.10. Weight and consistency ratio of sub-factors (F5)                           
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The results in Table 5.5 show the relative weights among the five main groups of the 
causal factors of pilotage accidents. The data revealed that the most significant causes 
of human error-related pilotage accidents can be ranked as follows: F1 (bridge team 
management failure), F2 (technical skills shortcoming), F3 (instructions and orders 
failure), F4 (rules and regulations noncompliance), and F5 Individual- task interaction 
factors. The top three factors are F1, F2, and F5 with total weight rate 33.84%, 30.48%, 
13.25%, respectively.  
 In Table 5.6, it can be seen that the sub-factor F12 (language barriers and lack of 
effective communication) was ranked as the most important contributing causal factor 
among the F1 sub-factors, 25.38%, whereas the sub-factor F13 (failure to exchange 
the information between pilot and ship’s master) was ranked as the second most causal 
factor with total weight rate 24.87%. The sub-factor F11 (lack of team work) was the 
third most critical contributing causal factor which has the third highest priority weight 
among the F1 sub-factors while F14 (lack of situation awareness in the bridge team), 
was in fourth place. It can be seen that there is no big difference between the weight 
value of sub factors F11 and F14, as they are nearly the same, while F11 is 21.32%, 
F14 is 20.40%. However, the sub-factor F15 (The master’s and pilot’s ineffective 
monitoring of the external parties and vessel’s progress) was ranked as the least 
important one at 8.03%.  
The results in Table 5.7 show that the sub-factor F21 (lack of ship handling skills) is 
the most significant causal factor for pilotage accidents since it has the highest priority 
weight among the F2 sub-factors with a total weight rate of 39.20%. It is followed by 
the sub-factor F22 (lack of familiarity with the navigational systems) which was 
ranked as the second most important causal factor at 24.04%, and the sub- factor F23 
(lack of skills of crewmembers on-board ship, tugs and mooring boats masters, and 
shore mooring personnel) is ranked in the third place at 18.93%, and F24 (improper/ 
inadequate use of tugs) is ranked in the fourth place at 17.83%.  
Table 5.8 shows that the priority weights of the causal factor F31 (failure of pilot to 
give precise instructions) is the highest among the F3 sub-factors at 37.13%, followed 
by the causal factor F32 (failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot 
directions) at 24.68%, which ranked as the second largest cause of piloting accidents. 
The causal factor F33 (failure of tug masters to carry out the pilot’s instructions 
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precisely) was ranked as the third most important cause with a total weight rate of 
21.90% F34 (failure of ship’s crewmembers to follow orders regarding anchoring, 
steering, and engine requests correctly) was ranked in fourth place at 16.10%. 
Table 5.9 shows that the sub-factor F41 (failure to establish a proper manoeuvring 
plan prior to piloting vessel) is the most significant causal factor among the F4 sub-
factors for pilotage accidents since it has the highest priority weight of 34.58%. The 
sub-factor F42 (failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in COLREG) was 
ranked as the second most important causal factor among the F4 sub-factors, with total 
weight rate of 27.26%. The sub-factor F43 (piloting ships in bad weather conditions 
and navigating vessels outside published guidelines or draft limits) was ranked in third 
place with a total weight rate 25.61%. F44 (pilot boarding and disembarking too close 
to breakwater) was ranked in fourth place at 12.55%.  
Table 5.10 shows the priority weights of the F5 sub-factors. The data reveals that the 
most important contributory causal factors of pilotage accidents among the F5 sub-
factors, can be ranked as follows: F51 (fatigue), F52 (mental and physical work load), 
F53 (distraction during the time of berthing operations), and F54 (stress). The top three 
factors are F51, F52, and F53 have total weight rate 49.35%, 21.94%, 18.50%, 
respectively. There is a general consensus among all the pilots and captains 
interviewed that these factors play a significant role in pilotage accidents (see chapter 
4).  
Derived from the results of AHP, lack of ship handling skills (F21) is the most 
important causal factor among the entire hierarchy, which has a relative importance 
value of 0.117, followed  by language barriers and lack of effective communication 
(F12, 0.085), failure to exchange information between pilot and ship’s master (F13, 
0,085), lack of familiarity with the navigational systems (F22, 0.072), lack of team 
work (F11, 0. 071), lack of situation awareness in the bridge team (F14, 0.068), fatigue 
(F51, 0.063), lack of skills of crewmembers on-board ship, tugs and mooring boats 
masters, and shore mooring personnel (F23, 0.057), Improper/ inadequate use of tugs 
(F24, 0.054), and failure of pilot to give precise instructions (F31, 0.048) as illustrated 
the top 10 highest scores in a bar graph 5.7.  
The results of this study corroborate the findings of the Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch of the UK (MAIB) (2015), who investigated the accidents that occurred in UK 
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territorial waters during the period 2005 to 2013 in which a pilot was on board. The 
major cause of the accidents which occurred was the human factor, and in the majority 
of cases reviewed they were due to one or more of the following: the pilot-master 
information exchange failure, poor bridge team-pilot integration, lack of 
communication, lack of planning, lack of ship handling skills, and pilot distracted/ 
overloaded (MAIB, 2015). The results also support some existing findings, e.g., 
findings from Darbra et al., (2007), and Chauvin et al., (2013), who investigated the 
risks contributing to maritime accidents during pilotage operations.  
This finding is also in line with some results of research conducted by the 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) (1995) who found that the inadequate 
interpersonal communications among the bridge team, lack of adequate information 
exchange, incomplete understanding of the intended manoeuvre, and loss of 
situational awareness were the most important factors. Based on these results, it can 
be easy to nominate the most significant risks that have great impact on the safety of 
the pilotage operations. The higher the value of human causal factors is, the higher the 
risk of pilotage safety performance. Therefore, an effective measure should be applied 
to reduce or mitigate their risks and effects.  
5.6. A CASE STUDY FOR IDENTIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE   
(HCFs) USING DEMATEL METHOD 
In the previous section, the importance of the human causal factors related to pilotage 
accidents has been outlined in detail. In this section a novel technique is applied to 
investigate the relationships among the human causal factors by using DEMATEL 
method. The suggested innovative method plays a significant role in providing a 
comprehensive illustration of influential relationships among the human factors 
contributing to maritime pilotage accidents.  
As has been described previously, maritime accidents are often reported as being 
multi-causal in nature, as highlighted by the so-called 'Swiss Cheese’ (Hollnagel, 
2006, p. 12). Previous accident investigation reports revealed that the maritime 
accidents occurring in the pilotage area are not usually caused by a single failure or 
mistake, but by the confluence of a chain or series of errors. It is recognised that 
multiple human factors may be present at any one time and these factors have an 
influence on each other. The occurrence of one risk gives rise to multiple risks 
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resulting in a cumulative effect. Therefore, it very important for decision-makers to 
determine and control these risks before they occur. 
Previous studies, which have been conducted by considerable numbers of researchers 
and international maritime authorities to evaluate human error have assumed that the 
accidents causal factors are independent, however Accident investigation reports 
revealed that the cause of maritime accidents occurring in the pilotage area are usually 
dependent on each other. Therefore, using a traditional assessment method which fails 
to identify the influencing relationship between accidents’ causal factors, to discover 
how the human factor can impact the others may introduce some level of uncertainty 
and could lead analysts to risk either underestimating factors that can have high 
influence on the others or overestimating factors that do not have much effect. In 
addition, the decision-makers would have difficulties in determining appropriate 
factors affecting pilotage operations performance that needs to be improved. Thus, in 
this study, to overcome this imperfection, and address these issues successfully, an 
MCDM method, the Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation (DEMATEL) method is 
utilised.  
The DEMATEL method has been used in this study because of its capability of 
assessing the influence of each human factor on the others, and determining whether 
a factor belongs to a cause or an effect group. Cause and effect are two different 
concepts. Causes tell the reason why something happened, whereas effects are the 
results of that happening (Lin and Wu, 2008). Detailed knowledge of the, intertwined 
effects , and the interrelation between the risks related to the human factors, can be 
very effective in identifying the most influential human factor that contributes to the 
occurrence of maritime accidents, and plays a significant role in providing reliable, 
accurate information, and an optimal solution for decision- makers to determine which 
causal factors need to be improved to reduce the human errors during maritime 
pilotage operations, and  prevent a similar incident/accident from occurring in the 
future.   
An original aspect of the proposed approach using a DEMATEL technique is that the 
approach has carried out practical work that has not been done before. Additionally, 
the proposed approach has looked into the relationships among the risk factors that 
researchers in the discipline have not looked at before. This method provides more 
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accurate and reliable results, and provide more realistic solutions. In addition, the 
method represent an effective performance measurement tool and offer a diagnostic 
instrument to ports to satisfy the port stakeholders in a flexible manner. 
5.6.1. The steps of the DEMATEL technique 
Step 1. Prior to employing the DEMATEL method, it is important to define the risk 
factors. This shall then be used as a pre-step into the DEMATEL. As has been 
discussed previously, a structural model was created; the list of human causal factors 
(HCFs) contributing to maritime accidents in pilotage operations which were required 
for evaluating are determined based on a literature review, accident investigations 
reports, and the marine experts’ perspectives in previous chapters (chapter 4). This is 
illustrated in Table 4.6. For further information, please refer to chapter 4.  
(Identification and classification process). 
Step 2. Carry out pairwise comparison and create the direct initial direct-relation 
matrix 
Following the same procedure of developing the pairwise comparison questionnaire 
above, the questionnaire for pairwise comparison was constructed. The objective of 
this questionnaire is to evaluate the relationships among the contributing human 
factors of the pilotage accidents, to obtain a direct relation matrix. It has been 
concluded by Yang et al. (2016) that a small sample size can be used for analysis and 
five to seven experts are ideally needed in the research on group decision-making 
problems. Furthermore, Saaty (2001) points out that a huge sample size is not required 
if the data collected are gathered from the experts. This is due to that fact that the 
Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method is a subjective methodology, and 
professionals should share consistent beliefs and thus, it diminishes the necessity for 
a large number sample size.    
 As a result, this sample size was considered acceptable for this study, and to provide 
a rating and to score the relationship among HCFs, five marine experts from the same 
panel group of experienced specialists involved in the previous survey (Chapter 4 and 
section 5.5.3) were chosen and participated in the judgements to provide a rating and 
score the relationship among factors based on the DEMATEL method. Experienced 
professionals were selected to be the sample, as they are aware of the importance of 
hazards and risk factors they are involved with, and due to their ability to compare and 
157 
 
define which risk factors have the higher impact on the others. The experts were 
professional ship masters who had served long periods on-board a variety of vessels, 
including four senior pilots currently working in different port companies in the UK 
and the Mediterranean, and one who is an insurance company manager in the UK, all 
with more than 10 years working experience. The five decision makers gave their 
opinions on a 0 to 4 scale.  
The initial direct-relation 21×21𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 A is obtained by using eq. (5.4). Table 5.11 
illustrates the results of the expert judgments pairwise comparison in terms of the 
influence among the 21 HCFs.  
Table 5.11 the initial direct-relation 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 “A” (21 x 21HCFs)
 
 
Step 3. Construct a normalised direct relation matrix. 
 A normalized direct-relation matrix “M” is obtained by using Equations (5.5). The 
maximum value of the sums of each row and column of the average matrix A, is 
calculated and determined as 58.2, which can be used to obtain the normalised direct-
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relation matrix M as presented in Table 5.12. Due to long and large calculation for a 
21x21 matrix, the Excel software has been used. 
An example of calculation to obtain normalised value of F11 to F15 by row is 
illustrated as follows:    
M=A×D      D=
1
58.2  
             F11 to F15 normalised value = 2. 60 ×
1
58.2
  =   0.0447    
 
       Table 5.12. A normalized direct-relation matrix “M” (21 HCFs)     
                                            
 
Step 4. Obtain a total-relation matrix 𝑇 and calculate its sum of rows and columns. 
 After the normalised direct-relation matrix “M” is obtained, the total relation matrix 
T can be acquired by using Equation (5.6), in which the “𝐼” is denoted as the identity 
matrix (Lin and Wu, 2008). The “I” is shown in Table 5.13.  
At first, to obtain (I - M) matrix, the normalised direct relation matrix M, is subtracted 
from an identity matrix I.  
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An example of the calculation to obtain value of F11 to F15 by row in the (I - M) 
matrix is shown as follows: F11to F15 (I - M) matrix value = (0 - 0.0447) = -0.0447, 
the (I - M) matrix is presented in Table 5.14.  
This is followed by inversing the obtained matrix (I - M).  For inversing a 21x21 
matrix, it would be too long and involves a large calculation; therefore, Excel software 
has been applied. The inverse matrix of the ( 𝐼 − 𝑀)−1  matrix is illustrated in Table 
5.15. Lastly, the normalised direct relation matrix M is multiplied by the inversed 
matrix (𝐼 − 𝑀)−1.  
To obtain the total relation matrix, T. An element in the T matrix can be obtained by 
computing the product of multiplication of each row in the M matrix with the 
corresponding column in the (𝐼 − 𝑀)−1  matrix. The total relation matrix T is 
illustrated in Table 5.16.  
Step 5. Set the threshold value and Build a cause and effect relationship diagram 
A threshold value (0.128) is calculated using Eq. (5.8), and the 𝑅𝑖, 𝐶𝑗, ( 𝑅𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 ) and 
(𝑅𝑖 − 𝐶𝑗) values of the (HCFs) are obtained (Table 5.17). Based on Table 5.16 and 
5.17, a causal diagram is constructed. 
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      Table 5.13 the I Matrix of the 21 HCFs
 





   Table 5.15.The   ( 𝐼 − 𝑀)−1  matrix of the 21 HCFs 
 
 
  Table 5.16 the total relation matrix of the 21 HCFs     
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  Table 5.17. The 𝑅𝑖, 𝐶𝑗, 𝑅𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 and 𝑅𝑖 − 𝐶𝑗 values of the HCFs  
Human causal factors (HCFs) 𝑅𝑖 𝐶𝑗 𝑅𝑖 + 𝐶𝑗 𝑅𝑖 − 𝐶𝑗  
F11 2.0188 2.1711 4.1899 -0.1523 
F12 2.2504 1.0694 3.3198 1.1810 
F13 1.8373 1.7503 3.5876 0.0870 
F14 1.8205 2.6490 4.4694 -0.8285 
F15 1.6620 2.3850 4.0471 -0.7230 
F21 2.1565 0.7955 2.9521 1.3610 
F22 1.8867 0.8043 2.6909 1.0824 
F23 1.8820 0.6486 2.5305 1.2334 
F24 1.4900 2.4814 3.9714 -0.9913 
F31 1.9268 2.5074 4.4342 -0.5806 
F32 1.7710 2.5435 4.3145 -0.7725 
F33 1.2179 2.4368 3.6547 -1.2189 
F34 1.4319 1.7837 3.2156 -0.3518 
F41 2.1298 2.1447 4.2745 -0.0149 
F42 1.6157 2.4394 4.0551 -0.8236 
F43 2.0813 2.6694 4.7506 -0.5881 
F44 1.6310 2.0317 3.6627 -0.4006 
F51 2.9651 1.1900 4.1552 1.7751 
F52 2.7444 2.1062 4.8506 0.6382 
F53 2.3650 2.3652 4.7303 -0.0002 





Table 5.18 presents the value of the relationships between causes and effects of the 
contributory factors leading to pilotage accidents, all values of coloured cells are 
ignored for the computation purpose because these coloured cell values are less than 
the threshold value.  
             Table 5.18 the relationships between causes and effects 
 
 
 5.6.2. Results and discussion  
Derived from the results of the relationships among the identified causal factors that 
affect the safety of pilotage operations, it is apparent that most of  factors are 
influenced by most of the HCFs. In terms of cause-effect relationship, (F12) lack of 
effective communication and language barriers, (F13) failure to exchange the 
information between pilot and ship’s master, (F21) lack of ship handling skills due to 
lack of training and experience, (F22) lack of technical knowledge and failure to use 
the bridge navigation equipment, (F23) lack of skills of the crewmembers onboard 
ship, tugs, and shore mooring personnel, (F51) fatigue, (F52) mental and physical 
workload, and (F54) stress are classified in causal factors. 
While (F11) lack of team work, (F14) lack of situation awareness, (F15) The master’s 
and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the tugboats drivers, mooring boats, and shore 
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mooring personnel performance and vessel’s progress, (F24) improper/ inadequate use 
of tugs, (F31) failure of pilot to give precise instructions, (F32) failure of the ship’s 
master to correctly follow the pilot directions, (F33) failure of tug’s masters  to carry 
out the pilot’s instructions precisely, (34) failure of ship’s crewmembers to follow 
orders regarding anchoring, steering, and engine requests correctly, (F41) failure to 
establish a proper manoeuvring plan, (42) failure to proceed with safe speed as 
stipulated in COLREG, (F43) piloting ships in bad weather condition, (F44) boarding 
and disembarking too close to breakwater, and (F53) distraction during the time of 
berthing operations are  classified in the effect factors.  
The results from DEMATEL show that the (F12) lack of communication due to 
language problems is considered one of the most influential causal factors for pilotage 
accidents. There is a strong relationship between this causal factor and the other factors 
such as the exchange of information, planning, teamwork and situation awareness 
which were considered as a significant factor for achieving effective and safe mooring 
operations. In this study, marine experts asserted that efficient pilotage is mainly 
dependent upon the effectiveness and understanding of the communications between 
the pilot and the bridge team members, between master and crew members as well as 
between pilot and assistant parties when manoeuvrings.  
In addition, the findings further showed that, during ship berthing when crewmembers, 
ship’s captain and pilot onboard ships do not speak the same language, and English 
language communication ability is insufficient, this increases the risk of 
misunderstandings, and can cause lack of coordination, lack of exchange of 
information, loss of bridge teamwork, and loss of situation awareness, which will 
negatively affect the safety of the pilotage operations. As good knowledge of English 
clearly makes it easy to understand conversations that take place during pilotage 
operations and also facilitates communication onboard the ship, furthermore, it makes 
it possible for the ship’s master and crew members to keep track of any actions taken 
by the pilot and any external parties (vessel and the Vessel Traffic System’ (VTS) 
operators, tug masters, mooring boat staff, and shore mooring men). It can be seen 
from the results that a language barrier can negatively influence communication and 
the exchange of information between master and pilot. 
165 
 
The findings of this study show that an effective exchange of information between 
pilot and master prior to the commencement of the manoeuvre is significant for 
ensuring effective berthing operations. In order to ensure effective and safe piloting 
operations, both the ship’s master and the pilot should exchange information prior to 
the commencement of a manoeuvre.  It is worth noting that, the feedback from marine 
experts showed that incorrect ship details provided to pilots such as vessel 
characteristics (e.g. Draft, efficiency of readiness and efficiency of 
navigation/propulsion equipment), or wrong information provided to ship’s master 
about berthing/sailing information e.g. port and channel depth of water, position of the 
berth, tugboats’ powers, and number of tugboats used etc.), prior to a pilotage 
operation may result in a dangerous and ambiguous situation on-board ship in 
particular on the bridge, and can influence the safety of a ship’s manoeuvring, and lead 
to increase of potential risk and accidents. 
 Marine pilots and ships’ crewmembers need to obtain the right information regarding 
details of passage and berthing plan, as knowledge of these will assist both the pilot 
and the ship master, to be aware of the whole situation and enable them to easily 
identify the ship’s manoeuvring characteristics, and quickly assess the skills needed 
to control the ship and prepare a proper and effective berthing plan to make the correct 
decision to handle the ship to its destination successfully and safely. 
The finding of this study shows that good teamwork is considered as one of the most 
significant factors for achieving effective and safe mooring operations. An efficient 
teamwork and familiarity with the situation are mainly dependent upon interactive co-
operation, effectiveness of the communication between the pilot and the ship’s 
crewmembers, and ship’s captain understanding of the communication between the 
pilots and assisting parties, as well as the effective exchange of information between 
the pilot and the ship’s captain.  
The result in this study showed that, factors such as lack of communication, or lack of 
information exchange can impact on Situation awareness and decision-making 
processes within the maritime pilotage operations. A wrong decision made by a pilot 
or shipmaster as a result of lack of situation awareness could result in an accident or 
disaster (Grech et al., 2008, p.51). It is therefore important to consider the 
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development of those two factors that influence the effectiveness of teamwork and 
situation awareness of pilotage performers.   
This result was supported by Chauvin et al. (2013), who concluded that effective 
teamwork relies on effective closed-loop communication, cooperation and 
coordination which play a significant role in obtaining and maintaining situation 
awareness (Chauvin et al., 2013). Øvergård et al. (2015), have also confirmed that 
effective teamwork requires interactive communication, cooperation and coordination 
which play a crucial role in gaining and preservation of Situation Awareness. 
Furthermore, Grech et al., (2008, p.125) stated that human factors (such as teamwork 
and communications) have a major effect on loss of situation awareness, which in turn 
may influence the piloting ship safety.  
Maintaining situational awareness through the practice of effective teamwork and 
communication between bridge team members is most important when a vessel is 
operating in restricted waters or areas of high traffic volume.  Therefore, Pilot, ship’s 
crewmembers, tug masters, mooring men and boat, must work together, in good 
teamwork with the objective of guiding the ship safely to its berth. This is considered 
crucial, particularly when a vessel is operating in dense fog and poor visibility 
conditions in restricted waters or congested areas.  
The results in table 5.18 show that the causal factor F21 (lack of ship handling skills) 
is one of the most significant influential causal factors for the pilotage incident. The 
success of the ship handler during berthing operations depends on the experience, 
knowledge, competence and the high level of the skills that the pilot, shipmaster, 
crewmembers, and tugboats masters have obtained. Lack of ship handling skills of 
pilot and ship’s master, due to the lack of experience, and improper training, were 
identified according to the study’s findings, as one of the most significant causal 
factors that may affect the safety of manoeuvring adversely.  It can be seen from the 
results that, lack of ship handling skills has a major influence on all factors 
particularly, the factor (F24) improper/ inadequate use of tugs, and factor (F31) the 
failure of the pilot to give precise instructions. This insight should help the 
stakeholders to concentrate on improving these particular factors that are most 
influential to the other factors.  
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 In table 5.18, it can be seen that the factor F22 (lack of familiarity with the electronic 
navigational systems knowledge such as AIS, RADAR, GPS, and ECDIS), is one of 
the most influential causal factors for pilotage incidents. Ineffective use of the 
navigational equipment such as, ECDIS, AIS, Echo Sounder, RADAR, and GPS, etc., 
as a result of a lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational equipment 
knowledge, is considered a high risk and has a greater potential to cause major 
accidents. The efficient use of such technology that plays a significant role in 
obtaining and maintaining situation awareness, and it can result in being fully unaware 
of the position of the ship and leading to loss of the whole situation awareness, 
particularly when the vessels navigate through narrow canals or while underway, 
inbound/outbound from/to ports and channels in the dark or under poor visibility 
conditions.  
In table 5.18, it can be seen that the factor (F23) lack of skills of tug masters and 
crewmembers on board ship, has a great impact on factor (F33) failure of tug masters 
to carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely, factor (34) failure of ship’s crewmembers 
to follow orders regarding anchoring, steering, and engine requests correctly, and 
factor (F24) the improper use of tugs, particularly in adverse weather conditions. 
During berthing operations, the attitude and operational skills of the ship’s staff and 
assistant parties is very important and affects the safety performance of pilotage 
operations.  
External parties such as tug boat masters, mooring boat, and shoreline personnel, are 
very important and play a significant role in ship’s manoeuvring safety, they must be 
ready for assistance and carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely. Orders regarding 
steering, engine requests, should be following out by ship’s crewmembers correctly. 
As failure of tugboat’s master/or personnel to correctly follow pilot’s instructions 
affect ship navigation safety and contribute to marine accidents in ports. Lack of skills 
of tugboats’ masters or crew members is considered high-risk and can affect the 
manoeuvring negatively and contribute to a ship’s berthing accidents. Operators’ work 
characteristics such as professional skills and work attitudes, are very significant 
factors and should be controlled.  
In Table 5.18 the result reveals that the causal factor (F51) fatigue, is affected by (F52) 
mental and physical workload, and (F54) (stress), and all of these three causal factors 
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have great impact on (F53) distraction which in turn can have significant impact on 
pilotage safety performance.  There is a general consensus among all the pilots and 
captains interviewed that these factors play a significant role in marine accidents.  
In Table 5.18 the result shows that there is a strong relationship between the situation 
awareness and unfamiliarity with the electronic navigational equipment knowledge, 
distraction and workload.  The mariner’s high mental workload due to the use of 
technology and continuous monitoring of navigational equipment can lead to memory 
loss and misperception of data especially if the ship’s operator is fatigued or not 
sufficiently trained.  
5.7. CONCLUSIONS 
As stated earlier, the literature lacks analysis of the potential risk to pilotage operations 
from human actions, relative importance, and causal relationships among human 
factors that influence maritime pilotage operations were rarely evaluated in a 
systematic method. In light of these considerations, studies to determine how the 
human causal factors influence the safety performance of maritime pilotage operations 
using an MCDM method is becoming more important and necessary. In this study to 
evaluate the relative importance of the pilotage human factors related risk, and 
determine the causal relationships among them, a novel technique using AHP and a 
DEMATEL method is applied. 
 An integrated method of the AHP and DEMATEL has been applied, because using 
only hierarchy structure (AHP) is not enough to have a complete and correct analysis 
of the problem, due to its restriction and inability to illustrate the cause-effect 
relationship between factors, which limits its applications.  The AHP method was used 
to evaluate and rank the human factors contributing to maritime pilotage accidents 
(HCFs). The DEMATEL method was used to analyse the causal relationships of 
(HCFs). The primary purpose of the proposed (DEMATEL) model in this study is to 
offer a comprehensive illustration of the causal relationships among the human factors 
contributing to maritime pilotage accidents, and to identify the influence of each factor 
on the others. The DEMATEL outputs help decision makers to understand how human 
factors affect each other and therefore how they affect the operator’s ability to achieve 
their tasks effectively. Thus, utilization of AHP and DEMATEL methods can help the 
stakeholders and company’s management in several areas, to know on which factor 
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they need to concentrate the most and also what knowledge/skills have to be improved 
by the operators the most. 
According to the results of AHP, (F11), (F12), (F13), (F14), (F21), (F22), (F23), (F24), 
(F31), (F51), and (F41) are the top important causes of human error-related pilotage 
accidents. In terms of cause-effect relationship, the results from DEMATEL imply 
that among the causal factors (F12), (F13) (F21), (F22), (F23), (F51), (F52), and (F54) 
are classified in causes factors that affect the most other factors. Based on these results, 
appropriate measures and preventive/corrective actions for mitigating the risks 
influencing pilotage operations will be taken.  
The aforementioned methodologies facilitated the decision-making process for 
identifying the most important risk factors influencing the safety of maritime pilotage 
operations, and provided a comprehensive illustration of relationships among the 
factors and offered insightful understanding of the mutual influence among the risk 
factors. The key findings of the previous models assist the decision-making process 
for choosing appropriate measures and take preventive/corrective actions in later 
stages for mitigating the risks influencing pilotage operations, and prevent a similar 
incident/accident to the one investigated from occurring. 
In the next chapter, based on the identified risk factors in the previous chapter, a 
decision-making framework for mitigating the risk factors affecting the safety 
performance of maritime pilotage operations is suggested. List of risk mitigation 









CHAPTER 6 A NEW DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK FOR 
SELECTING RISK MITIGATION MEASURES FOR PILOTAGE 
OPERATIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY  
This chapter proposes a decision-making framework for mitigating the human risk 
factors affecting the safety performance of maritime pilotage operations. In the 
previous chapters (i.e. chapter 5) AHP method is used to determine the relative 
importance weights of the most significant risk factors (the human causal factors 
contributing to pilotage accidents (HCFs)).  The weights of the criteria are used to 
facilitate application of TOPSIS method in selection of the best RMMs. Based on these 
risk factors, the list of risk mitigation measures to improve the pilotage operations 
safety is identified. The identified risk mitigation measures (RMMs) are prioritized 
and selected over the previously identified risk factors using a TOPSIS method. The 
proposed model has been demonstrated through a case study and sensitivity analysis 
was used to evaluate the robustness of the model results. The results yielded by the 
proposed framework present the ranking of ideal solutions for mitigating the identified 
risk factors affecting the safety of pilotage operations, and enables decision makers to 
find optimal measures to improve performance and safety of the pilotage operations.  
 
6.2 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, maritime authorities have been continuously challenged to 
improve the safety performance of maritime pilotage operations.  Pilotage operations 
area is categorized as a complex, dynamic and uncertain working environment that 
liable to diverse risks due to interaction and interdependence, in addition, the 
multiplicity of the entities who are performing ships’ berthing operations. It is 
therefore essential that operators maintain a consistently high standard of human 
performance in order to maintain the ship's piloting safety, as any decrease in 
performance can potentially lead to a disaster (CAMSS, 2012).  
Maintaining safe and reliable operations in the maritime pilotage area is of great 
significance for the protection of human life, properties, the environment, and the 
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economy. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that, numerous researches studies 
have been conducted by using different methods in order to reduce the occurrence of 
maritime accidents, however, MCDM method application on issues related to pilotage 
operations is quite limited. There is a need for decision makers to adopt some risk 
mitigation measures in order to reduce the root causes of the accidents occurring in 
the marine pilotage operations area.  
 The risk mitigation procedure represents the method of dealing with unexpected 
hazardous events.  The literature in maritime risk management has provided extensive 
researches in assisting decision making for analysing and mitigating various types of 
maritime risks like Bayesian Theory, System Dynamics (SD), Data Envelopment 
Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), etc. However, there are some 
disadvantages in each of these method. For example, by employing Bayesian theory, 
a large amount of data is required in order to generate stable results; Data Envelopment 
Analysis focuses on measuring organizational performance in respect of the inputs; in 
order to apply Artificial Neural Networks, Genetic Algorithms, and Simulation-based 
Methods, high computer language design skills and extensive quantitative data are 
usually required.   
Among the aforementioned MCDM methods, TOPSIS (Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution) is a practical and advantageous 
technique for ranking and choosing the best alternatives. The capability for TOPSIS 
to be effective in dealing with various weight estimation systems makes it to be a 
scalable method for risk mitigation strategies evaluation. TOPSIS method is ideal for 
determining the selection of an appropriate risk control option (RCO) by taking 
subjective judgments of decision makers into consideration. Therefore, in this study, 
in order to offer the best risk mitigation strategies with the most preferred safety 
control measures capable of addressing both operational efficiency and human-related 
risk reduction in pilotage operations, an MCDM method, such as the TOPSIS method 
is utilized, taking subjective judgments of decision-makers into consideration. 
TOPSIS technique is reasonable, understandable, and clear and less complex to use 
compared to other methods (Wang and Chang, 2007). Moreover, the calculation 
procedures are simple, and allows the pursuit of the best alternatives criterion 
illustrated in a simple straightforward mathematical calculation. In addition, this 
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approach is capable of reducing the computation time, which can provide reasonable 
and robust ranking results. By using the method proposed, decision-makers can select 
the ideal solutions or alternatives (i.e. risk mitigation measures). The use of TOPSIS 
in this Chapter can reasonably deal with the multiplicity of criteria and will enable the 
incorporation of additional criteria such as costs of the alternatives into the selection 
decision in the future work. Such advantages make this technique an appropriate 
method to be used in this research 
In this context, in the previous chapters (i.e. chapter 5) all the most significant human 
risk factors were assessed, ranked, and prioritised by using AHP method. The 
aforementioned methodology facilitated the decision-making process for identifying 
the most important human risk factors influencing the safety of maritime pilotage 
operations. The key findings of the previous method assist the decision-making 
process for choosing appropriate measures and taking preventive/corrective actions in 
later stages for mitigating the risks influencing pilotage operations, and prevent a 
similar incident/accident to the one investigated from occurring. 
This research aims to offer valuable insight to find optimal solutions to improve the 
pilotage operations safety performance, and ensure that safety measures can be taken 
to reduce the potential human errors that may occur during maritime pilotage 
operations in real-world practice, thus subsequently preventing or at least mitigating 
maritime accidents in the future.  To achieve this aim, this chapter is organised as 
follows.  
In the next section, a brief review of TOPSIS and some important previous studies that 
used this methodology is introduced. In section 6.4, the steps of the TOPSIS method 
are described.  In section 6.5, the description of each step of the methodology is then 
elaborated in detail including the process of the risk mitigating measures identification 
and a case study to demonstrate the procedure of the proposed TOPSIS method and to 
demonstrate its usefulness and validity.  Section 6.5.2.1 develops a discussion based 
on the results obtained. Section 6.5.2.3 concludes the chapter with a detailed 





6.3 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE TECHNIQUE FOR ORDER PREFERNCE BY 
SIMILARITY TO IDEAL SOLUTION (TOPSIS) 
“Multi-Criteria Decision Aid (MCDA) or Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) 
methods have received much attention from researchers and practitioners in 
evaluating, assessing and ranking alternatives across diverse industries” (Behzadian et 
al., 2012). The technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) 
is one of the well-known ranking methods for MCDM that has been commonly used 
in solving decision-making problems (Ding, 2011). It was initially proposed by 
Hwang and Yoon (1981) to help in selecting the best alternative, and with a limited 
number of criteria as a simple ranking method in conception and application. The 
principles of the TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal 
Solution) is that the best alternative should not only have the shortest distance from 
the positive ideal solution (PIS), but also have the farthest distance from the negative 
ideal solution (NIS) (Hung and Chen, 2009; Othman et al., 2015). The positive ideal 
solution comprises all best values obtained of criteria, while the negative ideal solution 
comprises the all worst values attained of criteria (Wang, 2007). 
It is worth mentioning that numerous researches studies have been successfully 
conducted by using the TOPSIS methodology to solve decision-making problem in 
various domains with varying subjects. A literature survey on TOPSIS applications 
and methodologies was conducted by Behzadian et al., (2012), the review included 
266 papers from 103 scholarly journals since the year 2000. They found out that the 
TOPSIS approach is one of the most popular methods lately used by researchers and 
has been successfully utilised to rank the preference order of alternatives and 
determine the optimal option, they indicated that the TOPSIS method has been widely 
and intensively applied for resolving complex decision problems in various 
application areas and many industrial sectors with different subjects, such as Supply 
Chain Management and Logistics; Design, Engineering and Manufacturing Systems; 
Business and Marketing Management; Health, Safety and Environment Management; 
Human Resources Management; Energy Management; Chemical Engineering; Water 
Resources Management; Education; Agriculture; Medicine; Design; Government; 
sport and social aspects. 
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In the past decades, the TOPSIS technique has been applied in numerous disciplines, 
however the AHP–TOPSIS application in the maritime sector particularly, on issues 
related to pilotage operations is quite limited. For instance, a study on TOPSIS 
application was utilised by Yang et al. (2011) in order to select a vessel under uncertain 
environment, a hybrid decision-making methodology by integrating Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS) has also been applied by Nooramin et al. (2012) in order to select 
the most efficient gantry crane installed in a marine container yard. 
Furthermore, a study on AHP–TOPSIS application was utilised by (Chang et al., 
2012). In this paper, an AHP and TOPSIS method was practised in order to support 
the critical decision upon shipping registry selection. Another study on AHP–TOPSIS 
hybrid technique was performed by Akyuz and Celik (2014). This study takes the 
advantage of TOPSIS and AHP hybrid technique for measuring the effectiveness of 
SMS implementation on board ship. The TOPSIS method has also been presented by 
Othman et al. (2015) in order to establish effective solutions and to investigate the 
contributing factors to the psychological distraction and to examine its impact on 
Senior Deck Cadets, Senior Deck Officers, and Junior Deck Officers among 
Malaysian seafarers. Given the advantages of both, AHP and TOPSIS, the proposed 
model provides a reliable means of determining an appropriate selection of RMMs. 
The AHP, and TOPSIS as an integrated methodology, enabling the specific decision 
maker’s preferences to be considered in making the strategic decision on human-
related risk management. 
6.4. THE PROCEDURES OF THE TOPSIS METHOD 
The MCDM tool TOPSIS in this study is applied for prioritizing and selecting the risk 
mitigation measures related to the maritime pilotage operations. The general 
framework of the proposed model is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The TOPSIS method and 
the calculation steps are described below according to (Akyuz and Celik, 2014) as 
follows:        




Figure 6.1. The general framework of the TOPSIS method 
       
                 
                                 
Step 1: The TOPSIS method begins with the construction of a decision matrix (D) 
shown in Equation 6.1. This step is to represent all information available for the 
criteria/ risk factors in the decision matrix. The structure of the decision matrix can be 
defined as follows;  
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                          6.1 
 
The MCDM problem can be demonstrated in a matrix format as shown in  Equation 
6.1,   𝐴1,  𝐴2, …… 𝐴𝑚 the alternatives/options related, while  𝐶1 ,𝐶2 ,… 𝐶𝑛 represents 
the criteria/risk factors, and xij represents the performance value of alternative/ option 
with respect to criteria/risk factors cj. Then, as a result of these evaluations, a decision 
matrix would be created. The average for all expert opinions can be computed by 
averaging “E” experts’ scores. In situations, where decision makers/experts are more 
than one and rated xij. The average of their ratings is taken as xij value. In this study, it 
is suggested that the experts use the five linguistic rating variables shown in Table 5.8 
for rating the alternatives with respect to criteria.  
                     
                 Table 6.1:  Evaluation scale for the alternatives rating                                          
                   
 
Step 2: The decision matrix (D) in formula 6.1, is normalised: This step normalizes 
the decision matrix by using the following Equation; 
177 
 
                                               6.2 
 
Wherein x ij is the score of the i 
th option, with respect to the j th criterion. 
Step3: Calculating weighted normalised decision matrix: In order to construct a 
weighted normalised decision matrix (𝑣𝑖𝑗), associated weight is to be multiplied with 
its normalised decision matrix. The calculation is as follows; 
𝑣𝑖𝑗=𝑤𝑗 × 𝑟𝑖𝑗,   𝑖  = 1, 2, … n, j = 1, 2…,  n                                                            6.3 
 
Whereas 𝑤𝑗 according to Yoon and Hwang represents the weight of the jth 
criterion/risk factors, while 𝑟𝑖𝑗 represents the performance value of alternative/ 
option   𝐴𝑖 with respect to criterion 𝐶𝑗 in a weighted normalised decision matrix.  
Step 4: Determining the (PIS) and (NIS): The PIS and NIS values can be determined 
by taking the maximum and minimum values within the row of weighted normalised 
decision matrix. 
 The PIS and NIS indicated as 𝐴+ and 𝐴− respectively, are mathematically determined 
in formulas 6.4 and 6.5, in order to ease the computation of the  Sⅈ
+ and Sⅈ
− which are 
developed to measure all the alternatives/options with their PIS and NIS. The Sⅈ
+and 
Sⅈ
− are mathematically described in Equations 6.6 and 6.7.  
Positive ideal solution: 
                                               6.4                                                    
Negative ideal solution: 
                                          6.5                         
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where J = 1,2,3,...,n. is associated with benefit (positive criteria) and J′ = 1,2,3,...,n is 
associated with cost (negative criteria) (Akyuz and Celik, 2014).  
Step 5: Calculate the separation measures (distance from PIS and NIS) for each 
alternative: The separation of each alternative from the PIS can be defined by using 
equations 6.6 and 6.7.  
The separation from the positive ideal alternative (PIS) is: 
                                                                   6.6 
Likewise, the separation from the (NIS) can be defined as; 
                                                            6.7 
Step 6: Calculating the relative closeness to the ideal solution. This step is provided to 
rank the mitigation alternatives/options  𝐴1,  𝐴2,…,  𝐴𝑚,. The relative closeness has 
been measured by the following equation; 
                                                                                                     6.8 
 0≤ 𝑅C𝐼
+≤1 and the preferred alternative/option is the one with the value of 𝑅C𝐼
+closest 
to 1. 
Step 7: Rank the preference order.  
In this step, the decision maker selects the high ranked alternative. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
6.5 METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF RISK 
MITIGATION MEASURES IN PILOTAGE OPERATIONS 
This study aims to propose a generic risk mitigation model for determining and 
evaluating the implemented risk mitigation measures. The generic framework of the 
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proposed model and decision hierarchy of the best risk mitigation measures (RMMs) 
selection are illustrated in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. Figure 6.2 illustrates the 
research methodology, which consists of identifying the implemented risk mitigation 
measures and the TOPSIS application to select an appropriate RMMs. Figure 6.3 
illustrates a decision hierarchy structure for the selection of the best measures to 
mitigate the human factors related to the risk associated with maritime pilotage 
operations. 
In this chapter, a novel technique is introduced to investigate the risk mitigation 
measures for improving the pilotage operations’ safety performance. The list of risk 
mitigation measures (RMMs) is determined based on the identified risk factors 
(human factors affecting maritime pilotage operations’ safety performance and 
contributing to maritime accidents) (HCFs) in previous chapters (chapter 5) (see table 
6.2), through a careful literature review, and via rules and regulations adopted by the 
maritime organisations and authorities. Thereafter, the validation and exploration of 
new risk mitigation measures are conducted via marine experts’ perspectives. 
Afterwards, in order to obtain feasible alternatives (mitigation/control options),  the 
identified risk mitigation measures (RMMs) are prioritized and selected over the 
previously ranked risk factors using an appropriate MCDM tool, a TOPSIS method. 
The proposed model has been demonstrated through a case study and verified using a 
sensitivity analysis. The description of the methodology is elaborated in detail in the 
following subsections. 
The significance of the proposed method is that the approach has carried out an 
empirical work that has not been done before, and during the selecting of the risk 
mitigations measures (RMMs), the proposed approach has looked into the 
relationships among the risk factors that researchers in the discipline have not looked 
at before, in addition to this no risks are categorized as independent risk and with a 
little influence on the system, all the risk factors that have influence on the other 
factors were considered and selected to be managed. This study can assist in 
implementing effective risk reduction measures to mitigate human errors affecting the 
safety performance of pilotage operations and can also assist in determining 
appropriate preventive measures against future maritime pilotage accidents. 
Moreover, it can help relevant stakeholders, such as port authorities and shipping 
companies, in the development of better policies, safety guidelines, and risk control 
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measures to improve the performance of operators and improve the safety of maritime 
pilotage operations.   
 
Figure 6.2: Framework for identification and evaluation of risk mitigation measures 





Figure 6.3: Decision hierarchy of alternative selection for mitigating risk factors 
6.5.1 Identification of risk mitigation measures for pilotage  
Once the AHP approach of expert judgment is applied to obtain relative weights of 
importance of criteria (pilotage human related risk factors) (HCFs) (chapter 5), it is 
necessary to identify the most ideal measures for their mitigation (Irukwu, 1991). 
Choosing appropriate risk mitigation measures is deemed to be an important step in 
improving the performance and mitigating maritime pilotage human error related 
risks. Risk mitigation is a decision-making process whereby actions are taken in view 
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of the results of risk assessment. The Institute of Risk Management IRM (2002) 
pointed out that "risk treatment is a process of selecting and implementing measures 
to modify the risk". Risk treatment includes as its major element, risk 
control/mitigation. According to IMO (2018) “Risk control measures (RCMs) should 
in general be aimed at one or more of the following: (1 reducing the frequency of 
failures through better design, procedures, organizational policies, training, etc.; (2 
mitigating the effect of failures in order to prevent accidents; (3 alleviating the 
circumstances in which failures may occur; and (4 mitigating the consequences of 
accidents”. In this research, based on the identified risk factors in previous chapters, 
twenty-one risk mitigation measures were identified (see table 6.3) and their efficiency 
will be evaluated through the developed method. 
 The risk mitigation measures identification methods are implemented through the 
following steps:  
In this study in order to extract the most appropriate risk mitigation measures that can 
reflect the current situation for further evaluation, multiple sources of evidence were 
employed for data collection. The study followed the particular steps to ensure that all 
sources were used in the study. The studies were conducted in three phases: (1) careful 
literature review, (2) review of rules and regulations, and (3) Empirical studies were 
conducted in some of the major ports in the UK and Mediterranean maritime 
industries. Each of the phases is discussed below. As a result, the hierarchy is 
constructed in Figure 6.2 with 11 risk factors and 21 alternatives (risk mitigation 
measures).  
6.5.1.1. Description of the process of selecting the risk mitigating measures 
Phase (1) careful literature review  
In order to identify the risk reduction measures to mitigate the identified risk factors, 
some relevant studies that can reflect the latest information about the current situation 
of the last implemented risk mitigation measures in maritime pilotage practice were 
reviewed critically through an appropriate literature review. A literature review can 
provide significant data and information about what has been done in the past in the 
research area.  Nonetheless, after the review, only some mitigation measures were 
identified because the existing literature is rather limited and fragmented. Therefore 
other methods have been used in this research to overcome this weakness. 
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 Phase (2) review of regulations 
Instead of identifying the risk mitigation strategies through a literature review, this 
research explored the currently implemented measures which turned out to be more 
reasonable in actual situations, all the recommendations, regulations, and rules 
adopted by maritime authorities for maritime pilotage safety performance 
improvement have been reviewed. Marine authorities have been attempting to reduce 
and prevent marine accidents in recent decades in accordance with regulation 
requirements (Akyuz and Celik, 2014). For instance, International maritime 
authorities have adopted several regulations in parallel with considerable efforts to 
maintain a high level of safety standards at sea to improve maritime safety and mitigate 
marine accidents, (Hetherington et al., 2006).  All statutory regulations introduced by 
international bodies including classification society rules, recommendations issued by 
organizations, and IMO Conventions and Codes are deemed typical examples of 
strategies used for the purpose of risk control.  
 A careful review of related rules and regulations in the maritime pilotage field is an 
effective mechanism to track the development of relevant regulations and policies over 
a long period of time. In addition, it provides significant data about what preventative 
measures have been done in the past to improve maritime pilotage safety, and also it 
is less costly than other techniques, especially when information may be accessed 
easily. Understanding the evolution of the changes over the past decades can help the 
researcher to know what has been done in the past, how maritime safety can be 
improved, and how to reduce or eliminate the risks to ships in the future (Luo and 
Shin, 2016).. 
Furthermore, using such an approach has the advantage of ensuring that the researcher 
gains access to the information that offers valuable solutions for decision-makers to 
use, to take the correct actions in order to improve the quality of pilotage performance 
and reduce maritime accidents, which would otherwise be challenging to acquire using 
other means like human beings, who may be difficult to track down or maybe 
unwilling to engage in an official study. And sometimes human beings, by their very 
nature, would not normally be willing to tell their thoughts during interviews or to 
write their honest opinions on questionnaires. As Yang et al., (2013) pointed out that, 
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experts may overlook certain safety aspects in a brainstorming session as a risk event 
might be considered ‘natural’ from their point of view.   
Phase (3) Empirical studies to collect domain experts' opinions  
At the beginning, a draft version of the questionnaire was examined by three academic 
researchers from a UK University to comment on the appropriateness and clarity of 
the questions. Moreover, the ethical approval was also obtained to further validate 
questionnaire contents and participant consent. The revised questionnaire as 
represented at the end was sent out to experts for data collection. A sample copy of 
this questionnaire is shown in Appendix IIII-1. 
 The survey questionnaires were conducted and took place in March 2019 in the 
maritime industry, by inviting five experts from the United Kingdom and 
Mediterranean maritime industry, whose levels of experiences have been detailed 
previously to take part in the survey, one is a captain who is a general manager of an 
insurance company and another four experts are marine pilots from different ports 
companies. All respondents have been involved in our previous surveys and regular 
contact was maintained from the point of contacting until the research project’s 
completion. All the experts were professional shipmasters who had served long 
periods on board a variety of vessels, all with more than 10 years of working 
experience. The experts selected, based on their adequate qualifications, skills, and 
experience on the field. Consequently, integrating the abovementioned three sources, 
ensured research with reduced bias. In the end, 21 risk mitigation measures were 
identified and discussed below.  
6.5.1.2 Description of the risk mitigation measures of pilotage operations 
The following risk factors shown in the table below (table 6.2) are identified as 
contributory causes of maritime pilotage accidents. In addition, these factors have 
been weighted by the experts as the most significant risk factors (HCFs) leading to 
pilotage accidents. And in order to mitigate their negative influences on pilotage safety 
performance and prevent or at least reduce the maritime pilotage accidents, the 
relevant risk mitigation measures for each risk factor are determined. As illustrated in 
(table 6.3) the identified risk mitigation measures are summarized and more details 












Table 6.3 Risk mitigation measures (RMMs) for improving pilotage operations 
performance 
S/N                                       Risk mitigation measures (RMMs) 
A1 Pilots should have an appropriate experience as a ship master before becoming a pilot.  
A2 Implement safety management system (SMS) for pilotage operations 
A3 Providing an adequate and a high standard of theoretical and practical training courses 
with regular renewal training including ship handling, bridge simulator training, bridge 
resource management (BRM), ECDIS, and NAEST generic training courses.  
A4 Using common communication language on board. 
A5 Improving the pilotage operators’ English language skills. 
A6 Ship’s staff, pilot, and assisting parties should maintain effective communication, 
cooperation, an effective co-ordination, and effective exchange of information.  
A7 A standard marine vocabulary should be used during the manoeuvrings.   
A8 Compliance with resolution A.893 (21) on Guidelines for voyage planning. 
A9 An effective working environment and close working relationship on the bridge of a 
ship between pilot and ship’s captain should be created.  
A10 Provide an adequate number of qualified, experienced, and well trained ship’s crew 







A11 Tasks and responsibilities should be understood and distributed properly among the 
bridge team members.   
A12  Providing training courses in safety and cultural awareness 
A13 Keeping high level of alertness and avoiding distractions elements 
A14 All pilotage performers should be in good physical and mental fitness and not under the 
effect of drugs or alcohol 
A15 Implement  standard operating procedures (SOP’s)  for ship board operations 
A16 Pilot boarding point should be at a sufficient distance from the commencement of the 
act of pilotage.  
A17 During pilotage operations distractions elements should be avoided. 
A18 Not to squeeze pilots or ship's captains for working outside established rules or piloting 
ships in poor weather condition situations due to commercial pressure.  
A19 
 
Keeping a high level of alertness, and maintaining continuous watchkeeping (the 
surrounding area, tug’s, and piloted ship’s performance and progress should be 
monitored effectively and continuously to be aware of the whole situation properly). 
A20 Provide sufficient and the required number of powerful tugboats which are necessary 
for all kind of ships manoeuvers. 
A21 Compliance with the principles and the requirements of IMO resolution A960  
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6.5.1.2.1 Measures for mitigating the risks due to the lack of ship handling skills 
(RF1). 
Lack of ship handling skills, due to lack of experience, and improper training, were 
identified as the most significant factors that may affect the safety performance of 
manoeuvring adversely. It is considered among the most important causes of accidents 
in pilotage operations. Therefore, in order to mitigate the effects of this failure and 
ensure safe and efficient ship-handling, qualified and well-trained pilots and ship’s 
masters should be employed by the port authorities and shipping companies. 
Employing qualified pilots in approaches to ports and other areas where specialised 
local knowledge is the most important step in mitigating maritime pilotage related 
risks. This was formally recognized by the IMO in 1968 when the organisation 
adopted the Assembly Resolution A.159 (ES.IV) recommendation on pilotage. 
 In order to provide high standards of pilotage services, every ship’s master and pilot 
must possess a Master Mariner certificate. The certificates should be appropriate to 
the service in which the vessel was engaged. In addition, the pilot should hold an 
appropriate pilotage certificate or license issued by the competent pilotage authority, 
furthermore, pilots should have appropriate experience as a shipmaster before 
becoming a pilot. Such a prior background provides appropriate skills to deal with any 
situation, and enable pilots to carry out their tasks safely and efficiently, in addition, 
experience in both positions (master and pilot) enables a pilot to relate more easily to 
a master when performing a pilot’s task (Darbra et al., 2007). Employing a highly 
experienced captains is deemed a significant factor to prevent maritime accidents 
(Akyuz, 2015). 
Ship handling was considered as one of the most complex tasks; particularly, when 
navigating a ship in restricted waterways, or in harbour basin or alongside the quay. 
Ship Handling is defined as an acquired art practised by marine pilots, masters, and 
officers of proper control of a ship while underway, especially in harbours, around 
docks and piers (Armstrong, 2007, p.1). One expert pilot mentioned that “it needs to 
be understood that not everyone has the aptitude to become a skilled ship handler.  
Ship handling is an art rather than a science, but a ship handler who is familiar with 
the science will be better at their art and this will enable them to easily identify a ship’s 
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manoeuvring characteristics, and quickly assess the skills needed to control the ship 
safely”. 
 This was also confirmed by Murdoch et al. (2012), efficient ship-handling during 
berthing and un-berthing operations is extremely important to the safety of the ship, 
which requires the master to understand what is happening to the ship and, what will 
happen a short time in the future. Ship handling skills is considered as one of the most 
important aspect of knowledge that must be gained by any pilot, ship’s master, officers 
and others who assist the pilot. The safety of the ship handling during berthing 
operations depends on the navigational experience, competence and the high level of 
skills that the pilot, and master of the ship who have the command of the ship have 
obtained. Ship-handling skills are acquired through a combination of formal training 
and practical experience.  
According to Yang et al. (2013) in spite of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) attention through international standards, training regimes and assessment are 
not consistent as a result of poor regulation implementation and this may lead to 
variations in seafarers’ competence. Therefore, in order to lower the risks, ensure a 
high standard of operation and improve maritime safety, companies have to be 
competitive and have well trained crews (Barsan et al 2012). And this can be done, 
according to Berg et al. (2013), by good quality training. An appropriate education 
and training for pilots and ship crewmembers is the best method to proceed toward 
this aim and considered one of the most important risk mitigation measures (Akyuz, 
2017). 
Previous related studies revealed that improving the operator's professional skills 
should be an important issue for port authorities to consider, and regular training 
should be provided for marine pilots and tugboat masters (Hsu, 20012). One expert 
pilot pointed out that, to ensure that the training will impact on their knowledge and 
attitude, shipping companies and competent pilotage authorities should provide an 
adequate  training period for its pilots, ships’ masters,  tugs’ crews, and deck officers, 
and the level and standards of training for certification or licensing should be real, 
proper, and of a higher standard and the content of courses should be higher quality 
and meet the IMO requirement, the expert also mentioned that refresher training for 
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their mariners should be reinforced, and pilotage standard operating procedures (SOP) 
should be implemented. 
An expert marine pilot who working at one of the biggest see ports in UK confirmed 
that, to ensure safe pilotage operations, the principles and requirements of the IMO’s 
resolution A960 should be embraced by all ports authorities and implemented by all 
pilotage performers. He considered it as one of the most effective ways to improve the 
safety performance of pilotage operations. In this respect, in order to provide high 
standards of pilotage services, the resolution A960 (23), recommended each applicant 
for a pilot certificate or license to be familiar with the necessary knowledge of the 
ship-handling for piloting, anchoring, berthing and unberthing, manoeuvring with and 
without tugs, and emergency situations. 
 In order to ensure the continued proficiency of pilots and updating of their knowledge, 
the Resolution A.960 encouraged competent pilotage authorities to provide sufficient 
and high-quality training with regular refreshers (renewal training), include; courses 
in bridge simulator training (simulation exercises), which may include radar training 
and emergency ship-handling procedures; and courses in ship-handling training 
centres using manned models, particularly, the courses that include ship simulator 
training scenarios, scenarios of simulation manoeuvres under control of an 
experienced pilot in particularly dangerous manoeuvres, when the vessels navigate 
through narrow canals or during entering or leaving the port in the dark or under poor 
visibility conditions.  
All marine pilots have to undertake an advanced training course. The training should 
include both theoretical and practical ship-handling training courses. Practical ship-
handling experience should be gained under the close supervision of experienced 
pilots.  This practical experience should be obtained on vessels under actual piloting 
conditions and should be supplemented by simulation, both computer and manned 
model, classroom instruction, or other training methods. Ship-handling simulator 
training courses can help operators acquire skills, learn vessel navigation, and 
understand the causes of and preventive measures against accidents (Akyuz, 2017). 
Simulator training is valuable training and an assessment tool which provides a 
realistic environment for trainees. Simulation exercises have proven to be very 
successful in high risk domains non-technical skills training and assessments (Wanger 
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et al., 2013). It has been utilised in diverse research studies to analyse different 
maritime related topics such as the effectiveness of officer competence under various 
circumstances (Saeed, 2015).  
6.5.1.2.2 Measures for mitigating the risks due to the lack of communication and 
language problems (RF2). 
It can be seen from the results shown in the previous studies that lack of 
communication due to language barriers on foreign ships continues to be a serious 
obstacle to the safe navigation of these vessels in pilotage areas. In this study, the 
results also show that the lack of effective communication and misunderstandings 
among operators due to language problems are among the most contributing factors to 
pilotage accidents. Therefore, a common working language is very significant and 
should be used during pilotage manoeuvring, and because the common 
communication language during periods of pilotage is English according to the revised 
STCW Convention 1995, both Pilot and crew must be able to communicate effectively 
to ensure navigation safety.  
According to the expert senior pilot, a common working language during pilotage 
manoeuvring should be used, and because the common communication language in 
maritime is English, competency in spoken English is important and leads to fewer 
accidents. Most of the participants of the study confirmed that proper knowledge of 
English clearly makes it easier to understand conversations that take place during 
pilotage operations. In addition, it facilitates communication on board the ship and 
contributes considerably to the ship’s manoeuvring safety. Furthermore, it makes it 
possible for the ship’s master and crew members to keep track of any actions taken by 
the pilot and those external parties (VTS operators, tug masters, mooring boat staff, 
and shore mooring men), and any actions taken by ship passage in the surrounding 
area. Enhancing operators’ English language skills abilities could not only help 
facilitate communication on board the ship, it also facilitates the exchange of 
information between pilot and ship’s master, and assists them to be fully aware of 
situations and help to avoid pilotage operations disasters. 
Effectiveness and understanding of the communications between the pilot and the 
bridge team members, between master and crewmembers as well as between pilot and 
assistant parties when manoeuvring, is mainly dependent upon proper knowledge and 
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competence of English language.  Therefore, in order to mitigate the risk of 
misunderstanding and lack of communication between pilot and the bridge staff 
member, operators’ English languages skills should be enhanced, and more attention 
needs to be paid to the quality of English tuition as a second language for all non-
native English speakers, and a high quality of training courses is necessary and should 
be provided to improve the proficiency in the English language. As Hsu (2012), 
pointed out, to avoid pilotage accidents, operators’ English language communication 
abilities should be enhanced, and regular training, by port authorities should be 
provided. “The level of English taught in maritime education has to be advanced and 
also implemented for on shore operators such as port operators” (Berg et al., 2013). 
The use of English as the working language on the bridge is obligatory on all ships 
except warships, ships below 150 gross tonnage on any voyage, ships below 500 gross 
tonnage not on international voyages and fishing vessels (IMO, 1997).  On this basis, 
IMO resolution A. 960 (23) attempted to overcome the issue of language barriers that 
may cause misunderstandings between bridge team members and risks to pilotage 
safety. The resolution attempts to set up the minimum language proficiency 
requirements for pilots, members of ships’ crews, pilots, and tug masters as well.  
According to the resolution, all pilots, shall have proper knowledge of English 
language skills, and a high level proficiency in spoken English language, especially 
competency in maritime English, and all other crew members, shore mooring men, 
tugs and mooring boats operators shall have a sufficient understanding of the English 
language and must be familiar with the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases 
(SMCP). The resolutions, recommended all pilotage operatives’ English language 
should be to a standard adequate to enable them to express communications clearly. 
Moreover, the communications on board between the pilot and bridge crew member 
should be conducted in the English language or in a language other than English that 
is common to all those involved in the operation. 
The IMO's International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978 was the first internationally-agreed 
Convention to address the issue of minimum standards of competence for seafarers. It 
is the prime authority on training that applies to ship-owners, training establishments 
and national maritime administrations and it concerns merchant ships in domestic or 
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international operations. The convention applies separate requirements for each 
position on board a ship. It also states that “all officers must have a good command of 
spoken and written English”.  
In order to address the problem of language barriers at sea and avoid 
misunderstandings between bridge team members that may cause accidents, IMO’s 
Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) were adopted by the 22nd 
Assembly in November 2001 as a resolution A.918 (22) IMO Standard Marine 
Communication Phrases.  It is recognised that maritime safety can be enhanced by the 
improvement of crew communication, through training in the use of Standard Marine 
Communication Phrases (SMCP) (Hughes, 2000). The IMO SMCP replaced the 
Standard Marine Navigational Vocabulary (SMNV) adopted by the IMO in 1978 (and 
amended in 1985). SMCP has been developed as a more comprehensive, standardised 
safety language taking into account changing conditions in modern seafaring and 
covering all major safety-related verbal communication. The IMO SMCP includes 
phrases that have been developed to cover the most important safety-related fields of 
verbal shore-to-ship (and vice-versa), ship-to-ship and on-board communications. The 
STCW Code requires ships’ masters and officers in charge of a navigational watch on 
vessels of 500 gross tonnages or above to be able to understand and use the Standard 
Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP).  
A study has been conducted by Culic (2014) to present the activities undertaken since 
2012 by the German Association for Maritime English (G.A.M.E) in order to address 
the problem of language barriers at sea and avoid misunderstandings which can cause 
accidents. The emphasis has been put on the pilotage and tug assistance phrases 
(SMCP), as the existing body of phrases has not been felt entirely suitable to the 
activities performed, in order to address the problems related to the tug assistance-
pilot-master communication. He concluded that the existing Standard Marine 
Communication Phrases (SMCP) have not been considered elaborate enough for the 
operation. As result, a request has been made to provide pilots and tug masters with a 
set of phrases for their working language - English - to be used during manoeuvring 
(Culic, 2015). 
The difficulties of communication among members of the bridge team while under 
way were mostly attributed to poor BRM and prevented the bridge team from serving 
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as an efficient support for the pilot (TSB, 2013). Thus, shipping and port companies 
including managers need to ensure that BRM procedures are actually practised on 
board ships, by providing courses for all operators in bridge resource management 
(BRM). The obligation of BRM training was introduced by ISM code and STCW 2010 
Manila amendments, which aimed to increase the knowledge and skills of seafarers 
worldwide, to reduce the human error, and mitigate maritime accidents. 
According to Resolution A.960 (23), English language qualifications of seafarers must 
be enhanced. Sufficient and high quality of training courses include courses to improve 
proficiency in the English language where necessary should be provided for pilots. 
Competent pilotage authorities should provide for pilots’ sessions and regular 
refreshers or renewal training courses in bridge resource management (BRM) for 
pilots to enhance the ability of pilots to communicate with local authorities and other 
vessels in the area.  BRM training is a great step towards improving communication 
(Rothblum, 2000; Hetherington et al. 2006, and Chauvin et al. 2013).  
6.5.1.2.3 Measures for mitigating the risks due to of the Exchange of information 
failure (RF3). 
The findings of this study indicate that failure to exchange the information between 
pilot and ship’s master prior to the commencement of a manoeuvre is one of the most 
significant factors that can cause the occurrence of accidents in pilotage operations. 
Thus, in order to mitigate this risk and ensure effective and safe piloting operations, 
both ship’s master and pilot should exchange information prior to pilotage operation 
(Wild and Constable 2013). In accordance with Annex 2 of the IMO’s Resolution 
A.960, “the master and the pilot should exchange information regarding navigational 
procedures, local conditions and rules and the ship’s characteristics.  This information 
exchange should be a continuous process that generally continues for the duration of 
the pilotage. According to, Resolution A.960 (23), all competent pilotage authorities 
should develop a standard exchange of information practice, taking into account 
regulatory requirements and best practices in the pilotage area.  Pilots should consider 
using an information card, form, checklist or other memory aid to ensure that essential 
exchange items are covered”.  
The Master/Pilot exchange information (MPX) process can be divided into two parts: 
an exchange of technical and the non-technical information, the successful completion 
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of an act of pilotage is dependent on both these components being undertaken 
effectively (Wild and Constable, 2013). The exchange of information regarding 
pilotage, and the passage plan should include the following information:  roles and 
responsibilities of the master, pilot and other members of the bridge's management 
team; local regulations; intended courses and route, how manoeuvres will be carried 
out, navigational intentions; local conditions including navigational or traffic 
constraints; expected weather conditions;  tidal and current information; details of 
passage and berthing plan; mooring boat use; proposed use of tugs; characteristics and 
ship details such as, year built, maximum allowable draft, breadth, and  length of the 
ship; main engine, to ensure steering gears fully operational; thrusters and propeller 
details; and to ensure that the thrusters are fully operational before approaching the 
berth. The main engines should be tested ahead and astern before beginning to 
manoeuvre and at the pilot station, details of equipment defects and any special 
peculiarities that affect the ship’s manoeuvrability should be noted.  
It can be seen from the results of this study that, lack of information exchange between 
pilot and ship’s master is influenced by many factors that need to be considered. Lack 
of communication between pilot and ship’s master mainly happens due to language 
problems. Language barriers is one of the main communication problems found on 
ships, and should be taken into account (Hetherington et al., 2006).  Therefore, in order 
to carry out an efficient Master/Pilot exchange information (MPX), a common 
language should be used and English language skills for pilot and ship’s master should 
be enhanced. A proper knowledge of English language skills is considered as one of 
the most significant factors for achieving an adequate and effective face-to-face 
exchange of information.  This measure will mitigate the risk of misunderstanding and 
facilitate the communication and help to understand the conversations that take place 
during exchange of information.  
Additionally, the finding of this study and the previous studies conducted by 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada TSB (1995), and Chauvin et al. (2013) 
concluded that, one of the reasons for information exchange failure was attributed to 
deficiencies in the effectiveness of bridge team management practices in compulsory 
pilotage areas. As a result, to facilitate information exchange between the pilots and 
ship’s master and lower the effect of this risk, BRM training should be provided.  
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This was also recommended by the IMO resolution A. 960, to facilitate information 
exchange between the pilot and ship’s master, each pilot has to undertake high quality 
training courses in bridge resource management (BRM). This training should include 
a requirement for the pilot to conduct an exchange of information with the master 
and/or officer in charge of navigational watch. This signifies that the safety 
management system (SMS) for pilotage operations introduced by the IMO should be 
implemented properly to avoid the risk of vessel accident and to ensure the safety of 
ship berthing 
Another factor that could affect exchange of information according to the finding of 
this study is the pilots disembarking early before the ship leaves the port entrance or 
embarking the ship at the breakwater, as will leave insufficient time for the captain of 
the vessel to exchange information with the pilot, and to arrange the passage plan 
which is considered as one of the most significant factors for achieving safe ship 
berthing. As a consequence, IMO resolution A.960 (23), recommended the boarding 
position for pilots to be located where practical, at a great enough distance from the 
port, so as to allow sufficient time for a comprehensive face-to-face exchange of 
information and agreement of the final pilotage passage plan. Gard (2014), reported 
that, the pilot boarding point should be at a sufficient distance from the 
commencement of the act of pilotage to allow sufficient time to meet the requirements 
of the master-pilot information exchange and agreement of the final pilotage passage 
plan (Gard, 2014).  
An expert senior pilot stated that, lack of safety culture and safety awareness could be 
another reason for the (MPX) failure. The pilot and other team members are not 
exchanging information, because they think that it is not necessary. They believe that 
the manoeuvring operation could be done by pilot and master individually. However, 
this is not true. Therefore, in order to improve a safety culture, safety awareness 
training program for pilots, and bridge team members’ safety awareness should be 
established by on-board training. Safety regulations for pilotage operations introduced 
by the IMO should be implemented properly to avoid the risk of vessel accident and 
to ensure the safety of ship berthing. 
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6.5.1.2.4. Measures for mitigating the risks due to of lack of bridge navigation 
equipment knowledge and failure to use the electronic navigational systems properly 
(RF4). 
 As has been mentioned previously, ineffective use of the navigational equipment such 
as, ECDIS, AIS, Echo Sounder, radar, Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) and 
Global Positioning System (GPS), etc. due to the unfamiliarity with the electronic 
navigational systems knowledge is considered a high risk and play a significant role 
in the risk of pilotage operations. Many accidents have occurred due to the failure of 
bridge team or pilot to use the bridge navigation equipment properly, therefore, in 
order to avoid some of the difficulties outlined above, operators’ knowledge of bridge 
navigation equipment should be improved.   
In order to improve operators’ skills and knowledge of bridge navigation equipment, 
pilotage performers have to undertake specific training on the bridge equipment, 
including; the use of all the advanced navigation technology; navigational aids; and 
other electronic devices on the bridges of ships. Marine pilots, bridge team members 
(ship’s masters, deck officers) and tug’s masters are required to understand the 
cognitive task involved with the advanced navigation technology,  as well-educated 
and trained crew with skills is considered an important factor for maritime pilotage 
safety. 
According to Berg et al, (2013) “The increase of technology aboard ships has 
increased the need for training, especially training on modern ships”.  Pilots, ships’ 
masters, deck officers and those who are in charge of a navigational watch, have to 
complete high standard Navigation Aids and Equipment Simulator Training (NAEST) 
course. All ship handlers (crew and pilot) have to undertake a high standard of generic 
ECDIS equipment training, including an Electronic Chart Display and Information 
Systems (ECDIS) simulator training course. Familiarity with the electronic 
navigational systems knowledge will assist both the pilot and ship’s crew member to 
be aware of the whole situation and enable them to easily handle the ship to its 
destination successfully and safely. 
ECDIS is a modern piece of navigation equipment designed to optimize the ship 
routing (Zang et al., 2007). It’s an electronic chart that is connected to other bridge 
equipment such as radar, GPS, AIS, and Gyro, to present the ship’s route for the voyage 
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and to plot and check positions throughout the voyage, displays ship’s, speed, course, 
leeway, depth of water, proximity to hazards, names and movements of the vessels in 
the surrounding area, and collision risks.  Training on ECDIS, ensures that navigators 
can use and understand ECDIS in the context of navigation and can demonstrate all 
competencies contained in and implied by STCW 2010. ECDIS training will eliminate 
human errors and operation errors, as well as ensure maritime pilotage safety. It was 
considered essential, to ensure that officers understand how to deal with new 
technology to avoid or reduce human error during maritime operations (Saeed, 2015).   
The regulatory requirements for generic training and familiarisation with ECDIS are 
covered by various international instruments including the IMO, the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
Convention (STCW),  the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the Manila amendments 
to the STCW Convention and its associated Code that were adopted by the IMO at a 
Diplomatic Conference in Manila in June 2010. Resolution A.960 (23), has also 
encouraged competent pilotage authorities to provide updating and refresher training 
conducted for certified or licensed pilots to ensure the continuation of their proficiency 
and updating of their knowledge, including seminars on new bridge equipment with 
special regard to navigation aids; Simulation exercises, which may include radar 
training (use of radar), and ECDIS and other electronic devices; their limitations and 
capabilities as navigation and collision avoidance aids.  
“ECDIS can deliver tremendous benefits for safe, compliant and efficient navigation. 
However, once installed, ship owners, operators and managers must fulfil their 
responsibilities for its ongoing use, including compliance with all relevant regulations. 
This includes updating their bridge procedures, upgrading their ECDIS software to the 
latest electronic navigational chart (ENC) standards and, above all, ensuring that 
bridge teams are trained and certified in the operation of ECDIS and in line with the 
requirements of Port State Control inspections and audits” (Martek marine, 2017).  
Thus, a proper education and training in ECDIS use is important and constitutes one 
of the most important risk reduction measures (Ugurlu et al., 2015). 
6.5.1.2.5 Measures for mitigating the risks due to lack of teamwork (RF5) 
Pilotage operations are categorised as a complex, dynamic and uncertain working 
environment and liable to diverse risks because of interaction and interdependence, in 
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addition, the multiplicity of the entities who are performing ships’ berthing operations. 
They are conducted by multiple operators with different responsibilities including the 
pilot, ship’s crewmembers, tugboats and mooring boats crews, VTC regulators and 
shoreline personnel, who are required to work cooperatively together as one team with 
the objective of guiding the ship safely to its berth (Murdoch et al. 2012). A team can 
be described as “two or more individuals with specified roles interacting adaptively, 
interdependently, and dynamically toward a common and valued goal” (Salas et al., 
1992). As team effectiveness and team performance depend upon a well-functioning 
team, a breakdown in team processes can lead to team failure which will negatively 
affect the whole situation (Salas et al., 2005). 
 The finding of this study shows that the failure of pilot, ship’s staff, and assisting 
parties (tugs masters, VTS, and shore personnel) to work with each other 
cooperatively, or failure to create an effective relationship on the bridge of a ship 
between pilot and ship’s captain can cause undesirable situations during ship berthing, 
which will negatively affect the safety of the pilotage operations. This was also 
confirmed by Grech et al. (2008), who stated that optimal teamwork is extremely 
important for on-board safety and plays a major role in the safety of maritime 
navigation, as breakdowns in teamwork can lead to undesirable situations. 
In order to create efficient teamwork, pilot, ship’s staff, and assisting parties (tugs 
masters, VTS, and shore personnel) should work with each other cooperatively. And 
ship’s crewmembers should not rely only on the pilot. As the STCW Code stated that,  
“despite the duties and obligations of pilots, their presence on board does not relieve 
the master or officer in charge of the navigational watch from their duties and 
obligations for the safety of the ship. Ship’s master and bridge team members should 
be in a higher state of attentiveness, and vigilance and not rely completely on the pilot 
(Gard, 2006). 
To mitigate the risk due to lack of teamwork, IMO Resolution A.960 recommended, 
the master of the ship and the watchkeeper to always monitor the position of the ship 
and pilot’s actions after the pilot has boarded and ensure that they are integrated into 
the bridge team properly. IMO Resolution A960 also recommended masters and 
bridge officers to support the pilot and to ensure that his/her actions are monitored at 
all times and the master, bridge officers and pilot must share a responsibility for good 
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communications and understanding of each other's role for the safe conduct of the 
vessel in pilotage waters.  
Mismanagement of tasks and failure to delegate the responsibilities of each team 
member during pilotage operations will degrade bridge team performance; as a result, 
in order to establish an effective team performance, tasks and responsibilities should 
be understood and distributed properly among the bridge team members. Pilot, ship’s 
master and OOW (officer of the watch), should work with each other in mutually 
supportive ways, and effective communication, interactive co-operation, and co-
ordination between them should be established (Flin et al., 2008, p. 94). One expert 
mentioned that the captain of the ship and pilot need to provide appropriate support 
and encouragement as well as motivate the individuals to understand their tasks and 
responsibilities in the team context.  
Officers at the ship forward and aft must maintain closed loop communications with 
the bridge. Pilot, captain, and officers of the watch must keep monitoring the tugs and 
ship's progress during the ship’s navigating. Pilot must give commands to external 
parties (tug boat mooring men and mooring boat) correctly. External parties such as 
tug boat masters, mooring boat, and shoreline personnel, must be ready for assistance 
and listen carefully to every command that is given by the pilot, and carry out the 
pilot’s instructions precisely, orders regarding steering, engine requests, should be 
following out by ship’s crewmembers correctly (Murdoch et al. 2012). 
The feedback of Accident investigations reports indicated that poor team work is one 
of the most significant contributory factors of pilotage accidents, and according to the 
result of this study, poor team work is influenced by most of the other factors such as 
lack of communication and language barrier, insufficient information exchange, and 
lack of planning. Therefore, in order to mitigate its influences and prevent the 
occurrence of such accidents, pilot, ship’s master, OOW (officer of the watch), and 
assistant parties should work together in accordance with the principles of BRM 
(MAIB, 2018), and an efficient communication between the pilot and the ship’s 
crewmembers (Hsu, 2012), and adequate information exchange (TSB, 2013a), should 
be established. Efficient and successful bridge team communication is acknowledged 
as a key to safe operations of sea-going vessels, and enables team members to perform 
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their specific task and thus supports effective team performance (Øvergård et al., 
2015).  
Exchanges of information and agreements on passage and berthing plan enable bridge 
team sharing of a common understanding of the manoeuvring (TSB, 2013a).) As Salas 
et al. (2005) stated, an exchange of information, shared mental models, and closed-
loop communication are considered to be necessary for achieving optimal teamwork. 
In order to effectively monitor the vessel movements and assist the pilot in maintaining 
situational awareness, it is essential that the relevant information has been exchanged 
between the master and the pilot beforehand. The master-pilot exchange forms the 
basis for the pilot and bridge team to work cooperatively to monitor the vessel's 
progress (TSB, 2014a). 
An efficient teamwork required that the team members possess specific knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes, such as; knowledge of their own and other team members’ tasks 
and responsibilities, skill in monitoring each other's performance, and a positive 
attitude towards working in a team (Øvergård et al., 2015). Those operators’ work 
characteristics, such as professional skills and work attitudes, should be enhanced by 
providing high quality specific training (Hsu, 2012). Additionally, bridge resource 
management training (BRM) for OOW (officers of the watch), ship’s masters, tug 
operators and pilots to improve cooperation and understand roles and responsibilities 
should be provided (Chauvin et al., 2013). The U.S. National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) reported that lack of proper crew interaction is a contributing factor to 
several marine accidents and has made many recommendations to present Bridge 
Resource Management (BRM) in training for deck officers on U.S.–flag vessels (TSB, 
1995). 
6.5.1.2.6 Measures for mitigating the risks due to of lack of situation awareness (RF6) 
Situation awareness (SA) was defined by Endsley (1995), as “being aware of what is 
happening around you and understanding what that information means to you now 
and in the future”.   
Experienced pilots mentioned that situation awareness during ships piloting plays a 
significant role in the safety of the maritime pilotage operations. The importance of SA 
in operator decision-making processes is little understood within the maritime pilotage 
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domain. It is an area of extreme importance within high risk industries which the 
maritime industry ignores. This is the underlying reason why the matter of shared 
situational awareness (SA) during pilotage operations is not dealt with and thus leads 
to often serious incidents which might otherwise have been avoided.  Situational 
awareness error is closely connected with lack of training, experience, and 
familiarization. If the bridge team members and/or pilot are unfamiliar with the risks 
and conditions of the intended manoeuvre or the vessel, a lack of situational awareness 
will naturally emerge.  
The results of this study show that, the factors, lack of communication and 
misunderstanding due to language barrier, poor teamwork, lack of exchanging of 
information and preparing a proper plan, lack of familiarity with the electronic 
navigational systems knowledge due to insufficient training, work load, and distracting 
elements, have a negative effect on the situation awareness and play a crucial role in 
situation awareness during pilotage operations.  According to the result of this study, 
poor shared situation awareness about the current situation is a contributing factor to 
the maritime accidents, and the safety of the ship handling during berthing operations 
depends on the level of the situational awareness that the pilot, and master of the ship 
who have the command of the ship are able to attain. Maintaining the desired state of 
pilot's SA at every stage of task achievement is so important. This is of particular 
importance when navigating a ship in restricted waterways, or in a harbour basin or 
alongside a quay.  
 According to Chauvin et al. (2013), three key elements of bridge resource 
management (BRM) are monitoring the vessel's progress, sharing the voyage plan, and 
maintaining situational awareness. Maintaining situational awareness through the 
practice of effective teamwork and communication between bridge team members is 
most important when a vessel is operating in restricted waters or areas of high traffic 
volume. In addition, information exchange was associated with high levels of SA and 
that high levels of SA were related to high levels of performance in teams (Øvergård 
et al., 2015).  
In order to maintain overall situational awareness when navigating with a pilot, it is 
critical that information is exchanged regularly so that all members of the bridge team 
are aware of the pilot's intentions and can provide assistance or timely advice and 
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observations (MAIB annual report, 2013). According to TSB (2012) to be aware of 
the situation properly pilot and crewmembers need to obtain the right information 
regarding details of passage and berthing plan, tasks and responsibilities of the master, 
pilot, tugs operators, deck officers and other crew members prior to the 
commencement of the manoeuvre to assist them to be aware of the situation and enable 
them to easily identify the ship’s manoeuvring characteristics, and quickly assess the 
skills needed to control the ship and handle it to the berth safely.  
According to the above-mentioned conclusions, implementing the SA process and 
acquiring the required state of SA by the pilot and ship’s crew staff is very important 
to the implementation of the decision-making process. Pilot and ship master should be 
aware of all the relevant elements influencing the quality of situational awareness. 
They must be aware of the all relevant factors external to the vessel constituting the 
situation, such as the environmental condition (wind, current, waves, visibility) 
particularly during the approaching and entering of the vessel to the port in adverse 
weather situations such as, strong current or wind, or reduced visibility.  
The presence of the other vessels must be detected visually or by technical means such 
as radar. Ship’s speed, and ship’s location and its clearance from the jetty must be 
precisely controlled, also tugs boats and mooring boat position must be observed if 
they carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely with respect to position and towing 
power requirements. In addition, pilot and ship’s captain must be aware of the factors 
internal to the vessel such as the state of the vessel, availability and usability of the 
equipment, and technology, the state, attitudes and attention of the crew, for example, 
the pilot must be aware if the orders regarding steering and engine requests during the 
ship piloting are followed up by ship’s crewmembers correctly.  
During berthing operations any wrong commands occurring as a result of lack of 
situation awareness could lead to an undesirable situation, and can negatively affect 
the safety of the ship during berthing operations. Therefore, effective teamwork, co-
operation and co-ordination, between the pilot and bridge team members should be 
performed, to be aware of the whole situation properly, and this could be achieved by 
bridge resource management (BRM) practical training on board ship for shipmasters, 
officers, tugs’ masters and pilots. According to TSB (1995), and Ugurlu et al (2015), 
providing practical training on board the vessel for ship’s operators, to fully understand 
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bridge resource management (BRM) is significant and  helpful for attaining the desired 
level of situational awareness.  This was also confirmed by most of the experts 
surveyed in this study. 
One expert mentioned that, to protect against mutual misunderstanding and to increase 
the situational awareness and support bridge team situation awareness during the ship 
handling, pilot and bridge staff should be communicating with each other in sufficient 
detail to allow all to achieve a mutual understanding and close the loop. The 
effectiveness of the communications between the pilot and ship’s master, and 
understanding of the communication between master and crewmembers as well as 
between pilot and assistant parties during manoeuvring is very significant for 
maintaining situation awareness during ship berthing (TSB, 2013a). 
 A common working language (English language or a common language other than 
English) during pilotage manoeuvring should be used. It is particularly important that 
the pilot communicates with the port/tugs and other assistant parties (VTS operators, 
mooring boats staff, and shore mooring men), in a common language which the ship’s 
master and crew staff can understand. This makes it easy for the ship’s master and crew 
members to recognize the pilot’s instructions and commands, as well as help them to 
monitor any subsequent actions taken by those external parties, or any actions taken by 
ships’ passage in the surrounding area. As a result, to be fully aware of situations, 
seafarers shall have a proper knowledge of the English language.  Enhancing operators’ 
English language skills abilities could not only help facilitate communication on board 
the ship, it also facilitates the exchange of information between pilot and ship’s master, 
which in turn will assist them to be fully aware of situations and help to avoid pilotage 
operations disasters. 
To increase situational awareness during the pilotage operations, bridge crew and pilot 
must be attentive, and alert, as well as having the ability to assess the situation 
continuously and act appropriately and correctly (Akyuze, 2015). The National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (2011a) reported that many accidents occurred 
due to the failure of the ship’s operators to maintain a proper lookout due to distraction 
and inattentiveness, which resulted from repeated personal use of a cell phone and 
laptop computer while they were navigating the vessel. 
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 As a consequence the maritime and coastguard agency (MCA) (2005), issued a notice 
to ship owners, ship operators, charterers, masters, ships’ officers, fishing and leisure 
vessel skippers, shipping agents, pilots, port authorities, ship chandlers, tug operators, 
bunkering providers, that the use of mobile phones at inappropriate times is distracting 
bridge management teams from their primary duties of navigating and conning their 
vessel. Control measures, must be taken to ensure that entertainment devices and 
mobile telephones are not distracting for the bridge team at a time when they should 
be concentrating fully on the navigation of the vessel. As a result improving the 
operators’ cultural awareness by providing training courses is significant. 
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (2005) pointed out that the use of 
mobile telephones in the approaches to a port should be restricted, for both incoming 
and outgoing calls.  This can be achieved by designating pilotage, and other restricted 
waters, as ‘red zones’, in which outgoing mobile telephone calls are prohibited, and 
incoming calls must be diverted to a message service. Use of this technique, or similar 
control measures, ensures that mobile telephones are not a distraction for the bridge 
team at a time when they should be concentrating fully on the navigation of the vessel.  
One expert stated that to build and maintain a clear picture and perceive the situation 
correctly, during the manoeuvring, a high standard of continuous watchkeeping must 
be established, by using all the available electronic means on the bridge. Additionally, 
the bridge must maintain a proper look-out by visual sight (observations) and hearing 
and not just rely on electronic navigational systems during pilotage operations, 
particularly when the vessel navigates inside the port or while approaching close to the 
berth. The need for an all-round lookout should be not overlooked, to move out to the 
bridge wings to check the stern of the vessel on both sides, track the movement of the 
other ships in the surrounding area, and tug’s and piloted ship’s performance and 
progressing should be effectively and continuously monitored by pilot and master.  
According to the rule 5 of the COLREGs, "every vessel shall at all times maintain a 
proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in 
the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to gain an appraisal of the situation 
and of the risk of collision". Keeping a proper lookout (watchkeepers) in accordance 
with the requirements of North West European Area Guidelines (NWEA) plays a 
significant role in detecting other vessels and assessing, obtaining and maintaining 
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situation awareness, particularly when the vessels navigate through narrow canals or 
while underway, inbound/outbound from/to ports and channels in the dark or under 
poor visibility conditions. Keeping a good lookout (watchkeepers) at all times of the 
pilotage operation enables them to detect the potential navigation hazards, assess the 
situation effectively and acquire the desired state of SA.  
Advanced maritime technology and the new electronic navigational systems have 
significant safety and efficiency benefits. The potential effect of automation on the 
performance of the shipboard tasks and the role of advanced technology systems is 
aimed at reducing the risk of maritime accidents. However, poor knowledge in the use 
of navigational aids such as; Automated Identification System (AIS), RADAR, GPS, 
and Electronic Chart Display and information Systems (ECDIS), can have a negative 
effect on SA.  
Although new maritime technology can be viewed as beneficial in terms of being able 
to process more data,  one of the consequences of an increasing level of technology is 
a loss of situation awareness (Sandhåland., et al, 2015), which significantly affects 
performance in abnormal, time-critical situations, and can lead to an accident (Grech 
et al., 2008, p.125).  Therefore, to achieve and maintain SA effectively, Pilot, ship’s 
masters, and officers have to undertake a high standard of watchkeeping training 
courses includes using all bridge navigation equipment such as echo sounders, Radar, 
AIS, and ECDIS. Also, an advanced training course, including simulation exercises 
and practical training on board ship should be provided, this will help the bridge crew 
and pilots to monitor, observe critical available information, discriminate and detect 
data correctly.   
In spite of the importance and benefits of the technologies on ships through which 
operators obtain more data more quickly, allowing them to make timely decisions, the 
advanced instruments and technical innovations require greater knowledge and 
extensive training. Due to the complexity of the tasks involved, operators are 
distracted and overloaded with information and might not be aware enough of the 
situation to make the proper decisions during berthing operations. It is worth 
mentioning that the chance for human error increases when things are complicated, 
new, and unfamiliar. This opinion was confirmed by Grech et al (2008, p.125) who 
concluded that the electronic equipment such as ECDIS, AIS, and electronic 
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navigational chart display (ENC) are considered significant factors that overload, 
confuse, and distract operators, rather than assisting them.  
Analysis of a considerable number of pilotage accidents shows that situation 
awareness of the surrounding environment was lacking, and mistakes were due to 
failure to monitor or observe data. In most cases, these mistakes were as a result of the 
operator being too focused on one instrument, or of momentary task distractions, or 
excessive workload. The mariner’s mental workload due to the use of technology and 
long-time continuous monitoring of navigational equipment can lead to memory loss 
and misperception of data especially if the ship’s operator is fatigued or not 
sufficiently trained.  
Therefore, according to the experts, controlling work load is a key factor when using 
new technology, and in order to mitigate operator’s mental workload due to excessive 
workload of using new technology and long-time monitoring navigational aids 
equipment, tasks need to be evenly and properly distributed among the bridge team 
members, and bridge team members and pilot have to work cooperatively. Training 
and other forms of procedural guidance are needed to make seafarers aware of both 
the capabilities and limitations of new technologies. Previous related study revealed 
that providing more education and training opportunities to seafarers, promoting 
widespread use on board of electronic chart display and information systems, and 
improving seafarers’ working hours and rest breaks would help to reduce the risk of 
high work load and prevent maritime accidents (Ugurlu, 2015). 
6.5.1.2.7. Measures for mitigating the risks due to of fatigue (RF7) 
As mentioned in the preceding section, human fatigue is difficult to measure and even 
more difficult to state as a cause of an accident, therefore, accident investigation 
reports are often reluctant to assign any great importance to human fatigue (Grech et 
al., 2008 p.59). The IMO adopted several actions, regulations, and guidelines in order 
to ensure maritime safety and to either eliminate or mitigate risks caused by human 
fatigue such as; the enforcement of the International Convention STCW (1995) related 
to working hours on board that produces scheduling and sufficient manning which has 
certainly reduced the ill effects that could lead to mental illness and fatigue among 
seafarers. Chapter VIII (Fitness for duty) of the STCW Convention sets limits on the 
hours of work and minimum rest requirements for watchkeepers. Additionally, 
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measures have been introduced for watchkeeping personnel to prevent fatigue. 
Administrations are required to establish and enforce rest periods for watchkeeping 
personnel and to ensure that watch systems are so arranged that the efficiency of 
watchkeeping personnel is not impaired by fatigue. 
 IMO (2001) Guidance on Fatigue, has also developed practical guidance to assist 
interested parties to better understand and manage the issue of “fatigue.” The 
guidelines on fatigue contain practical information that can assist interested parties 
(naval architects/Ship designers, owners/operators/managers, masters, officers, 
maritime pilots, tugboat personnel, other crew members and training institutions) to 
better understand and manage fatigue.  
Furthermore, Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) is an important 
international labour Convention that was adopted by the International Labour 
Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO), under article 19 of its 
Constitution at a maritime session in February 2006 in Geneva, Switzerland.  The 
convention addressed significant issues which might influence the seafarers on board, 
and maritime safety, in order to protect the seafarers from the fatigue.  
According to the convention, the rest hours should be implemented in national 
legislation. The maximum hours of work in that legislation should not exceed 14 hours 
in any 24-hour period and 72 hours in any seven-day period, or at least ten hours of 
rest in any 24-hour period. In addition, the daily hours of rest may not be divided into 
more than two periods and at least six hours rest should be given consecutively in one 
of those two periods. In spite these above-mentioned actions, however, maintaining 
minimum crewing levels for reducing operational cost resulted in the risk of fatigue 
(Yang et al, 2013). In addition, the lack of an effective response to lessons learned 
from marine accident reports, also has threatened precautions already taken towards 
system safety.  
The factors mentioned above might have resulted in additional occurrence of fatigue 
due to the reduced number of pilots and tug operators in shift, and the reduced number 
of crew members on the ships. Moreover, lack of necessary rest periods makes fatigue 
an essential element of human error that contributes to marine accidents. The feedback 
from maritime accident investigation reports show enormous challenges to preventing 
shipping accidents. Darbra (2007) highlighted that, a shortage of pilots in some ports, 
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makes fatigue management more difficult, and commercial pressures sometimes do 
not allow fatigue to be managed as effectively as pilots would like. Therefore, Port 
authorities should increase the number of pilots and tug operators working on any 
given shift and ship owners should not reduce the number of crewmembers to avoid 
an increasing work load and mitigate the risk of fatigue. Operators should ensure that 
they are adequately rested prior to an act of pilotage, in good physical and mental 
fitness and not under the effect of drugs or alcohol. 
 In addition, in order to perform well at work, pilots, tug operators, and ship’s staff 
should have a deep and uninterrupted sleep during rest hours. Rest breaks during work, 
particularly aboard ship should be sufficient and strictly complied with by the vessel's 
seafarers and management due to the importance of this element which can also impair 
the performance and alertness of seafarers during the operations. Mismanagement of 
workload can cause degradation in bridge team performance. Therefore, the intense 
workload of the officer on watch must not be reflected in the voyage’s shifts, and 
inconvenient working hours must be avoided (Uğurlu et al., 2015a). 
Pilots and ship’s staff are performing a high-risk task that requires intense 
concentration and alertness, and any decrease in performance as a result of workload 
can potentially lead to a disaster. The result of this study and previous studies show 
that excessive workload can lead to mental fatigue which in turn impairs information 
processing and reaction time, increasing the probability of errors and ultimately 
leading to ship accidents (Hetherington et al., 2006).  In busy situations this is very 
difficult to manage, and if tasks are not deputed properly omissions could occur and 
disasters could happen.  
It is important to mention that nowadays maritime pilots on the bridge are exposed to 
information from several sources: crew verbal instructions, multiple instrument 
displays, and communication systems. Due to the introduction of the new 
communication and navigation devices on the bridge which require greater 
knowledge; higher levels of accuracy, proficiency, and intelligence are necessary. In 
addition, the complexity of maritime pilotage operations and the large number of tasks 
involved add to the pressure. Furthermore, harsh working conditions, and poor 
weather conditions add to the risk.  Moreover, the short time allocated to achieve the 
tasks has increased the work burden, level of stress, and fear for the pilotage operators. 
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As a result, in order to mitigate the effects of workload during the pilotage operation, 
tasks need to be evenly and properly distributed among the bridge team members. As 
Saeed (2015) stated, on port approaches, on the bridge of a ship the master needs to 
make sure that the tasks are allocated properly to be sure that the whole operation is 
performed successfully and safely.  
When responsibilities are assigned by the pilot and the captain of the ship during s 
pilotage operation to perform a task, then an individual is made responsible to perform 
one particular task and can avoid the risk of being overloaded. According to studies 
conducted by Chauvin et al. (2013), failure to delegate responsibilities of each team 
member, and inadequate task allocation are significant factors that can lead to 
maritime accidents. Chauvin concluded that, maintaining bridge resource management 
training for OOW (officers of the watch), ship’s masters, and pilots to manage this 
issue is necessary. 
6.5.1.2.8 Measures for mitigating the risk due to the improper/ inadequate use of tugs 
(RF8) 
As mentioned earlier, handling ships such as large passenger ships, container ships 
with towering deck cargo, high free board car carriers, mammoth tankers, and deep 
draught bulk carriers is considered one of the most complex tasks, and cannot be 
handled and treated the same way as small cargo ships (Armstrong, 2007, p.1). It 
requires sufficient numbers and sufficiently powerful tugboats, particularly in adverse 
weather conditions (Hus, 2012). The main purpose of tugboats is to assist ships, such 
as pushing and towing the vessels. Tugboats play a significant role in assisting vessels 
in berthing alongside and unberthing from the berth safely and efficiently. The lack of 
using sufficient tugs is considered high-risk and can affect the manoeuvring negatively 
and contribute to a ship’s berthing accident. It is important to highlight the fact that a 
shortage of tugs in some ports, makes ship’s manoeuvring more difficult, and as a 
result, using adequate numbers and sufficiently powerful tugboats are considered a 
major factor for ship piloting safety. 
According to the expert perspective, pilots always prefer to use adequate tugs during 
port manoeuvres, however due to the commercial pressure attributed to shipping 
companies, ship’s masters use the minimum number of tugs in order to make the 
manoeuvres cost efficient. Flag states and port states need to reconsider the mandatory 
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pilotage and tug usage regulations to mitigate this risk factor. This study and previous 
related studies showed that commercial pressures result in pilots and ship’s masters 
working outside established rules and sometimes do not allow pilotage operations to 
be performed as effectively as pilots would like. Therefore, in order to mitigate this 
risk factor, ports authorities should not squeeze pilots or ship's captains to work outside 
established rules due to commercial pressure (Darbra et al., 2007).  
The finding of this study shows that efficient ship-handling during berthing and 
unberthing operations is extremely important to the safety of the ship, which requires 
sufficient number and sufficiently powerful tugboats, skilful tugboat masters, and a 
qualified pilot. Failure to use sufficient numbers and sufficiently powerful tugboats 
and skilful tugboat masters may affect the quality of tugboat operations and contribute 
to marine accidents in ports. Therefore, in order to achieve successful and safe 
manoeuvres, port authorities should provide the required number of tugboats that are 
necessary for all kind of ships manoeuvres, particularly in adverse weather conditions. 
Additionally, qualified and experienced personnel should be employed and regular 
training for pilots and tugboat masters should be provided (Hsu, 20012).  
This opinion was confirmed by an expert senior pilot, who confirmed that, in order to 
avoid pilotage accidents and achieve safe berthing, qualified, experienced, and well 
trained pilots who have an appropriate knowledge of a complex manoeuvre with multi-
tugs should be employed, and personal qualifications and experience of operators 
should reflect the tug use in any particular operation. In order to ensure safe and 
efficient ship berthing, the port pilot should be familiar with the necessary knowledge 
of the berthing and unberthing and manoeuvring with tugs. The pilot should be fully 
aware of how to deal with each tug to carry out the task safely and efficiently.  
 In addition, theoretical and practical advanced training courses should be provided, 
and the level and standards of training for certification or licensing should be real, 
proper, and to a high standard. According to Akyuz (2017), the safety of the ship 
handling during berthing operations depends on the navigational experience, 
competence and high level of skills that the pilot, master of the ship, and tug operator 
have attained. Therefore, an appropriate education and training is the best method to 




 6.5.1.2.9. Measures for mitigating the risk due the failure of pilot to give correct and 
precise instructions (RF9).            
The Captain of the ship is the individual responsible for commanding the ship and 
giving the orders to the ship’s crew, officers in the bridge, and officers at the ship’s 
forward and aft, on what the pilot has suggested or instructed. The marine pilot in is 
on board ship because he is familiar with the port and the local area, he is responsible 
during piloting the vessel for the ship handling, as well as for other assistant parties 
such as tugs, shore mooring men, and mooring boats (Gard, 2014).  As a result, failure 
of the pilot to give precise or correct instructions during ship piloting is a high risk and 
can lead to disaster. Thus, in order to ensure safe and efficient ship berthing, control 
measures must be taken to ensure that the orders given by the pilot regarding steering, 
engine, instructions and commands to the bridge staff and external parties are correct 
and precisely. 
According to the experts and the results of this study, there are many contributing 
causal factors likely to occur during manoeuvring and affecting the pilot and 
preventing him from giving correct instructions. A pilot might fail to give precise 
instructions if he is fatigued or stressed due to high mental or physical workload or he 
might not be in good physical and mental fitness and under the effect of drugs or 
alcohol. Furthermore, the pilot might lose situational awareness, due to lack of 
planning for the intended manoeuvre, as a result of inadequate communication and 
language barriers and sometimes he is just not experienced and not a qualified pilot. 
Therefore, in order to mitigate the effect of this risk and reduce its frequency, it’s 
important to employ a trained, qualified and experienced pilot who has good 
knowledge of ship’s handling skills and is able to avoid all causes that could adversely 
influence his performance, and implement all the mitigations measures, to manage 
problems sufficiently and successfully.  
The most basic thing to be understood by a pilot in ship handling is to know how a 
ship behaves under all circumstances and what orders should be given in order to 
handle the ship to its destination successfully and safely (Murdoch et al., 2012). 
According to experts, ship’s handling characteristics must be also understood by the 
pilot. In addition, instructions from the pilot should be clear, simple and in a common 
language (English or a common language other than English). Port pilot should be 
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familiar with the knowledge of the electronic navigational systems, principles and the 
requirements of IMO resolution A960, as well as being fully aware of each tug’s power 
and how to use them properly. 
Moreover, situation awareness is very important to the implementation of the decision-
making process, and in order to acquire the required state of SA pilot should be 
familiar with the knowledge of the local area of the port, all the relevant elements 
influencing the quality of situational awareness, particularly during the approaching 
and entering of the vessel to the port in adverse weather conditions such as, strong 
current or wind, or reduced visibility. He must be aware of all the relevant factors 
external to the vessel such as tug’s and piloted ship’s performance, progress should be 
effectively and continuously monitored by the pilot 
The pilot shall also have a proper knowledge of the English language to maintain an 
effective and closed-loop communication and exchange information with the master 
regarding the passage and berthing plan prior to the commencement of the manoeuvre. 
Knowledge of this information will help to improve the marine pilot’s professional 
piloting ability, and will assist him, to easily identify the ship’s manoeuvring 
characteristics, as well as enable him to quickly assess the skills needed to control the 
ship and make the correct decision to handle the ship to its destination successfully 
and safely. 
The results of this study show that accidents in pilotage are likely to occur as a result 
of failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot’s directions (e.g. incorrect 
interpretations, refusal, rejection, intervention by master, etc.) during manoeuvring. 
This fact was also confirmed by Darbra et al. (2007), they reported that these 
occurrences are quite frequent making the pilot’s task much more difficult and of 
increased risk. There are many reasons that might lead the master of the ship to 
interfere or refuse pilot’s advice or instructions during the period of ship piloting. 
Because the pilot is human and he can make mistakes, and can become very fatigued, 
fall sick, and sometimes he is just not qualified (Gard, 2006).  However, on the other 
hand, failure of ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot’s directions, is also 
considered very hazardous and can affect ship navigation safety and contribute to 
marine accidents in ports. Therefore, in order to mitigate the influence of this risk 
factor and reduce its frequency, the full bridge team is required to be involved and 
214 
 
manoeuvring should be carefully planned and monitored. The ship’s bridge team and 
pilot should create an effective working environment on the bridge of a ship, and 
shipmasters should not challenge the pilot during the pilotage task (Darbra et al., 
2007). Sufficient briefing and discussion about who is in charge of the con are 
significant factors for achieving successful and safe ship piloting (Chauvin et al., 
2013).  
An experienced pilot stated that, “it has to be understood that one person only has the 
conduct of the vessel”. If that is the pilot then the master of the piloted ship must be 
confident that the pilot is doing his duties correctly and should not interfere or give 
conflicting orders unless the pilot is clearly behaving irresponsibly.  This point of view 
was also supported by Armstrong (2007, p.9).  A mutual trust and respect between 
pilot, and ship’s captain should be created (Salas et al., 2005). In addition, master and 
pilot must work as one team, and a close working relationship between pilot, and 
ship’s captain should be created (Armstrong, 2007, p.8). 
6.5.1.2.10 Measures for mitigating the risk due to the failure of pilots and ship’s 
masters to prepare a proper passage and berthing plan (RF10). 
As has been stated in the preceding section, in spite of the regulations, guidelines and 
large set of international conventions and codes which have been adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization, which aimed to either eliminate or mitigate 
mistakes caused by human factors during maritime operations, numerous maritime 
accidents still occurred as result of failure of pilots and ship’s masters to conduct a 
proper and effective passage and berthing plan prior to piloting the vessel, and many 
accidents could have been avoided if the pilot and the bridge team had a common 
understanding about how the passage would be carried out (Gard, 2007).  
Therefore, in order to avoid a crisis situation and achieve a successful and safe pilotage 
operation, the passage and berthing plan should be prepared and performed by the 
ship’s master and pilot prior to the commencement of the manoeuvre. In order to 
establish a proper and effective berthing plan, as mentioned earlier, both ship’s master 
and pilot must provide sufficient information regarding details of the passage and 
berthing plan before manoeuvring commences, marine pilot and ship’s master need to 
obtain the right information regarding vessel characteristics and berthing/sailing 
information e.g. port and channel depth of water, tugboats’ powers, and number of 
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tugboats used, etc., as soon as possible once the pilot has boarded the ship and prior 
to pilotage operation commencing. Knowledge of this information will help to 
establish a shared mental model of the voyage (TSB, 2014a), and assist both the pilot 
and the ship’s master to be aware of the whole situation (TSB, 2012), as well as help 
them to make the correct decisions and enable them to easily identify the ship’s 
manoeuvring characteristics, and in addition, help them to quickly assess the skills 
needed to control and handle the ship to its destination successfully and safely 
(CAMSS, 2012). 
Hetherington et al (2006) pointed out that, failure to comply with regulations is the 
major contributory factor for the majority of human errors that have been the cause of 
many maritime disasters. IMO has introduced several regulations to reduce the risk of 
vessel accident occurring due to failure of pilots and ship’s masters to prepare a proper 
passage and berthing plan, nevertheless, the issue of negligence and breaching the 
rules and regulations introduced by maritime authorities, as well as the lack of 
interpretation and enforcement prevent its full success. As mentioned previously, the 
IMO is incapable of effective control and has absolutely no powers of enforcement. 
Therefore, in order to implement and enforce regulations in good order, ship 
management organization, flag states, port states and classification societies should 
play key roles in the implementation and enforcement of maritime safety regulations 
and establish an advance monitoring system. 
According to IMO resolution A.893 (21), on Guidelines for voyage planning, voyage 
planning is a required task obliging the development of a plan in accordance with IMO 
rules and other factors specified by the master. The vessel’s passage plan is intended 
to enhance safety by highlighting high-risk areas and providing key information in a 
format that is readily available to those involved in the vessel’s navigation. When a 
pilot boards a vessel, it is important that both the vessel’s passage plan and the pilot’s 
passage plan are discussed during the master-pilot exchange. In order to avoid the risk 
of vessel accident and ensure safety of ship berthing, rules and regulations introduced 
by IMO such as safety management system (SMS) for pilotage operations and IMO 
resolution A. 960 (23), and IMO Resolution A. 893 ‘‘Guidelines for voyage 
planning’’, should be obeyed and implemented properly. Previous related studies 
showed that knowledge of IMO Resolution 960, IMO Resolution A. 893 ‘‘Guidelines 
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for voyage planning’’, SMCP, and Standard Maritime Communications Phrases are 
contributing factors to safety of pilotage and are required (Darbra et al., 2007). 
In addition, Mutual insurance organisations, which are commonly known as Protection 
and Indemnity clubs (P&I) have also produced guidance and an example of such is ‘A 
Master’s Guide to Berthing’ (Murdoch et al., 2012). They reported that, a berthing 
plan and exchange of information between pilot and master is significant for ensuring 
effective berthing operations, the captain of ship and pilot should know from each 
other what the difficulties in navigating the ship are. They confirmed that the primary 
task for the ship’s master and pilot is to provide accurate information regarding the 
manoeuvring, and how it will be conducted, in order to avoid the risks and to ensure 
safe passage and successful manoeuvring. 
The findings of this study show that the language barrier, and lack of communication 
and master-pilot information exchange, and pilot boarding point are influencing 
factors on the berthing and pilotage passage plan. An expert pilot mentioned that pilot 
boarding point should be at a sufficient distance from the commencement of the act of 
pilotage to allow sufficient time to meet the requirements of the master-pilot 
information exchange and agreement of the final pilotage passage plan. These two 
factors are considered significant factors in achieving safe ship berthing, and play a 
major role in the safety of pilotage operations. Sharing the vessel’s passage plan during 
the master-pilot information exchange enables pilots and bridge officers to identify 
and account for variables and discrepancies that may affect the safe navigation of the 
vessel. It also allows the pilot and all bridge team members to reach a common 
understanding of how the voyage will progress (TSB, 2014a).  
6.5.2 A CASE STUDY FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE TOPSIS ON MARINE 
PILOTAGE OPERATIONS. 
In Chapter 5 all of the relative weights for risk factors (i.e. criteria) in pilotage 
operations by use of the AHP method were calculated. In this Chapter the twenty-one 
mitigation options (i.e. alternatives) which were identified previously in section 
6.5.1.2 and illustrated in table 6.3 will be applied on marine pilotage operations using 
the TOPSIS method. The hierarchical structure of this decision problem is shown in 
Figure 6.3. This process is carried out to rank and select the alternatives as per their 
priorities for risk mitigation purposes as per the following steps:  
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Step 1: Step 1: Creation of Decision Matrix. 
In this study a questionnaire has been developed (see Appendix IIII-2) to evaluate the 
identified risk mitigation measures. At the beginning, a draft version of the 
questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire was then examined by three academic 
researchers from LJMU to comment on the appropriateness and clarity of the 
questions. The revised questionnaire as represented at the end was distributed to five 
experts who are working in the related field to contribute their judgements. In order to 
increase the valid response rate, the respondents were contacted in advance to 
determine if they would agree to participate in our survey. The same participating 
experts introduced in sections 6.5.1.1, 5.3.3, and section 5.6.1 have contributed to the 
evaluation purposes here in this chapter.  
As a first step of the TOPSIS method, the decision matrix is created, the established 
decision matrices are based on the evaluation sheet shown in Appendix IIII-2. It is 
used for evaluating 21 various alternatives (mitigation options) for each of the 11 risk 
factors separately. In order to rate the alternatives, experts used the linguistic variables 
shown in able 6.1. This research uses the basic linguistic reference as very low (VL), 
low (L), medium (M), High (H) and very high (VH). After collecting the experts' 
opinions through the evaluation sheet constructed, explained and depicted in 
Appendix IIII by using Equation 6.1, the results of the evaluations (performance 
scores) are obtained and assigned, and a decision matrix is developed. Then the 
average of their ratings are calculated and illustrated in Tables 6.4. For example, 
regarding the risk factor (criteria) “RF1” with respect to the alternative “A1”, all of 
the five experts ticked the number five. Then the average rating value for such a risk 
is 5 (25/5). As similar calculation process is applied to all other risk factors (criteria). 
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 Table 6.4.  Standard Decision Matrix
      
                   
Step 2: Construct the normalised decision matrix, 𝑟𝑖𝑗 
In this research, all the criteria are the risks in the pilotage operations, as per the goal 
mitigation of these risks is required. Hence, all the risks are termed as cost criteria. 
The normalized decision matrix was obtained by reducing each value on a column to 
a single denominator through dividing each such value to the square root of sum of 
squares of all values on such column. The normalized decision matrix, created by 
means of rij values is computed according to the Equation 6.2, as shown in the Table 
6.5. 
 By using the alternative ‘A1’ with respect to the risk factor (criteria) ‘RF1’ as an 
example, the value of rij is calculated as follows: 








In a similar way, the calculation technique is applied to all alternatives with respect to 
all the attributes for calculating the rij values (Table 6.5). 




Step3: Calculating the weighted normalised decision matrix, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 
 In order to construct weighted normalised decision matrix (𝑣𝑖𝑗), the weight of each 
risk factor obtained through AHP, which are 0.117, 0.086, 0.085, 0.072, 0.071, 0.068, 
0.063, 0.057, 0.054, 0.048, and 0.035 respectively (see table 6.2) is multiplied with 
each column of the normalised decision matrix. The weighted evaluation matrix ( 𝑣𝑖𝑗), 
is established using the Eq. (6.3) which is shown in Table 6.6.  
For instance, the 𝑣𝑖𝑗 value of the alternative ‘A1’ with respect to the risk factor 
(criteria) ‘RF1’ is calculated as follows: 
  𝑣𝑖𝑗= 0.117×0.4045= 0.0473 




 Table 6.6:  The weighted normalised decision matrix for the pilotage risk mitigation 
measures 
 
 Step 4: Determining the positive ideal solution (PIS), 𝐴+  and negative ideal solution 
(NIS),  𝐴−   
Based on the output values in Table 6.6, the positive and negative ideal solutions are 
determined respectively. As it was explained before the positive ideal solution (PIS) 
and the negative ideal solution (NIS) for the alternatives (mitigation options) can be 
determined via taking the maximum and minimum values within the row of weighted 
normalised decision matrix. The values of   
{(maxj Vij | j € j) and {(min j Vij | j € j’)} belong to the positive ideal solution and the 
values of {(maxj Vij | j € j) and {(min j Vij | j € j’)} belong to the negative ideal 
solution. Table 6.7, and Equations 6.4 and 6.5 refer.  
             





     Table 6.7:  The positive ideal solution (PIS) and the negative ideal solution (NIS) 
 
 
Step 5: Calculate the distance separation measures for PIS, Sⅈ
+ and NIS  Sⅈ
− 
The distance separation is divided into two parts which are related to the PIS and NIS. 
The Sⅈ
+ is calculated using formula 6.6, while the Sⅈ
− is computed using equation 6.7. 
By using the distance separation values of Sⅈ
+and Sⅈ
−,  𝑅Cⅈ
+  is calculated using 
equation 6.8.  Referring to the alternative ‘A1’ as an example, the values of Sⅈ
+and Sⅈ
− 
are obtained as follows: 
√(0.0473 − 0.0473)2 + (0.0283 − 0.0322)2 + (0.0272 − 0.0272)2 + (0.0262 − 0.0262)2 + (0.0190 − 0.0207)2
+(0.0155 − 0.0177)2 + (0.0167 − 0.0222)2 + (0.0206 − 0.0206)2 + (0.0148 − 0.0148)2 
+(0.0124 − 0.124)2+ (0.0099 − 0.0113)2 
Sⅈ
+ = √0.0125 = 01118 
√(0.0473 − 0.0113)2 + (0.0283 − 0.0064)2 + (0.0272 − 0.0054)2 + (0.0262 − 0.0054)2 + (0.0190 − 0.0051)2
+(0.0155 − 0.0042)2 + (0.0167 − 0.0046)2 + (0.0206 − 0.0043)2 + (0.0148 −
0.0088)2 +(0.0124 − 0.0084)2+ (0.0099 − 0.0031)2 
Sⅈ





In a similar way, the calculation technique is applied to the other alternative with 
respect to all factors for obtaining values of 𝐴+and 𝐴−. Table 6.8 illustrate the values 
of the distance separation and closeness of each alternative. 
Table 6.8. The distance separation and closeness of each alternative for the pilotage 
risk mitigation  
 
Step 6: Calculate the relative closeness to the idial solution 𝑅Cⅈ
+ 
 
The best solutions for pilotage risk mitigation will be selected based on the 𝑅Cⅈ
+ value 
closest to the one which has the shortest distance from the positive idial solution point 
223 
 
and the farthest distance from the negative idial solution point. The 𝑅Cⅈ
+  values will 
be used to show how important each alternative is through ranking. Alternative with 
high 𝑅Cⅈ
+  value is more important than the one with low 𝑅Cⅈ
+  value. Refering to the 
alternative “A1” as example and the Sⅈ
+ and Sⅈ
− value from  Table 6.8 the value of 𝑅Cⅈ
+ 





 = 0.3465   
The 𝑅Cⅈ
+of the other alternatives can be computed and ranked accordingly in a similar 
way and their results are shown in Table 6.9.  
Table 6.9 illustrates TOPSIS results and final ranking for the implementation of risk 



















Tble 6.9:  Sⅈ
+, Sⅈ
− and 𝑅Cⅈ
+ values and ranking of all alternatives 
 
 
Step 7: Ranking the preference alternatives  
Based on the results shown in table 6.9, it is obvious that the value of 𝑅Cⅈ
+for the A21, 
A3, A5, A19, A6, A9, A4, A20, A10, and A1, are ranked according to their overall 
priorities by experts as the most optimal measures for safety performance 
improvement of pilotage operations and best solutions for mitigating the human 
related risk factors contributing to pilotage accidents.  





6.5.2.1. Result and discussion 
The final results shown in table 6.9 indicate that A21 “compliance with the principles 
and the requirements of IMO resolution A960”  with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.9844, A3 
“providing an adequate and a high standard of theoretical and practical training 
courses with regular renewal training including; ship handling, bridge simulator, 
BRM, ECDIS, and NAEST training courses to improve knowledge and competence” 
with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.7657, A5 “improving the pilotage operators’ English language 
skills” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.7644, A19 “maintaining continuous watch keeping 
(surrounding area, tug’s and piloted ship’s performance and progressing should be 
monitored effectively and continuously)” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.6806, A6 “Ship’s staff, 
pilot, and assisting parties should maintain effective communication, cooperation, 
effective co-ordination, and  an effective exchange of information” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value 
of 0.5388, A9 “ Close working relationship on the bridge of a ship between pilot and 
ship’s captain should be created” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.5185, A4 “using common 
communication language on board” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.4167 and A20 “Provide 
sufficient and the required number of powerful tugboats which are necessary for all 
kind of ships manoeuvres” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.3601, A10  “Provide an adequate 
number of qualified, experienced, and well trained ship’s crew members, pilots and 
tugs operators working on shift (adherence to MLC rest hour maritime regulations)” 
with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.3479, A1  Pilots should have an appropriate experience as a ship 
master before becoming a pilot 𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.3465, A8  “Compliance with resolution 
A.893 (21) on Guidelines for voyage planning with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.3439, and A11 
“Tasks and responsibilities should be understood and distributed properly among the 
bridge team members” with  𝑅Cⅈ
+ value of 0.3350, have the highest relative closeness 
indices and should therefore be recommended as the top risk mitigation measures for 
the maritime pilotage operations to be implemented. 
Resolution A.960 (23), recommendations on training and certification and on 
operational procedures for maritime pilots other than deep sea-pilots have been 
introduced by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2003 in order to 
provide high standards of pilotage services. IMO resolution A960 (23), is the main 
reference guide available for the management of maritime pilotage safety. Its 
recommendations represent the essential demands to be considered in establishing 
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pilotage operations’ safety. It is aimed at ensuring pilotage safety performance at sea, 
preventing human injury or loss of life, and avoiding damage to the maritime 
environment and property (IMO, 2003). It encourages all port competent pilotage 
authorities to embrace and implement its principles and requirements. Therefore, to 
ensure safe pilotage operations and manage pilotage related risk, the principles and 
requirements of the IMO’s resolution A960 are considered as one of the most effective 
ways to improve the safety performance of pilotage operations and should be 
embraced and implemented by all pilotage performers. 
6.5.2.2 Model robustness evaluation process/ Sensitivity analysis   
In this study, evaluating the robustness of the model results delivered in the proposed 
model is conducted through sensitivity analysis. A sensitivity analysis is a method for 
verifying the robustness of the model employed and testing the degree of sensitivity 
of a model's variables and deemed by some as necessary for model building in 
diagnostic or prognostic setting (Saltelli, 2002). In MCDM methods, sensitivity 
analysis is a commonly suggested method to validate the feasibility and robustness of 
MCDM methods (Satty and Ergu, 2015).  
A sensitivity analysis is proposed to investigate the influence of different criteria 
weights on selection of risk mitigation measures.  It generates different scenarios that 
may change the ranking of alternatives. If the ranking order is changed by increasing 
or decreasing the importance of the criteria (the identified 11 risk factors), the results 
are expressed to be sensible, otherwise it is robust. In this research, sensitivity analysis 
is implemented to investigate the effect of different criteria weights on the selection 
of risk mitigation measures, to see how sensitively the alternatives change with the 
importance of the criteria (human risk factors). More specifically, each risk’s weights 
value has been exchanged with another risk’s weights.  
The weight matched with one criterion is increased separately by 10, and 20% and for 
each condition, the relative closeness to the ideal solution 𝑅Cⅈ
+was computed. The 
sensitivity of the twenty-one RMMs has been analysed when the most important 
criterion “risk factors” is increased separately by 10, 20% sequentially. It is noted that 
a slight increase in the value of distance separation measure for the PIS, Sⅈ
+for an 




for a the most of  RMMs. The results of sensitivity analysis are presented in the 











       
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 Figure 6-4: Sensitivity analysis: computation of the relative closeness to the ideal solution         
                  
 
6.5.2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the last step in the pilotage risk/safety management process, 
i.e. risk mitigation measures identification and evaluation. Selecting the optimal risk 
mitigation measures is considered to be an important step in mitigating maritime 
pilotage related risks. In this research, instead of identifying the relevant mitigation 
measures based on the literature review, the current implemented measures were 
identified through the existing regulation, rules, and recommendations adopted by the 
IMO and other organizations and via experts’ perspectives. And then a risk mitigation 













A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A20 A21
Chart Title
Original 10% incr 20% Incr
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Mitigation of human related risk factor and determining an appropriate selection of 
RMMs in pilotage operations by taking subjective judgments of decision makers into 
consideration, is a complex subject involving vagueness and uncertainty in the 
decision-making process. Therefore, a novel integrated AHP and TOPSIS model is 
proposed to select the optimal mitigation measures in relation to the most significant 
risk factors in this chapter. An AHP method is used to determine the weight of each 
HCF derived from a previous chapter. Then a TOPSIS method is employed to 
determine the ranking of the RMMs. 
 The mechanism of the TOPSIS method was to analyse five experts’ subjective 
judgments. It is an appropriate instrument to help MCDM under uncertain 
environment where the available data is subjective and vague. Moreover, these 
measures consider all potential risks and the effectiveness of individual measures in 
mitigating these risks. It provides a practical decision support tool for taking explicit 
account of multiple types of risk in assisting decision-making and compares as well as 
ranks alternative measures in an indicator basis individually. By using the method 
proposed and presented in this chapter, decision makers can select the ideal solutions 
or alternatives (i.e. mitigation measures).  
The measures A21, A3, A5, A19, A6, A9, A4, A20, A10, A1, A8, and A11 were 
selected according to their overall priorities by experts as the best solutions for 
mitigating the human-related risk factors contributing to pilotage accidents, and the 
most optimal measures for performance improvement of pilotage operations and 
should, therefore, be recommended as the top measures to implement, for improving 
pilotage operations’ safety performance and mitigating the human-related risk factors 
contributing to pilotage accidents. 
The proposed model provides a reliable means of determining an appropriate selection 
of RMMs. Additionally, the innovative proposed model has been demonstrated by a 
case study and partially validated using a sensitivity analysis. The significance of the 
proposed model is that it could assist decision makers to determine an ideal RMMs in 
terms of overcoming the root cause of an incident/accident effectively. As a result, 
preventive measures can be taken to reduce human errors within pilotage 
environments, efficiently preventing or at least mitigating the risk of a similar 
incident/accident occurring in the future.  
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The use of TOPSIS in this Chapter will enable the incorporation of additional criteria 
such as costs of the alternatives into the selection decision in future. The contributions 
made on this thesis and the areas of future work will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSIONS   
7.1 SUMMARY 
In the previous chapters, the various technical models involved in the development of 
the human error quantification in pilotage operations have been outlined in detail. As 
a whole, the research has provided a comprehensive a new conceptual decision making 
framework in order to provide an effective risk factors assessment tool, and offer a 
diagnostic instrument to reduce the human error, and enhance the maritime pilotage 
safety performance. This concluding chapter briefly summarises overall results and 
the findings of this research, it also introduces the themes for which further efforts are 
required in order to improve the developed subject matter in the research. The chapter 
highlights determined research objectives and research questions, and it is followed 
by a description of the contribution to the established knowledge and its practical 
implications. Finally, this chapter finishes with a discussion of research limitations 
and recommendations for further research. 
7.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In this study to address the gaps, research questions for this study were developed. To 
answer the questions, a multi-methodology approach involving comprehensive 
literature review, questionnaire survey, and semi-structured interviews were adopted. 
Research question 1 was concerned with the developed appropriate frameworks to 
identify and classify the human related risk factors contributing to pilotage accidents, 
research questions 2, and 3 were concerned with a proposed novel conceptual 
framework which presents a mixed methodology (i.e. hybrid approach) that uses 
different decision making approaches for human related risk assessment, whereas 
research question 4 focused on risk mitigation. The proposed models are validated 
using case studies in some of the major ports and pilotage areas of the UK and 
Mediterranean from different marine experts’ perspectives. A summary of the research 
outputs specific to each question are demonstrated as follows:   
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i) The first objective of this study was to develop a comprehensive human factor 
related risk identification and classification model within the context of the maritime 
pilotage operations.  As has been mentioned previously, the procedure for risk factors 
identification is one of the most significant steps in the pilotage safety/risk 
management process. Risk identification enables decision-makers to classify, 
evaluate, and mitigate the contributory causal factors that can lead to maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. As a result, in this research by using the human 
factor identification process, it was possible to evaluate and mitigate threats that 
influence maritime pilotage operations’ safety performance.  
This research would not be limited only to identifying the root causes of an 
incident/accident that are already known. The investigation provided a complete 
solution for the potential causes which may  lead to accidents in the future but have 
not happened yet, taking into consideration the ones which have previously occurred. 
To ensure that all the risk factors are identified, human related risk factors 
identification was carried out by using more than one method.  In this thesis, the author 
identifies a list of risk factors initially through a literature review. In addition, to 
determine the existing root causes that play a central role in the causal chain of 
maritime pilotage accidents, an analysis of a considerable number of worldwide 
marine accident investigation reports relating to vessels under pilotage operations 
were reviewed and examined.  
 Moreover, an empirical study has been conducted, interviews, and survey 
questionnaires with professional marine experts were carried out through which it was 
be possible to validate the existing risk factors and explore the other potential risk 
factors which may influence operators’ performance and contribute to pilotage 
accidents in the future. The human causal factors (HCFs) are identified and classified 
into five group main factors and each one is divided into sub-factors. An initial 
structural hierarchy risk taxonomic diagram is developed, and then validated by 
experienced experts from the maritime sector.  
ii) In this research a novel technique for HCFs evaluation was introduced. The 
proposed methodology fills the gaps and overcomes the shortcomings of the previous 
traditional assessment methods, which disregard the rank and evaluate the relative 
weight and the causal relationships among the human-related risk factors. As a result, 
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this research adopts a mixed methodology (i.e. hybrid approach) MCDM methods 
AHP and DEMATEL as a data analysis technique. Applying a mixed approach that 
uses different techniques in the same study can offset weaknesses in each. 
 In this research Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied to determine the 
relative weights and rank the importance of the human factors that affect pilotage 
operation safety, while the Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory 
(DEMATEL) method is applied to identify whether there are relationships among 
these factors. By using the hybrid approach of two methodologies AHP and 
DEMATEL methods, it was possible to determine the most significant human factors 
that affect pilotage operation safety, and identify the relationships among these factors 
and determine which factors have influence on the other factors to be managed and 
controlled. 
The empirical results indicate that the hybrid approaches, attempting to use 
quantitative modelling for dealing with the uncertain working environments and 
dependency and interdependency problems for facilitating the quantification analysis 
of human factors in maritime pilotage operations can be successfully fulfilled. The 
hybrid methodology has proven to be a sound approach in dealing with MCDM 
problems under uncertainty which the previous studies have done little with on the 
measurement of maritime pilotage operations human related risk factors.  
iii) In this thesis, after the pilotage related risks factors were identified and assessed in 
order to manage and control these risks factors, a generic framework for determining 
and evaluating the implemented risk mitigation measures is developed. The 
implemented risk mitigation measures (RMMs) are identified by employing multiple 
sources for data collection in order to extract the most appropriate risk mitigation 
measures that can reflect the current situation for further evaluation, including a 
careful literature review, rules and regulations adopted by maritime authorities.  
In addition, in order to explore other mitigation measures that have not been mentioned 
in the literature and other documentation, questionnaire surveys were conducted with 
experienced marine experts from the UK and Mideterainean maritime domain. Finally, 
twenty-one risk mitigation measures (RMMs) were identified. Afterwards, in order to 
obtain feasible alternatives (RMMs/RCOs), the identified risk mitigation measures are 
prioritized and selected over the previous ranked risk factors using an appropriate 
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MCDM tool a TOPSIS method. The proposed model has been demonstrated through 
a case study and validated using a sensitivity analysis. The analysis results indicate 
that measures, A21, A3, A5, A19, A6, A9, A4, A20, A10, A1, A8, and A11 have the 
highest ranking among the alternative mitigation measures and should, therefore, be 
recommended. They are considered as the top risk mitigation measures that can ensure 
optimal operations of the pilotage operations and must be implemented. 
7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD 
According to the literature review, there are a small number of studies specifically 
focused on the human factor risk assessment, especially in pilotage operations. 
Nevertheless, the findings of the literature review reveal that the current human factor 
related risk analysis models are not capable of meeting challenges faced by maritime 
stakeholders.  Findings from the literature have revealed that there are few human-
related risk factors measurement frameworks in the pilotage and port industry. There 
is a distinct need for a new human-related risk factors measurement tool not only to meet the 
need of port stakeholders but also to develop diagnostic instruments to port and pilotage 
systems capable of supporting decision-making in solving complex pilotage operations 
problems in an uncertain environment. 
Thus, this thesis has developed a comprehensive human-related risk factors 
measurement framework, that provides significant insights into how human-related 
risks in the pilotage operations area can be understood and how organizations and 
stakeholders involved in the maritime industry can effectively manage these risks. 
Specifically, this research is the first study to provide an integrated maritime pilotage 
risk management framework, by using both qualitative and quantitative techniques for 
risk factors identification, assessment, and mitigation in the maritime pilotage 
operations area.   
The contribution mentioned above is made by identifying, assessing, and controlling 
the most significant HCFs in maritime pilotage operations. The framework provides 
an integrated approach to increase the safety and reliability of maritime pilotage 
operations. Also, given the dynamic nature of the complex system of pilotage 
operation, it provides an efficient safety prediction tool that can ease all the processes 
in the methods and techniques used with the risk management framework. 
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The proposed innovative framework provides an effective pilotage risk/safety 
assessment tool and offers a diagnostic instrument to help implement effective risk 
reduction strategies, in order to prevent or at least mitigate a human error 
incident/accident from occurring. The research has thus established essential findings 
and suggestions on risk management that will be valuable to the decision-making 
process in the offshore, port, and marine industry. The research has added to the 
frontier of knowledge in a way that has not been done before, by concentrating on the 
maritime pilotage operations to overcome the present limited nature of similar 
research in the maritime industry.  
 The novelty of the proposed framework lies in the fact that it incorporates the AHP, 
DEMATEL model, and TOPSIS as an integrated methodology, enabling the specific 
decision maker’s preferences to be considered in making the strategic decision on a 
human factor related risk and safety basis, linked to pilotage operations. They have 
been developed for academic implications to deal with various problems and issues in 
an uncertain port and pilotage environment. Additionally, this research makes 
practical contributions by conducting empirical studies in important ports and pilotage 
operation areas in both the UK and the Mediterranean, in order to support a resource-
effective and time-efficient decision-making tool for managers. 
Academic implications 
The frameworks use several decision making tools and procedures.  The methods and 
techniques are demonstrated as follows: 
Firstly, a new database of maritime related human factors has been identified. The 
research was not limited to only identifying the root causes of an incident/accident that 
are already known. The investigation provided a complete solution for the potential 
causes which may lead to accidents in the future but have not happened yet, taking 
into consideration the ones which have previously occurred. Therefore, decision-
makers can evaluate the current status of their risk management efforts with the risk 
mitigation measures and practices suggested in this research. The last establishes a 
new database on human causal factors that contribute to maritime pilotage accidents, 
which can assist in implementing effective risk reduction strategies to mitigate 
operator errors during pilotage operations, and can also assist in evaluating and 
determining appropriate preventive measures against future accidents 
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Secondly, the wider scope of pilotage operations human related risks has been 
assessed. The risk assessment step provides a useful tool by developing advanced risk 
assessment based models under high uncertainties for pilotage operations, using both 
quantitative and qualitative data. The research has introduced a new hybrid approach 
to evaluate human related risk factors, using a combined AHP and DEMATEL 
approach, currently lacking in the maritime pilotage operations field. This last also 
assists in overcoming the existing delusion of assuming that the HCFs are all of equal 
importance and independent of each other, which in fact is not the case. The two 
methods with different disciplines represent a new measurement method to address 
the challenges in pilotage risk factor measurement. Also, the framework for modelling 
HCFs dependent of weights and interdependency among factors is a novelty in 
maritime pilotage operations. 
The methodologies above facilitate the decision-making process by identifying the 
importance of the human factors influencing the safety of maritime pilotage 
operations, and provide a comprehensive illustration of relationships among the 
factors and also offer an insightful understanding of the mutual influence among the 
risk factors to be managed. Additionally, the proposed model also facilitates dealing 
with the limitation of the availability of data in the maritime domain, and the 
uncertainty and complexity that exist in the quantitative analysis of human factors.   
The developed hybrid approach could help reduce the existing gap left in human factor 
research studies, in terms of evaluating the relative importance of pilotage human 
related risk factors and determining the causal relationships among them. Furthermore, 
the proposed model can be tailored to recognise and incorporate the relationships and 
interdependencies among human factor variables, involved in other transportation 
systems and industrial fields. 
Thirdly, this research has proposed an innovative TOPSIS model to select an 
appropriate RMMs. The significance of applying TOPSIS method in this research is 
that the approach has carried out an empirical work that has not been done before, and 
during the selecting of the risk mitigations measures (RMMs), the proposed approach 




Fourthly, the proposed framework provides a platform to facilitate a generic risk-based 
method. Furthermore, the methodology is an objective way to handle subjective 
information in establishing a risk analysis to guide the development of risk control 
measures.  
Finally, similar framework can be utilised for transportation systems and other 
industrial fields, by modifying causal diagram and classification schemes of factors to 
suit the industry concerned, and enhance human error and human reliability data in the 
related fields. 
Practical implications 
The application of the frameworks proposed in this study is particular useful in dealing 
with the following issues. 
The empirical investigations in the UK and the Mediterranean ports herein are 
conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed frameworks. The results 
obtained provide both ships’ operators and port authorities with valuable insights, as 
this framework allows them to: 
1. Recognise the human related risks affecting the safety of port and maritime 
pilotage operations.  
2. Better understand the conditions and status of their operators' performance 
3. Improve competitiveness and customers’ satisfaction by improving the 
operators’ skills and increase the safety and reliability of maritime pilotage 
operations performance. 
4. Find optimal strategies and choose optimal risk mitigation measures, which is 
deemed to be an important and necessary step in the improvement of pilotage 
operations safety performance and maritime accidents mitigation. 
5. The DEMATEL outputs help decision makers to understand how human 
factors affect each other and therefore, how they affect the operator’s ability to 
achieve their tasks effectively. A better understanding of the relationships 
among the human factor variables involved in causing an incident/accident can 
facilitate a reduction in human error. Thus, utilization of AHP and DEMATEL 
methods can help the stakeholders and companies’ management in several 
areas; specifically to know on which factor they need to concentrate the most, 
and also what knowledge/skills have to be improved by the operators. 
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6. This study can help relevant stakeholders, such as port authorities and shipping 
companies, in the development of better policies, safety guidelines, and risk 
control measures to improve performance of operators and improve the safety 
of maritime pilotage operations.  
7. The implemented framework provides a logical and organised procedure to 
guide industrial risk management professionals such as port stakeholders, 
pilotage risk managers, and etcetera, through a series of well-defined 
structured phases and steps necessary to make knowledgeable, reliable, and 
efficient changes to the pilotage operations processes in ports and the marine 
industry. 
 
7.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Developing a risk management framework with uncertainty treatment based decision 
making analysis methodology to identify, assess, and mitigate the human related risk 
factors affecting the pilotage operations has achieved the aim of this research. 
Although the research attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis using risk/safety 
management based methodologies including many approaches and techniques to 
facilitate the quantitative and qualitative data in maritime pilotage operations, this 
study has several limitations due to scope and time constraints.  In this regard, the 
aspects that were not covered in detail are part of the suggestions that would be 
desirable for further investigations in future work as follows.   
In this study, the secondary data have been retrieved mainly from little research 
literature and accident investigation reports due to the limited research focused on 
pilotage operation risk management to date. Additionally, the confidential nature of 
the ports and maritime industry when conducting the empirical studies highlights the 
difficulty of gathering primary and secondary data.  
The size of the sample was limited due to the time constraints, and the size of the 
questionnaire survey, which mostly required a pair-wise comparison between each 
factor.  In addition, sample selection is limited to specific professional roles. Most 
participants involved in this research either have abundant knowledge in academia or 
rich practical experience in the field or hold a position at or above the manager level 
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in practitioner fields. Therefore, a further limitation of the research is reflected in the 
size of the sample.   
Furthermore, another factor that needs to be considered is the length of the interview. 
In this study, the interview questions were designed to limit interviews to one hour or 
less (interviewing time), but some participants might have thought that there were too 
many questions and these feelings would have negatively affected their attitudes 
toward the questions.  Moreover, in this study, the empirical investigations were 
conducted only in some major ports in the UK and Mediterranean due to the cost and 
time constraints 
In addition, the proposed integrated model is highly dependent on the respondents’ 
knowledge, experience, and attitude that might lead to the subjective bias. For 
instance, respondents and their attitudes or perceptions might be affected by the 
surrounding environment in which they participated in the survey. The unexpected 
factors, such as personal issues, or other external factors might have impacts on their 
attitudes.  
7.5 RECOMMENDATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Based on the results of this study, some future research directions and areas that can 
be further developed are as follows:  
i). Further studies involving a wider selection of experts from different pilotage 
regions/areas would strengthen the validity of finding. For HCFs weights assignment, 
this study used the judgement of fewer than 10 experts. The weights of HCFs can be 
changed when more experts take part in the judgement, which may lead to a more 
accurate result. In addition, when using more experts from different stakeholders, the 
important difference between different stakeholder groups can be analysed. Hence, a 
future study should gather multiple responses from each stakeholder. Furthermore, 
further empirical study in different regions/areas can be carried out to identify the best 
practices/solutions of the pilotage safety performers.  
ii). Although the most important human causal factors contributing to pilotage 
accidents are determined in this study, more research studies can be carried out to 
develop the present classification schemes, by including organisational factors, policy 
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implications, and natural and political issues that may affect the pilotage operations 
safety.  
iii). As any strategic implementation requires substantial investments, the decision to 
adopt appropriate risk management mitigation measures requires a trade-off between 
the benefits and costs involved. More work can be carried out to develop the present 
TOPSIS method and further research can cover the cost and benefit analysis to support 
significant strategic decisions on pilotage performance safety 
v). This study used the DEMATEL model to evaluate the causal relationships among 
the human causal factors contributing to pilotage accidents, further study to develop 
the proposed approach using a DEMATEL model can be made by incorporating an 
analytic network process (ANP) technique. An ANP can be used to determine 
interdependent weights of the human causal factors that play important roles in 
causing an incident/accident. 
vi). Many types of risk factors and alternatives existing in the pilotage operations, are 
not considered as they are less significant; nonetheless, they should be of concern. 
Therefore, it would be more comprehensive to consider all kinds of risks and 
mitigation measures in the structural model so that more complete results could be 
obtained.   
vii).The development of shipping management resulted in an increased number of 
maritime based training and research simulators. Simulator based studies can be 
conducted to perform qualitative and quantitative analyses of human-related risk 
factors. The proposed framework can be designed as computer software and used in 
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Appendix I: QUESTIONNAIR PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 




Title of Project: The impact of human factors on safety of pilotage operations of 
pilotage operations 




I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily.  
 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any   
time, without giving a reason and that this will not affect my legal rights.    
 I understand that any personal information collected during the study will be 
anonymised and remain confidential. 
 I agree to take part in the above interview study.  
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
Name of Researcher                Date   Signature 
                                                                                               
 
School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime 
Operations 
 Liverpool John Moores University  
Byrom Street 
 L3 3AF UK 
Questionnaire participant consent form 
 
 
School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime 
Operations 
 Liverp ol John Moores University  
Byrom Street 
 L3 3AF UK 




Appendix II.1: The Questionnaire used for (HCFs) identification in Chapter 4 
                                        
                                                                       Liverpool John Moores University  
                                                                        School of Engineering, Technology and            
                                                                                          Maritime Operations 
                                                                                             Byrom Street 
                                                                                                 L3 3AF UK 
 
 To: Whom it may concern 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to the impact of human factors on maritime pilotage operations. I will be 
most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time and take part in this study. 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and will only take a few minutes.  All 
the information that you provide in the course of your interview, completion of 
questionnaires or in general discussion will be greatly benefit and contribute to achieve 
the aim of this project. The information gathered in this survey will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
The questionnaire is anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or 
your organization. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without 
any responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate 
your willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or 
have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact me either by email or 
by phone at the addresses listed below. 
Yours faithfully, 
H. Oraith, 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations  
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Tel: + (44)7480120401 
Email: H.M.Oraith@2014.ljmu.ac.uk   
Or: hemz1966@hotmail.com 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Room 121, James Parsons Building 
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
 
Section A: Introduction  
Identification of the relevant pilotage operations related risk factors is the vital step 
for employing efficient risk management in the maritime industry. The objective of 
this study is to identify the human factors contributing to pilotage accidents.  
The analysis of the past marine accident investigation reports showed that the main 
cause of the occurred accidents during pilotage operations were the human factor.  For 
this reason, in this part of questionnaire, questions were designed to verify the extent 
to which of the aforementioned factors contribute to maritime accidents. 
 
Section B: Respondent Profile 
Q1. What is your job title? Please indicate your rank? 
Q2. For how many years have you worked in maritime industry?  
Q3. Please can you outline a bit of your background?        
 
Section: C Identification of human factors influencing the safety of pilotage 
operations.  
Based on the findings of the previous studies, the following human factors shown in 
the below table (table 1) are considered contributory factors leading to pilotage 








Table.1 contributory human factors to maritime pilotage accidents 
 
       Human factors affecting safety performance of pilotage operations 
 
1. Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel (RF1) 
2. Stress (RF2)       
3. Failure to exchange the information (RF3) 
4. Lack of situation awareness  (RF4) 
5. Distraction (RF5) 
6. Lack of effective communication and language barriers (RF6) 
7. Lack of bridge navigation equipment knowledge (RF7) 
8. Mental and physical work load (RF8) 
9. Pilot boarding and disembarking too close to breakwater  (RF9) 
10. Piloting ships in poor weather condition or navigating vessels outside published 
guidelines or limits draft (RF10) 
11. Lack of team work (RF11) 
12. Fatigue (RF12) 
 
EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLE  
Example 1. How strongly do you agree with the statement that the fatigue is a 
significant factor that contributing to the occurrence of maritime accidents during 
pilotage operations?  
Explanation of the above example 




In this part of questionnaire, participants will be asked to answer the statement using 
the following 5 point Likert scale: strongly disagree; disagree; neither agree nor 
disagree; agree; and strongly agree. 
Firstly before to proceed with the evaluating, an expert has to understand the ratio 
scale measurement used in this study. Table 2 below describe the numerical 
assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each rating variable. The grades 
illustrated in Table 2 show the effect or importance value of the risk factors. It is used 
for evaluating and rating of the importance of the risk factors shown in table1. An 
expert is required to look at the measures. Subsequently fill the empty spaces by 
selecting the appropriate grades from Table 2 
         Table 2: Five point Likert scale 
 
An expert is required to give a possible judgment to question based on his/her expertise 
and experience in the shipping industry.  For instance: if the expert believe that the 
fatigue is significant factor and contribute to the occurrence of maritime accidents 
during pilotage operations and strongly agree with this statement then he will tick (/) 
on the given table (see table 3). 
         Table 3. Example for selecting the factors 
 
Questionnaire 
In this part of questionnaire as shown in the below table, questions were designed to 
verify the extent to which of the aforementioned twelve factors contribute to maritime 




disagree         
disagree         neither agree 
nor disagree          
agree           Strongly agree          
score 1 2 3 4 5 
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Statements were made and participants are required to answer each statement using 
the 5 point Likert scale as illustrated in the example table (table 3): strongly disagree; 
disagree; neither agree nor disagree; agree; and strongly agree.  
An expert is required to give a possible judgement to all questions based on his/her 
expertise and experience in pilotage operation 
Q1:  Please refer table 1 before answering the questionnaire. For your opinion as an 
expert, how strongly do you agree with the statements shown in the below table? 
Please kindly give your comments and select the appropriate grade from Table 2.  
  Table 4. Potential risk factors affecting safety performance of pilotage operations 
 
 
Q2. Have you had any issues or incidents in the past affected the safety of the ship 
piloting. 
Q3. From your experience do you know any additional causal factors that might affect 
pilotage operations performance? 
THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY 
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Appendix II.2 List of Semi-structured Interview Questions for the purpose of 
Chapter four                                          
 
The interviewer will ask questions where necessary to help to understand. 
If the interviewer thinks something is particularly important he will ask questions for 
more information.  
Interviewer probes as required. 
Q. What is your job title? Please indicate your rank? 
Q. For how many years have you worked in maritime industry?  
Q. Please can you outline a bit of your background?        
Q. How far do you agree with statements listed in the questionnaire?  
Q. What are your views on human element factors that impact on safety during 
pilotage operations? Is there anything else you would like to add about human element 
factors? 
Q. What kind of mistakes could be made by ship crew members or pilots, and tugs 
assistance during pilotage and ship berthing? 
Q.  Have you had any issues or incidents in the past affected the safety performance 
of the pilotage operations?  
Q. How do you think if someone with less experience (e.g. ship’s crew members, 
pilots, and tugs’ operators? Can you think of any problems that would have happened 
or they might have encountered? 
Q. In your point of view do you think that the good skills in English language is helpful 
during pilotage operations to avoid accidents? 
Q. In your point of view do you think that the new technology is helpful during 
pilotage operations to avoid collisions and grounding? Explain why? 
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Q. Do you think that poor knowledge in the use of navigational aids such as AIS, 
ARPA, and ECDIS effect pilotage operation?  Explain why?   
Q. Do you think IMO regulations are sufficient and has successfully addressed the 
human element and pilotage issues?  
Q. In your opinion what are the reasons that could lead pilots and ships' staff making 
errors in spite of existing the rules and regulations adopted by IMO? 
  
Appendix II.3: Questionnaire used for (HCFs) classification in Chapter 4 
Section A: Introduction 
Based on the research, the purpose categorizing the human factor related risks in 
pilotage operations into five main categories: 1) Bridge team management failure (F1); 
2) Technical skills shortcoming (F2); 3）Instructions and orders failure (F3); 4) Rules 
and regulations noncompliance (F4), and 5) The Individual- task interaction factors 
(F5), and each one is divided into sub-factors. That is, the most contributory causal 
human factors of maritime pilotage accidents. The sub-factors are sub criteria which 
are, F1: (F11, F12, F13, F14 and F15), F2: (F21, F22, F23, and F24), F3: (F31, F32, 
F33, and F34), F4: (F41, F42, F43, and F44), and F5: (F51, F52, F53, and F54). (See 









The list of causal factors contributing to maritime accidents in pilotage operations 
Main factors Sub-factors 
 
 
 Non-Technical skills (Bridge team 
management failure) (F1) 
 
 
Lack of team work (Poor bridge team-pilot integration, cooperation, and 
coordination,)  (F11) 
 
lack of effective communication and language problems (F12) 
Failure to exchange the information between pilot and ship’s master prior to 
pilotage operation (F13) 
 
Lack of situation  awareness (F14)  
The master’s and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the  tugboats drivers, mooring 
boats, and shore mooring personnel performance and vessel’s progress (F15) 
 
Technical skills shortcoming(F2) 
 
 
Lack of ship handling skills due to  lack of improper training and experience, 
(F21) 
Lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational equipment knowledge (F22) 
Lack of skills of the crewmember on ship board, tugs, and shore mooring 
personnel (F23) 
Improper/ inadequate use of tugs (F24) 
 
Instructions and orders failure (F3) 
 
Failure of pilot to give precise instructions (F31) 
Failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot directions (F32). 
Failure of  tug’s masters   to carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely with respect 
to position and towing power (F33) 
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Orders regarding anchoring,  steering, and engine requests, are not following out 
by ship’s crewmembers correctly(F34) 
Rules and regulations noncompliance 
(F4) 
Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel (F41).   
Failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in COLREG (F42)  
Piloting ships in bad weather condition or navigating vessels outside published 
guidelines or limits draft due to subject to commercial pressure (F43) 
Poor boarding arrangements (e.g., pilot boarding and disembarking too close to 
breakwater  (F44) 
 
Individual- task interaction factors (F5) 
 
Fatigue (F51)  
Mental and physical work load (F52) 
Distraction and simultaneous tasks during the time of berthing operations  (F53) 
Stress (F54) 
 
Section B: Questionnaire 
The following questions are related to modifying and further validating the identified 
risk factors in the pilotage operations. The main question is to classify the factors 
which can represent their associated main factors (categories) and sub factors and the 
questions are:   Do you think the main group factors (categories) and their sub-factors 
are well classified?”, and if necessary, modification, removal, division and 








1. Risk element category (F1): Bridge team management failure (Lack of non-
Technical skills) 
                               Identified Risk Factors Yes No Any comments 
 Lack of team work (F11)    
lack of effective communication and Language problems (12)    
 Failure to exchange the  information between pilot and ship’s 
master (F13) 
   
 Lack of situation awareness (F14)    
The master’s and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the tugboats 
drivers, mooring boats and shore mooring personnel 
performance and vessel’s progress (F15) 
   
Any other elements should be considered?  
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks associated with Lack 
of non-technical skills (Bridge team management failure) (F1) are categorized into 
“Lack of team work”, “Language problems and lack of effective communication”, 
“Failure to exchange the information between pilot and ship’s master”, “Lack of 
situation awareness”, and “The master’s and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the 
tugboats drivers, mooring boats, and shore mooring personnel performance and 








2. Risk element category (F2): Technical skills shortcoming  
                                      Sub-factors Yes No Any comments 
 Lack of ship handling skills due to  lack of experience, 
improper training, and attitude (F21) 
   
Lack of familiarity with the electronic navigational equipment 
knowledge (F22) 
   
 Lack of skills of the crewmember on ship board, tugs, and 
shore mooring personnel (F23) 
   
 Improper/ inadequate use of tugs (F24)    
Any other elements should be considered?  
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks associated with 
Technical skills shortcoming (F2) are categorized into “Lack of ship handling skills 
due to lack of experience, improper training, and attitude”, “Lack of familiarity with 
the electronic navigational equipment knowledge”, “Lack of skills of the crewmember 
on ship board, tugs, and shore mooring personnel”, and “Improper/ inadequate use of 











3. Risk element category (F3): Instructions and orders failure  
Sub-factors Yes No Any comments 
Failure of pilot to give precise instructions (F31)    
Failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot directions 
(F32). 
   
Failure of  tug’s masters   to carry out the pilot’s instructions 
precisely with respect to position and towing power (F33) 
   
Orders regarding anchoring,  steering, and engine requests, are not 
following out by ship’s crewmembers correctly (F34) 
   
Any other elements should be considered?  
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks associated with 
Instructions and orders failure (F3) are categorized into “Failure of pilot to give precise 
instructions, Failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot directions”, 
“Failure of tug’s masters   to carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely with respect to 
position and towing power”, “Orders regarding anchoring, steering, and engine 
requests, are not following out by ship’s crewmembers correctly”. Do you think this 









4. Risk element category (F4): Rules and regulations noncompliance  
                                           Sub-factors Yes No Any comments 
Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan prior to 
piloting vessel (F41).   
   
Failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in COLREG 
(F42)  
   
Piloting ships in bad weather condition or navigating vessels 
outside published guidelines or limits draft due to subject to 
commercial pressure (F43) 
   
Poor boarding arrangements (e.g., pilot boarding and 
disembarking too close to breakwater  (F44) 
   
Any other elements should be considered?  
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks associated with Rules 
and regulations noncompliance (F4) are categorized into “Failure to establish a proper 
manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel”, “Failure to proceed with safe speed as 
stipulated in COLREG”, “Piloting ships in bad weather condition or navigating vessels 
outside published guidelines or limits draft due to subject to commercial pressure”, 
and “Poor boarding arrangements (e.g., pilot boarding and disembarking too close to 








5. Risk element category (F5): Individual- task interaction factors 
Sub-factors Yes No Any comments 
Fatigue (F51)     
Mental and physical work load (F52)    
Distraction and simultaneous tasks during the time of 
berthing operations  (F53) 
   
Stress (F54)    
Any other elements should be considered?  
 
Considering the above structure, elements contributing to risks associated with 
Individual- task interaction factors (F5) are categorized into “Fatigue”, “Mental and 
physical work load”, “Distraction and simultaneous tasks during the time of berthing 













Appendix III-1: The Questionnaire used for AHP Technique in Chapter 5   
                                        
                                                                       Liverpool John Moores University  
                                                                        School of Engineering, Technology and            
                                                                                          Maritime Operations 
                                                                                             Byrom Street 
                                                                                                 L3 3AF UK 
                    
To: Whom it may concern 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to the impact of human factors on maritime pilotage operations. I will be 
most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time and take part in this study. 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and will only take a few minutes.  All 
the information that you provide in the course of your interview, completion of 
questionnaires or in general discussion will be greatly benefit and contribute to achieve 
the aim of this project. The information gathered in this survey will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
The questionnaire is anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or 
your organization. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without 
any responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate 
your willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or 
have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact me either by email or 
by phone at the addresses listed below. 
Yours faithfully, 
H. Oraith, 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations  
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Tel: + (44)7480120401 
Email: H.M.Oraith@2014.ljmu.ac.uk   
Or: hemz1966@hotmail.com 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Room 121, James Parsons Building 
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
 
Introduction                                  
Based on literature review and accident investigation reports, taxonomy including the 
factors influencing marine pilotage operations safety and causing accidents as shown 
in table1. 1, are illustrated. The goal of this study is to select the most important factor 
that contributing to the occurrence of maritime accidents during pilotage operations. 
These factors are considered to affecting the safety of the pilotage operations.  
Therefore, the factors and sub-factors listed in Table1.1 are the parameters that need 
to be evaluated by using a “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique. The pairwise 
comparison between the factors will be conducted using the Analytical Hierarchy 










Table 1. 1: The hierarchy for the contributory causal factors of pilotage accidents 
(HCFs) 
Factors Sub-factors  
1 F1 






F11 Lack of team work (F11) 1 
F12 Lack of effective communication and language barriers 2 
F13 Failure to exchange the information 3 
F14 Lack of situation awareness 4 
F15 
The master’s and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the  
tugboats drivers, mooring boats, and shore mooring 






Lack of ship handling skills due to improper training and 
lack of experience. 
6 
F22 




Lack of skills of the crewmember onboard ship, tugs, and 
shore mooring personnel. 
8 
F24 Improper/ inadequate use of tugs. 9 
3 F3 
Instructions and  
orders failure 
F31 Failure of pilot to give precise instructions. 10 
F32 










Orders regarding anchoring, steering, and engine 




Rules and regulations 
noncompliance 
   F41 








Piloting ships in bad weather condition or navigating 
vessels outside published guidelines or draft limits. 
16 
F44 
Poor boarding arrangements (e.g., pilot boarding and 





F51 Fatigue. 18 
F52 Mental and physical workload. 29 
F53 Distraction during the time of berthing operations 20 
F54 Stress 21 
 
 The procedures and guidelines for answering this set of questionnaires are 
explained as follows: 
1. Pair-wise comparison 
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In this questionnaire there will be two type of pair-wise comparison. 
There will be an example at the beginning of the questionnaire showing how the 
questionnaire must be filled. There will also be a scale of importance at the beginning 
of each questionnaire. 
The first questionnaire is:  Pair-wise comparison between the main five factors (F1, 
F2, F3, F4, and F5).  Then the second questionnaire is:  Pair-wise comparison between 
the sub-factors, which are, F1: (F11, F12, F13, F14 and F15), F2: (F21, F22, F23, and 
F24), F3: (F31, F32, F33, and F34), F4: (F41, F42, F43, and F44), and F5: (F51, F52, 
F53, and F54). 
Before proceeding with the “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique, an expert has to 
understand the ratio scale measurement used in this study. The table 1.2 below 
describe the numerical assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each 
number. It’s used for comparing factors with each other.  Importance is rated from 1 




















An expert is required to give a possible judgment to all questions based on his/her 
expertise and experience in the shipping industry.  
To select the most important factor that contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. The expert will be asked to underline accordingly 
the rate of importance of each factor and sub-factor in the given column. For instance:  
only one number either on the right or the left of the scale for every comparison as 
shown in the example at the beginning of questionnaire survey. 
 
1.1 Example of pair-wise comparison of the main factors.  
Please refer table1.1 before answering the questionnaire, in order to evaluate the 
importance of each factor. For instances to compare between the (bridge team 
management factor), and the factor of (technical skills) you should see to the table 1.2 
before you judge and evaluate the rate of importance.  
Intensity of importance   Definition 
1  Same importance 
2  Slightly more important 
3  Weakly more important 
4  Weakly to moderately more important 
5  Moderately more important 
6  Moderately to strongly more important 
7  Strongly more important 
8  Greatly more important 
9  Absolutely more important 
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The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations.  
 To achieve the above goal, how important is the factor of the bridge team management 
(F1) compared to technical skills shortcoming factor (F2)?  
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number refer to the factors in table1. 1, and to the scale of importance table1. 2, before 
answering the questionnaire 
If you think bridge team management failure factor (F1) is moderately more 
important than technical skills shortcoming factor (F2) in contributing to the 
occurrence of maritime accidents during pilotage operations, then please underline 
as follows:  
Factor  Intensity of relative importance Factor  
Bridge team management (F1) 9 
 
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Technical skills (F2) 
 
If you think technical skills shortcoming factor (F2) is moderately more important 
than bridge team management failure factor (F1) in contributing to the occurrence of 
maritime accidents during pilotage operations, then please underline as follows:  
Factor Intensity of relative importance  Factor 
Bridge team management failure 
(F1) 
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Technical skills 




If you think bridge team management failure factor (F1) and technical skills 
shortcoming factor (F2) are the same important in contributing to the occurrence of 
maritime accidents during pilotage operations, then please underline as follows:  
 
Factor Intensity of relative importance Factor 
Bridge team management failure (F1) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Technical skills 
shortcoming (F2) 
 
1.2 The first part of the questionnaire is:  Pair-wise comparison between the main 
five factors (F1, F2, F3, F4, and F5).   
 1. Bridge team management failure (F1)  
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and table1.2, scale of 
importance before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the factor bridge team management 






Factor Intensity of relative importance  Factor 
(F1) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F2) 
(F2) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F3) 
(F3) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F4) 
(F4) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F5) 
 
 
2. Technical skills shortcoming (F2)  
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table hereunder by underlining the appropriate 
number (See exampl1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the factor of the technical skills 
shortcoming (F2), compared to the other factors? 
Factor Intensity of relative importance Factor 
(F2) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F3) 
(F2) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F4) 





3.  Instructions and orders failure (F3) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table hereunder by underlining the appropriate 
number (See table 1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. To select the most important 
factor that influence the safety of pilotage operations  
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the factor of the Instructions and orders 
failure (F3), compared to the other factors? 
 
Factor Intensity of relative importance Factor 
(F3) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ((F4) 
(F3) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F5) 
 
4.  Rules and regulations noncompliance (F4) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table hereunder by underlining the appropriate 
number (See table 1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and table1.2, scale of 
importance before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations.  
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To achieve the above goal, how important is the factor of the rules and regulations 
noncompliance (F4) compared to the other factor? 
 
Factor Intensity of relative importance  Factor 
(F4) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F5) 
 
1.3 The second part of the questionnaire is:  Pair-wise comparison between the sub-
factors, which are: F1: (F11, F12, F13, F14 and F15), F2: (F21, F22, F23, and F24), 
F3: (F31, F32, F33, and F34), F4: (F41, F42, F43, and F44), and F5: (F51, F52, F53, 
and F54). 
 Group1. Bridge team management failure (Non-technical skills shortcoming) (F1) 
1. Lack of team work (Poor bridge team-pilot integration, cooperation, coordination, 
and close loop) (F11) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See table1.1), and refer to the table1.2, scale of importance before answering 
the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the factor lack of team work (Poor bridge 
team-pilot integration, cooperation, coordination, and close loop) (F11), compared to 
the other factors? 
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Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
(F11) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F12) 
(F11)) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F13) 
(F11) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F14) 
(F11) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F15) 
 
2. Lack of effective communication and Language barriers (F12) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations.  
To achieve the above goal, how important is the Lack of effective communication and 
language barriers (F12), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
(F12) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F13) 
(F12) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F14) 





3. Failure to exchange the information between pilot and ship’s master prior to 
pilotage operation (F13).  
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the failure to exchange the information 
between pilot and ship’s master (F13), compared to the other factor? 
 
 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance Sub-factor 
(F13) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F14) 
     (F13) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F15) 
 
4. Lack of situation awareness in the bridge team (F14)   
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
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The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the Poor shared situation awareness in 
the bridge team (CFA4) compared to the other factor? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance Sub-factor 
(F14) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F15) 
 
Group 2. Technical skills shortcoming (F2) 
1. Lack of ship handling skills due to lack of experience, improper training, and 
attitude (F21) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the lack of ship handling skills due to 






Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance Sub-factor 
(F21) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F22) 
F21) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F23) 
(F21) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F24) 
 
2. Lack of technical knowledge and failure to use the bridge navigation 
equipment such as (RADAR, ECDIS) (the lack of familiarity with the 
navigational systems) (F22) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the table1.2, scale of importance before 
answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the lack of familiarity with the electronic 
navigational equipment knowledge (F22), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance Sub-factor 
(F22) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F23) 





3. Lack of skills of the crewmember on ship board, tugs, and shore mooring 
personnel (F23) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the lack of skills of the crewmember on 
ship board, tugs, and shore mooring personnel (F23), compared to the other factor? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
(F23) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F24) 
 
Group 3. Instructions and orders failure (F3) 
1. Failure of pilot to give precise instructions (F31) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
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To achieve the above goal, how important is the failure of pilot to give precise 
instructions (F31), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
(F31) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F32). 
(F31) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F33) 
(F31) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F34) 
 
2. Failure of the ship’s master, and/or personnel to correctly follow the pilot 
directions (e.g. refusal, rejection, intervention by master) (F32) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the failure of the ship’s master to correctly 
follow the pilot directions (e.g. incorrect interpretations, refusal, rejection, 
intervention by master, etc.) (F32), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
 (F32). 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F33) 




3. Failure of tug’s masters   to carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely with 
respect to position and towing power (F33) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the failure of tug’s masters   to carry out 
the pilot’s instructions precisely with respect to position and towing power (F33), 
compared to the other factor? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
 (F33) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F34) 
 
Group 4. Rules and regulations noncompliance (F4) 
1. Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel (F41) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
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To achieve the above goal, how important is the failure to establish a proper 
manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel (F41), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
(F41) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F42) 
(F41) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F43) 
(F41) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F44) 
 
2. Failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in COLREG (F42) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the failure to proceed with safe speed as 
stipulated in COLREG (F42), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
 (F42) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F43) 





2. Piloting ships in bad weather condition or navigating vessels outside published 
guidelines or limits draft due to subject to commercial pressure (F43) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the Piloting ships in bad weather 
condition or navigating vessels outside published guidelines or limits draft due to 
subject to commercial pressure (F43) compared to the other factor? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
 (F43) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  (F44) 
 
Group 5. Individual- task interaction factors (F5) 
1. Fatigue (F51) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
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To achieve the above goal, how important is the Fatigue (F51), compared to the other 
factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
(F51) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F52) 
(F51) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F53) 
(F51) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F54) 
  
 
2. Mental and physical work load (F52) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the mental and physical work load 
(CFE2), compared to the other factors? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance Sub-factor 
 (F52) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (F53) 





3. Distraction during the time of berthing operations (F53) 
Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (See example1.1), and refer to the factors in table1.1, and to the scale of 
importance table1.2, before answering the questionnaire. 
The goal is to compare between them and select the most important factor that could 
have negative impact on pilotage safety and contributing to the occurrence of maritime 
accidents during pilotage operations. 
To achieve the above goal, how important is the Distraction during the time of berthing 
operations (F53), compared to the other factor? 
Sub-factor Intensity of relative importance  Sub-factor 
 (F53) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Stress (F54) 
 
      THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY 










Appendix III-2: The Questionnaire used for DEMATEL method in chapter 5 
                                        
                                                                       Liverpool John Moores University  
                                                                        School of Engineering, Technology and            
                                                                                          Maritime Operations 
                                                                                             Byrom Street 
                                                                                                 L3 3AF UK 
                                                                       
To: Whom it may concern 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to the impact of human factors on maritime pilotage operations. I will be 
most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time and take part in this study. 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and will only take a few minutes.  All 
the information that you provide in the course of your interview, completion of 
questionnaires or in general discussion will be greatly benefit and contribute to achieve 
the aim of this project. The information gathered in this survey will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
The questionnaire is anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or 
your organization. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without 
any responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate 
your willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or 
have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact me either by email or 
by phone at the addresses listed below. 
Yours faithfully, 
H. Oraith, 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations  
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Tel: + (44)7480120401 
Email: H.M.Oraith@2014.ljmu.ac.uk   
Or: hemz1966@hotmail.com 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Room 121, James Parsons Building 
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
 
1. Introduction  
Previous efforts to evaluate human error have assumed that accidents causal factors 
are independent, but reality proves otherwise. In fact, maritime accidents occurring in 
the pilotage area are caused by a combinations of risk factors and these risk factors are 
correlated to each other. Here in, the DEMATEL method is applied to assess the 
relationships among the causal factors and assess the cause–effect relations and the 
degrees of influence.  This survey aims to evaluate the relationships among the causal 
factors of the pilotage accidents. There will be an example at the beginning of the 
questionnaire showing how the questionnaire must be filled. The procedures and 
guidelines for answering this set of questionnaires are explained as follows: 
 
2. Pair-wise comparison 
The questionnaire is:  Pair-wise comparison among the accident causal factors shown 
in table 1, which are, F1: (F11, F12, F13, CF14, and F15), F2: (F21, F22, F23, and 
F24), F3: (F31, F32, F33, and F34), F4: (F41, F42, F43, and F44), and F5: (F51, F52, 






Table 1: The list of causal factors contributing to maritime accidents in pilotage 
operations 
causal factors contributing to maritime accidents  
 
Lack of team work  (F11) 
Lack of effective communication and Language problems (F12) 
Failure to exchange the information between pilot and ship’s master (F13) 
Lack of situation  awareness (F14) 
The master’s and pilot’s ineffective monitoring of the  tugboats drivers, mooring boats, and shore mooring 
personnel performance and vessel’s progress (F15) 
Lack of ship handling skills due to  lack of experience, improper training, and attitude (F21) 
Lack of technical knowledge and failure to use the bridge navigation equipment (F22) 
Lack of skills of the crewmember onboard ship, tugs, and shore mooring personnel (F23) 
Improper/ inadequate use of tugs (F24)  
Failure of pilot to give precise instructions (F31) 
Failure of the ship’s master to correctly follow the pilot directions (F32). 
Failure of  tug’s masters   to carry out the pilot’s instructions precisely with respect to position and towing 
power (F33) 
Orders regarding anchoring,  steering, and engine requests, are not following out by ship’s crewmembers 
correctly(F34) 
Failure to establish a proper manoeuvring plan prior to piloting vessel (F41). 
Failure to proceed with safe speed as stipulated in COLREG (F42) 
Piloting ships in bad weather condition or navigating vessels outside published guidelines or limits draft 
due to subject to commercial pressure (F43) 
Pilot boarding and disembarking too close to breakwater  (F44) 
Fatigue (F51) 
Mental and physical work load (F52) 
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Distraction and simultaneous tasks during the time of berthing operations  (F53) 
Stress (F54) 
 
3. Description on how to fill up the Questionnaire  
Before proceeding with the “Pair-wise Comparisons” technique, an expert has to 
understand the ratio scale measurement used in this study. Table 2 below describes the 
numerical assessment together with the linguistic meaning of each number. It is used 
for evaluating the influence level between the factors.  
The expert is required to give a possible judgment and to evaluate the influence level 
among the factor based on his/her expertise and experience. The expert will be asked 
to score the level of the influence with ‘‘no influence (0),’’or ‘‘low influence (1),’’ 
‘‘medium influence (2),’’ ‘‘high influence (3),’’ and ‘‘very high influence (4),’’ 
respectively.  
The evaluation scale of the relationships between factors ranges from 0 to 4 as show 
in the table below. 
                        Table 2 Evaluation scale  
                     
 
Example - The following shows how to evaluate the relationships and the 
interdependency among the factors and how to fill the blanks of the evaluation forms 
for the accidents contributing factors. 
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Please answer the following questions based on pairwise comparisons, based on your 
experience, and judging the rate of influence of the factors by using the scale shown 
in Table 2 to estimate to what extent each left-side factor affects the opposite factor. 
For instances, among the two factors, if you think that, lack of effective 
communication and language problems has high influence on the lack of exchange the 
information between pilot and ship’s master and might play role in the occurrence of 
maritime accidents during pilotage operations, your evaluation scale is “3” so that you 
should underline “X” on the evaluation form as shown in the example below.  
Sample Form: 
                                                                          Pairwise comparisons 
                           Factors    Degree of   
   Influencing 
                            Sub-Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
language problems and lack of effective 
communication (F12)                                            
 
 
  X  Failure to exchange the information between pilot 
and ship’s master (F13)                                                                      
 
However, if you believe that the language problems and lack of effective 
communication has no influence on the exchange the information between pilot and 
ship’s master in contributing to the occurrence of maritime accidents during pilotage 
operations your evaluation scale is “0” so that you should underline “X” on the 
evaluation form as shown in the example below.  
 
                                                                          Pairwise comparisons 
                        Main factors    Degree of   
   Influencing 
                              Sub-factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
Lack of team work  (F11)  
X 
    Lack of ship handling skills due to  lack of 
experience, improper training, and attitude (F21) 
 
Pairwise comparison to evaluate the rate of influence among the factors 
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Could you please fill the questionnaire/ table here under by underlining the appropriate 
number (see examples above), and refer to the table1 and scale in Table2, before 
answering the questionnaire. 
The following questions based on pairwise comparisons, could you please, based on 
your experience, use the 5-scale to estimate to what extent each left-side factor affect 
the opposite factor; where: 
0- No Influence, 1- Very Low Influence, 2- Low Influence, 3- High Influence, 4-Very 
High Influence  
                  Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
 Factors      Degree of   
   influencing 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F11)      (F12) 
(F11)      (F13) 
(F11)      (F14) 
(F11)      (F15) 
(F11)      (F21) 
(F11)      (F22) 
(F11)      (F23) 
(F11)      (F24) 
(F11)      (F31) 
(F11)      (F32). 
(F11)      (F33) 
(F11)      (F34) 
(F11)      (F41). 
(F11)      (F42) 
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(F11)      (F43) 
(F11)      (F44) 
(F11)      (F51) 
(F11)      (F52) 
(F11)      (F53) 





Pairwise comparisons between factors  




0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F12)      (F11) 
(F12)      (F13) 
(F12)      (F14) 
(F12)      (F15) 
(F12)      (F21) 
(F12)      (F22) 
(F12)      (F23) 
(F12)      (F24) 
(F12)      (F31) 
(F12)      (F32). 
(F12)      (F33) 
(F12)      (F34) 
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(F12)      (F41). 
(F12)      (F42) 
(F12)      (F43) 
(F12)      (F44) 
(F12)      (F51) 
(F12)      (F52) 
(F12)      (F53) 
(F12)      (F54) 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
   Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F13)      (F11) 
(F13)      (F12) 
(F13)      (F14) 
(F13)      (F15) 
(F13)      (F21) 
(F13)      (F22) 
(F13)      (F23) 
(F13)      (F24) 
(F13)      (F31) 
(F13)      (F32). 
(F13)      (F33) 
(F13)      (F34) 
(F13)      (F41). 
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(F13)      (F42) 
(F13)      (F43) 
(F13)      (F44) 
(F13)      (F51) 
(F13)      (F52) 
(F13)      (F53) 
(F13)      (F54) 
 
 
         Pairwise comparisons between factors  
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F14)      (F11) 
(F14)      (F12) 
(F14)      (F13) 
(F14)      (F15) 
(F14)      (F21) 
(F14)      (F22) 
(F14)      (F23) 
(F14)      (F24) 
(F14)      (F31) 
(F14)      (F32). 
. (F14)      (F33) 
(F14)      (F34) 
(F14)      (F41). 
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(F14)      (F42) 
(F14)      (F43) 
(F14)      (F44) 
(F14)      (F51) 
(F14)      (F52) 
(F14)      (F53) 
(F14)      (F54) 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F15)      (F11) 
(F15)      (F12) 
(F15)      (F13) 
(F15)      (F14) 
(F15)      (F21) 
(F15)      (F22) 
(F15)      (F23) 
(F15)      (F24) 
(F15)      (F31) 
(F15)      (F32). 
(F15)      (F33) 
(F15)      (F34) 
(F15)      (F41). 
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(F15)      (F42) 
(F15)      (F43) 
(F15)      (F44) 
(F15)      (F51) 
(F15)      (F52) 
(F15)      (F53) 








Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F21)      (F11) 
(F21)      (F12) 
(F21)      (F13) 
(F21)      (F14) 
(F21)      (F21) 
(F21)      (F22) 
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(F21)      (F23) 
(F21)      (F24) 
(F21)      (F31) 
(F15)      (F32). 
(F21)      (F33) 
(F21)      (F34) 
(F21)      (F41). 
(F21)      (F42) 
(F21)      (F43) 
(F21)      (F44) 
(F21)      (F51) 
(F21)      (F52) 
(F21)      (F53) 
(F21)      (F54) 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F22)      (F11) 
(F22)      (F12) 
(F22)      (F13) 
(F22)      (F14) 
(F22)      (F21) 
(F22)      (F22) 
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(F22)      (F23) 
(F22)      (F24) 
(F22)      (F31) 
(F22)      (F32). 
(F22)      (F33) 
(F22)      (F34) 
(F22)      (F41). 
(F22)      (F42) 
(F22)      (F43) 
(F22)      (F44) 
(F22)      (F51) 
(F22)      (F52) 
(F22)      (F53) 
(F22)      (F54) 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F23)      (F11) 
(F23)      (F12) 
(F23)      (F13) 
(F23)      (F14) 
(F23)      (F21) 
(F23)      (F22) 
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(F23)      (F23) 
(F23)      (F24) 
(F23)      (F31) 
(F13)      (F32). 
(F23)      (F33) 
(F23)      (F34) 
(F23)      (F41). 
(F23)      (F42) 
(F23)      (F43) 
(F23)      (F44) 
(F23)      (F51) 
(F23)      (F52) 
(F23)      (F53) 
(F23)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F24)      (F11) 
(F24)      (F12) 
(F24)      (F13) 
(F24)      (F14) 
(F24)      (F21) 
(F24)      (F22) 
(F24)      (F23) 
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(F24)      (F24) 
(F24)      (F31) 
(F24)      (F32). 
(F24)      (F33) 
(F24)      (F34) 
(F24)      (F41). 
(F24)      (F42) 
(F24)      (F43) 
(F24)      (F44) 
(F24)      (F51) 
(F24)      (F52) 
(F24)      (F53) 
(F24)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F31)      (F11) 
(F31)      (F12) 
(F31)      (F13) 
(F31)      (F14) 
(F31)      (F21) 
(F31)      (F22) 
(F31)      (F23) 
(F31)      (F24) 
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(F31)      (F31) 
(F31)      (F32). 
(F31)      (F33) 
(F31)      (F34) 
(F31)      (F41). 
(F31)      (F42) 
(F31)      (F43) 
(F31)      (F44) 
(F31)      (F51) 
(F31)      (F52) 
(F31)      (F53) 
(F31)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F32)      (F11) 
(F32)      (F12) 
(F32)      (F13) 
(F32)      (F14) 
(F32)      (F21) 
(F32)      (F22) 
(F32)      (F23) 
(F32)      (F24) 
(F32)      (F31) 
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(F32)      (F32). 
(F32)      (F33) 
(F32)      (F34) 
(F32)      (F41). 
(F32)      (F42) 
(F32)      (F43) 
(F32)      (F44) 
(F32)      (F51) 
(F32)      (F52) 
(F32)      (F53) 
(F32)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F33)      (F11) 
(F33)      (F12) 
(F33)      (F13) 
(F33)      (F14) 
(F33)      (F21) 
(F33)      (F22) 
(F33)      (F23) 
(F33)      (F24) 
(F33)      (F31) 
(F33)      (F32). 
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(F33)      (F33) 
(F33)      (F34) 
(F33)      (F41). 
(F33)      (F42) 
(F33)      (F43) 
(F33)      (F44) 
(F33)      (F51) 
(F33)      (F52) 
(F33)      (F53) 
(F33)      (F54) 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F34)      (F11) 
(F34)      (F12) 
(F34)      (F13) 
(F34)      (F14) 
(F34)      (F21) 
(F34)      (F22) 
(F34)      (F23) 
(F34)      (F24) 
(F34)      (F31) 
(F34)      (F32). 
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(F34)      (F33) 
(F34)      (F34) 
(F34)      (F41). 
(F34)      (F42) 
(F34)      (F43) 
(F34)      (F44) 
(F34)      (F51) 
(F34)      (F52) 
(F34)      (F53) 
(F34)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F41)      (F11) 
(F41)      (F12) 
(F41)      (F13) 
(F41)      (F14) 
(F41)      (F21) 
(F41)      (F22) 
(F41)      (F23) 
(F41)      (F24) 
(F41)      (F31) 
(F41)      (F32). 
(F41)      (F33) 
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(F41)      (F34) 
(F41)      (F41). 
(F41)      (F42) 
(F41)      (F43) 
(F41)      (F44) 
(F41)      (F51) 
(F41)      (F52) 
(F41)      (F53) 
(F41)      (F54) 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F42)      (F11) 
(F42)      (F12) 
(F42)      (F13) 
(F42)      (F14) 
(F42)      (F21) 
(F42)      (F22) 
(F42)      (F23) 
(F42)      (F24) 
(F42)      (F31) 
(F42)      (F32). 
(F42)      (F33) 
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(F42)      (F34) 
(F42)      (F41). 
(F42)      (F42) 
(F42)      (F43) 
(F42)      (F44) 
(F42)      (F51) 
(F42)      (F52) 
(F42)      (F53) 





Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F43)      (F11) 
(F43)      (F12) 
(F43)      (F13) 
(F43)      (F14) 
(F43)      (F21) 
(F43)      (F22) 
(F43)      (F23) 
(F43)      (F24) 
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(F43)      (F31) 
(F43)      (F32). 
(F43)      (F33) 
(F43)      (F34) 
(F43)      (F41). 
(F43)      (F42) 
(F43)      (F43) 
(F43)      (F44) 
(F43)      (F51) 
(F43)      (F52) 
(F43)      (F53) 
(F43)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F44)      (F11) 
(F44)      (F12) 
(F44)      (F13) 
(F44)      (F14) 
(F44)      (F21) 
(F44)      (F22) 
(F44)      (F23) 
(F44)      (F24) 
(F44)      (F31) 
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(F44)      (F32). 
(F44)      (F33) 
(F44)      (F34) 
(F44)      (F41). 
(F44)      (F42) 
(F44)      (F43) 
(F44)      (F44) 
(F44)      (F51) 
(F44)      (F52) 
(F44)      (F53) 







Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F51)      (F11) 
(F51)      (F12) 
(F51)      (F13) 
(F51)      (F14) 
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(F51)      (F21) 
(F51)      (F22) 
(F51)      (F23) 
(F51)      (F24) 
(F51)      (F31) 
(F51)      (F32). 
(F51)      (F33) 
(F51)      (F34) 
(F51)      (F41). 
(F51)      (F42) 
(F51)      (F43) 
(F51)      (F44) 
(F51)      (F51) 
(F51)      (F52) 
(F51)      (F53) 
(F51)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F52)      (F11) 
(F52)      (F12) 
(F52)      (F13) 
(F52)      (F14) 
(F52)      (F21) 
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(F52)      (F22) 
(F52)      (F23) 
(F52)      (F24) 
(F52)      (F31) 
(F52)      (F32). 
(F52)      (F33) 
(F52)      (F34) 
(F52)      (F41). 
(F52)      (F42) 
(F52)      (F43) 
(F52)      (F44) 
(F52)      (F51) 
(F52)      (F52) 
(F52)      (F53) 





Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F53)      (F11) 
(F53)      (F12) 
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(F53)      (F13) 
(F53)      (F14) 
(F53)      (F21) 
(F53)      (F22) 
(F53)      (F23) 
(F53)      (F24) 
(F53)      (F31) 
(F53)      (F32). 
(F53)      (F33) 
(F53)      (F34) 
(F53)      (F41). 
(F53)      (F42) 
(F53)      (F43) 
(F53)      (F44) 
(F53)      (F51) 
(F53)      (F52) 
(F53)      (F53) 
(F53)      (F54) 
 
Pairwise comparisons between factors 
 
Factors      Degree of   
   Influencing 
 
Factors 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
(F54)      (F11) 
(F54)      (F12) 
(F54)      (F13) 
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(F54)      (F14) 
(F54)      (F21) 
(F54)      (F22) 
(F54)      (F23) 
(F54)      (F24) 
(F54)      (F31) 
(F54)      (F32). 
(F54)      (F33) 
(F54)      (F34) 
(F54)      (F41). 
(F54)      (F42) 
(F54)      (F43) 
(F54)      (F44) 
(F54)      (F51) 
(F54)      (F52) 
(F54)      (F53) 
(F54)      (F54) 
 
Q.1 please write your company name? 
Q.2 please indicate your rank? 
Q. 3 How much time have you spent at sea?   Please can you outline a bit of your 
background? 






Appendix IIII-1: The Questionnaire used for identifying risk mitigation 




                                        
                                                                       Liverpool John Moores University  
                                                                        School of Engineering, Technology and            
                                                                                          Maritime Operations 
                                                                                             Byrom Street 
                                                                                                 L3 3AF UK 
 
To: Whom it may concern 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to the impact of human factors on maritime pilotage operations. I will be 
most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time and take part in this study. 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and will only take a few minutes.  All 
the information that you provide in the course of your interview, completion of 
questionnaires or in general discussion will be greatly benefit and contribute to achieve 
the aim of this project. The information gathered in this survey will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
The questionnaire is anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or 
your organization. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without 
any responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate 
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your willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or 
have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact me either by email or 
by phone at the addresses listed below. 
Yours faithfully, 
H. Oraith, 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations  
Tel: + (44)7480120401 
Email: H.M.Oraith@2014.ljmu.ac.uk   
Or: hemz1966@hotmail.com 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Room 121, James Parsons Building 
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
 
Section A: Introduction 
This research proposed a novel risk assessment methodology for identifying, 
evaluating and mitigating the risk factors that contribute to maritime pilotage 
accidents. Based on the findings from the previous survey, the following risk factors 
shown in the below table (table 2) have been weighted by the experts as the most 
significant contributory factors leading to pilotage accidents.  
We further need to determine the relevant risk mitigation measures for each causal 
factor.  
Section B: Example 
 For your opinion as an expert, please kindly give your comments and identify the 
optimal measure and best solutions for mitigating the risk factors shown in the below 





Table.1 Example for selection of mitigation measures (RMMs) for reducing the risk 
of lack of communication and language barriers. 
S/N                            
The most contributory factors to maritime pilotage accidents 
(HCFs) 
 
Risk mitigation measures (RMMs)? 
RF1 Lack of  communication and language barriers (1) Improving the pilotage operators’ 
English language skills. 
(2) A standard marine vocabulary 
should be used during the 
manoeuvring. 
(3) Providing an adequate and a high 
standard of theoretical and practical 
training courses with regular renewal 




Section B: Questionnaire 
 For your opinion as an expert, please kindly give your comments and identify the 
optimal measure and best solutions for mitigating the following risk factors shown in 








Table.2 Selection of risk mitigation measures (RMMs) for reducing maritime pilotage 
related accidents 
S/N The most contributory factors to 
maritime pilotage accidents (HCFs) 
Risk mitigation measures (RMMs)? 












RF3 Failure to exchange the information 






RF4 Lack of bridge navigation equipment 
knowledge and failure to use the 
electronic navigational systems properly 


























Lack of skills of the crewmember on 
ship board, tugboat crews, and shore 























RF11 Failure of pilot and ship’s master to 
establish a proper passage and berthing 










Q. Please indicate your profession and rank?  
Q. Please can you outline a bit of your working experience background (time period 
you have spent at sea or as pilot so far)?        
 
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your help. 
 
     Appendix IIII: 2 The Questionnaire used for TOPSIS method in chapter 6 
 
 
                                                      Liverpool John Moores University  
                                                                        School of Engineering, Technology and            
                                                                                          Maritime Operations 
                                                                                             Byrom Street 
                                                                                                 L3 3AF UK 
 
To: Whom it may concern 
A research project at Liverpool John Moores University is currently being carried out 
with regard to the impact of human factors on maritime pilotage operations. I will be 
most grateful if you could kindly spend your valuable time and take part in this study. 
Your participation in this survey is voluntary and will only take a few minutes.  All 
the information that you provide in the course of your interview, completion of 
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questionnaires or in general discussion will be greatly benefit and contribute to achieve 
the aim of this project. The information gathered in this survey will be treated in the 
strictest confidence. 
The questionnaire is anonymous, thus your response can not be attributed to you or 
your organization. Any refusal or incomplete questionnaire will be excluded without 
any responsibility on the participant. Completion of the questionnaire will indicate 
your willingness to participate in this study. If you require additional information or 
have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact me either by email or 
by phone at the addresses listed below. 
Yours faithfully, 
H. Oraith, 
PhD researcher, School of Engineering, Technology and Maritime Operations  
Tel: + (44)7480120401 
Email: H.M.Oraith@2014.ljmu.ac.uk   
Or: hemz1966@hotmail.com 
Liverpool Logistics Offshore and Marine Research Institute (LOOM) 
Room 121, James Parsons Building 




Section A: Introduction and Explanation 
This research proposed a novel risk assessment methodology for identifying, 
evaluating and mitigating the risk factors that contribute to maritime pilotage 
accidents. Based on the findings from the previous survey, the following risk factors 
shown in the below table (table 1) have been weighted by the experts as the most 
significant contributory factors leading to pilotage accidents. We further need to 
determine which relevant risk mitigation measures for each causal factor has become 




                 
 
  Table.1 the most contributory factors to maritime pilotage accidents (HCFs) 
S/N Contributory factors to maritime pilotage accidents (Criteria) 
RF1 Lack of ship handling skills. 
RF2 Lack of communication and language barriers. 
RF3 Failure to exchange the information between pilot and ship’s master prior 
to pilotage operation 
RF4 Lack of bridge navigation equipment knowledge and failure to use the 
electronic navigational systems properly (Lack of familiarity with the 
navigational systems) 
RF5 Lack of team work 
RF6  Lack of situation awareness 
RF7 Fatigue as result of mental and physical work load 
RF8 
 
Lack of skills of the crewmember on ship board, tugboat crews, and shore 
mooring personnel (linesmen) 
RF9 Improper/ inadequate use of tugs 
RF10 Failure of pilot to give precise or correct instructions 
RF11 Failure of pilot and ship’s master to establish a proper passage and berthing 







SECTION B: EXPLANATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
Questionnaire for selection of the best measures (Risk mitigation measures) (RMMs) 
for eliminating and/or mitigating the identified risk factors affecting the safety of 
pilotage operations is developed. The purpose of this questionnaire is to select the 
optimal measures and ideal solutions for mitigating the 11 risk factors illustrated in 
the table (table 1). 
 
The following 21risk mitigation measures (RMMs) for reducing maritime pilotage 
related accidents have been determined in this research. All these risk mitigation 
measures are shown in the below tables (table 2), and need to be evaluated by using 
TOPSIS technique. This process is required to provide reliable data by identifying an 
expert opinion of each evaluation parameter.  
       Table for Risk mitigation measures (RMMs) for improving pilotage safety 
performance 
S/N                                       Risk mitigation measures (RMMs) 
A1 Pilots should have an appropriate experience as a ship master before becoming a pilot.  
A2 Implement safety management system (SMS) for pilotage operations 
A3 Providing an adequate and a high standard of theoretical and practical training courses with 
regular renewal training including ship handling, bridge simulator training, bridge resource 
management (BRM), ECDIS, and NAEST generic training courses.  
A4 Using common communication language on board. 
A5 Improving the pilotage operators’ English language skills. 
A6 Ship’s staff, pilot, and assisting parties should maintain an effective communication, 
corporation, an effective co-ordination, and an effective exchange of information.  
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A7 A standard marine vocabulary should be used during the maneuvering.  
A8 Compliance with resolution A.893 (21) on Guidelines for voyage planning.  
A9 An effective working environment and Close working relationship on the bridge of a ship 
between pilot and ship’s captain should be created.  
A10 Provide an adequate number of qualified, experienced, and well trained ship’s crew 
members, pilots and tugs operators working on shift (adherence to MLC rest hour maritime 
regulations) 
A11 Tasks and responsibilities should be understood and distributed properly among the bridge 
team members.   
A12  Providing training courses in safety and cultural awareness 
A13 Keeping high level of alertness and avoid distractions elements 
A14 All pilotage performers should be in good physical and mental fitness and not under the 
effect of drugs or alcohol 
A15 Implement  standard operating procedures (SOP’s)  for ship board operations 
A16 Pilot boarding point should be at a sufficient distance from the commencement of the act 
of pilotage.  
A17 During pilotage operations distractions elements should be avoided. 
A18 Not to squeeze pilots or ship's captains for working outside established rules or piloting 
ships in poor weather condition situations due to commercial pressure.  
A19 Maintaining continuous watchkeeping and keeping a high level of alertness (the 
surrounding area, tug’s, and piloted ship’s performance and progress should be monitored 
effectively and continuously to be aware of the whole situation properly). 
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A20 Provide sufficient and the required number of powerful tugboats which are necessary for 
all kind of ships manoeuvers. 
A21 Compliance with the principals and the requirements of IMO resolution A960  
 
The procedures and guidelines for answering this set of questionnaires are 
explained as follows:  
The linguistic meaning of the measurement scale 
To proceed with the evaluating, an expert has to understand the ratio scale 
measurement used in this study. Table 3 below describe the numerical assessment 
together with the linguistic meaning of each rating variable. The grades illustrated in 
Table 3 show the effect or importance value of the mitigation or control options. It is 
used for evaluating and rating of the measures (alternatives) for mitigating the risk 
factors shown in table1. 
         
                      Table 3: Evaluation scale for the alternatives rating 
Linguistic  variables Very low Low Medium High Very high 
Grade 1 2 3 4 5 
 
                
Example of answered questionnaire 
With respect to manage “Lack of ship handling skills”, please evaluate how effective 
each risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction. What would be the risk 





Table.4 Measures for mitigating the risks due to the lack of ship handling skills 
    
 Explanation of the above example 
An expert is required to give a possible judgement to all questions based on his/her 
expertise and experience in pilotage operation. In the above example, the goal is to 
evaluate how effective each risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction. The 
description of the qualitative judgement "very Low", "Low", "Medium", "High" and 
"very high" is explained above. 
Firstly an expert is required to look at the mitigation measures. Subsequently fill the 
empty spaces by selecting the appropriate grades from Table 3 the evaluation scale 
used for rating of the best measures (alternatives) for mitigating the risk factors 
 Pilots should have an appropriate experience as a ship master before becoming a pilot 
(A1). 
Answer: Very High - Grade (5) 
 Improving skills and knowledge by providing theoretical and practical of advanced 
ship-handling training courses under close supervision of an experienced pilots (A2). 
         














Employ qualified, experienced, and well trained personnel 
(A1) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ 
Improving skills and knowledge by Providing theoretical 
and practical of advanced  ship-handling training courses 
under close supervision of an experienced pilots (A2) 
☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐ 
The level and quality of training for certification or licensing 
should be adequate and higher standard (A3) 
☐ ☐ ☒ ☒ ☐ 
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Answer: Low - Grade (2) 
The level and quality of training for certification or licensing should be adequate and 
higher standard (A3) 
Answer: Medium- Grade (3) 
 
SECTION C: QUESTIONNAIRS 
 For your opinion as an expert, please kindly give your comments and select the 
optimal (best solutions) for mitigating the following risk factors. 
Q1. With respect to manage “Lack of ship handling skills”, please evaluate how 
effective each risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction. What would be the 
risk reduction if you decide to apply the following risk mitigation measures? 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 





Q2. With respect to manage “Lack of effective communication and 
misunderstanding due to language barriers”, please  refer to the risk mitigation 
measures  in table1.2 and evaluate how effective each risk control measure is in terms 
of risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if you decide to apply the 
following alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 





Q3. With respect to manage “Failure to exchange the information between pilot 
and ship’s master prior to pilotage operation.” please refer to risk mitigation 
measures in table 2 and evaluate how effective each risk control measure is in terms 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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of risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if you decide to apply the 



















A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




Q4. With respect to manage “Lack of bridge navigation equipment knowledge and 
failure to use the electronic navigational systems properly.”  please refer to risk 
mitigation measures in table 2 and evaluate how effective each risk control measure is 
in terms of risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if you decide to apply the 
following alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




Q5. With respect to manage “Lack of team work.” please evaluate how effective 
each risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction? What would be the risk 
reduction if you decide to apply the following alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 





Q6. With respect to manage “Lack of situation awareness.” please evaluate how 
effective each risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction? What would be the 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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risk reduction if you decide to apply the following alternatives or risk mitigation 
measures? 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




Q7. With respect to manage “Fatigue” please evaluate how effective each risk control 
measure is in terms of risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if you decide 
to apply the following alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 





Q8. With respect to manage “Lack of skills of the crewmember on ship board, 
tugboat crews, and shore mooring personnel”, please evaluate how effective each 
risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if 
you decide to apply the following alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




Q9. With respect to manage “Improper/ inadequate use of tugs”, please evaluate 
how effective each risk control measure is in terms of risk reduction? What would be 






A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 

















A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 





Q10. With respect to manage ““Failure of pilot to give correct and precise 
instructions”, please evaluate how effective each risk control measure is in terms of 
risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if you decide to apply the following 
alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
 
 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A4 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




Q11. With respect to manage Failure to establish a proper passage and berthing 
plan prior to piloting vessel”, please evaluate how effective each risk control 
measure is in terms of risk reduction? What would be the risk reduction if you decide 
to apply the following alternatives or risk mitigation measures? 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 













A1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ 
A2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A3 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




Q. Please indicate your profession and rank?  
Q. Please can you outline a bit of your working experience background (time period 
you have spent at sea or as pilot so far)?        
   
   THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR YOUR KIND PARTICIPATION IN THIS SURVEY 
A5 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A6 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A7 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A8 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A9 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A10 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A11 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A12 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A13 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A14 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A15 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A16 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A17 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A18 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A19 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A20 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
A21 ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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